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Abstract 
The Embodied Cognition Theory (ECT) has become a hot topic in Cognitive Science, providing the 
investigation of cognitive phenomena with food for thought through a wide range of empirical 
findings. Two core claims from ECT were investigated in the present study: 1) the non-neural parts of 
an organism’s body play a constraining role in cognition; and 2) all concepts (strong embodiment) or 
some concepts (weak embodiment) are grounded in modality-specific areas of the brain. In line with 
2), studies on mental imagery of bodily-related movements (henceforth: motor imagery) suggest that 
we use motor concepts grounded in modality-specific areas of the brain (the motor cortices) when we 
carry out motor simulations of our own body (Jeannerod, 2006), including in cognitive tasks such as 
MR of bodily-related pictures (Parsons et al., 1995). Also, studies in music perception have correlated 
the cortical activation of motor areas of the brain with rhythmic perception, varying in degree of 
activation according to the rhythmic complexity of a stimulus (Grahn & Brett, 2007). Finally, these 
assumptions predict the Mozart Effect, which consists of subjects’ temporary enhancement in 
performance at spatial-temporal reasoning tasks, including MR tasks (Rauscher, Shaw & Ky, 1993).      
Based on these assumptions, it was investigated whether subjects’ (N= 36) performance at a MR of 
bodily-related pictures would differ after exposure to musical pieces with different levels of rhythmic 
complexity and a control condition (silence). Results show that, although subjects’ performance was 
affected by the biomechanical constraints of their own bodies, suggesting that the body biomechanics 
play a constraining role in cognition, the Mozart Effect was not observed, suggesting that either 1) 
weak conceptual embodiment may not be true for motor imagery, and motor concepts are not 
grounded in modality-specific brain areas, 2) the musical samples used in the present study were not 
adequate to elicit sufficient cortical activation that would eventually result in performance 
enhancement, or 3) the Mozart Effect is due to reasons other than cortical activation of modality-
specific brain areas, such as increase in arousal/mood levels or an artefact of subjects’ preference for a 
stimulus (Chabris, 1999). 
It is suggested that future research employs brain-mapping techniques, such as Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET Scan), Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), or Electroencephalogram 
(EEG) to strengthen one or more hypotheses that account for the failure in observing the Mozart Effect 
in this study by identifying which brain areas were involved during the listening task and/or the MR of 
bodily-related pictures. 
 
Keywords: Embodied Cognition Theory, conceptual embodiment, motor imagery, rhythmic 
perception, Mozart Effect       
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Resumo 
A Teoria da Cognição Corporificada (ECT) tem se tornado um tópico amplamente discutido nas 
Ciências Cognitivas, uma vez que uma ampla gama de descobertas empíricas tem provocado reflexões 
a respeito da cognição. Duas fortes suposições da ECT foram investigadas no presente estudo: 1) as 
partes não neurais do corpo de um organismo possuem um forte papel de limitação sobre a sua 
cognição; e 2) todos os conceitos (corporificação forte) ou alguns conceitos (corporificação fraca) 
estão ancorados em regiões cerebrais de modalidade específica. Alinhado à 2), estudos em imaginação 
motora sugerem que nós utilizamos conceitos motores ancorados em regiões cerebrais de modalidade 
específica (córtices motores), para realizarmos a simulação de atos motores (Jeannerod, 2006), 
incluindo tarefas como rotação mental de imagens corporais (Parsons et al., 1995). Mais, estudos em 
percepção musical correlacionam a ativação de córtices motores com a percepção de estruturas 
rítmicas da música, variando em nível de ativação de acordo com o grau de complexidade rítmica do 
estímulo (Grahn & Brett, 2007). Essas assunções predizem o Efeito Mozart, que consiste na melhoria 
temporária no desempenho de sujeitos em tarefas de raciocínio espaço-temporal, incluindo tarefas de 
rotação mental (Rauscher, Shaw & Ky, 1993). 
Baseado nestas assunções, este estudo investigou se o desempenho de sujeitos (N = 36) em tarefas de 
rotação mental de imagens corporais teria alguma alteração após a escuta de peças musicais com 
diferentes níveis de complexidade rítmica e silêncio como condição controle. Os resultados 
demonstram que, apesar dos desempenhos dos sujeitos terem sido afetados pelas restrições 
biomecânicas dos seus corpos, sugerindo que a biomecânica corporal possui um papel limitador na 
cognição, o Efeito Mozart não foi observado, sugerindo que 1) a corporificação conceitual fraca pode 
não ser verdadeira para imaginação motora, e conceitos motores não estão ancorados em regiões 
cerebrais de modalidade-específica, 2)  as amostras musicais utilizadas no presente estudo não foram 
adequadas para evocar ativação cortical o suficiente que resultasse em uma melhoria na performance 
na tarefa, ou 3) o Efeito Mozart se dá por razões distintas à ativação cortical de regiões cerebrais de 
modalidade-específica, como acréscimo em níveis de ativação e de humor ou por ser artefato da 
predileção por um estímulo (Chabris, 1999). 
É, por fim, sugerido que pesquisas futuras empreguem técnicas de mapeamento cerebral, como 
Tomografia por Emissão de Pósitrons (PET Scan), Ressonância Magnética Funcional (fMRI), ou 
Eletroencefalograma (EEG), fortalecendo uma ou mais hipóteses que visam explicar a falha ao 
observar-se o Efeito Mozart neste estudo, identificando quais áreas cerebrais foram ativadas durante a 
exposição aos estímulos e/ou durante a realização da tarefa de rotação mental.  
 
Palavras-chave: Teoria da Cognição Corporificada, corporificação conceitual, imaginação motora, 
percepção rítmica, Efeito Mozart      
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Resumo alargado 
Após a revolução cognitiva, modelos de processamento de informação vieram a dominar teorias a 
respeito de como funciona a cognição humana (Gallistel, 2001). Em especial, a Teoria Clássica de 
Computação da Mente (CCTM) propõe que cognição, em sua essência, é computação sobre 
representações mentais através da manipulação de símbolos atômicos em virtude de propriedades 
sintáticas e valores semânticos que representam o mundo (Fodor, 1975). A CCTM também propõe 
que, haja vista que a mente humana opera através de computação, diversos sistemas como um robô 
humano, chips de silicone, um cérebro numa incubadora, etc., possam realizar computações sobre 
representações mentais (Fodor, 1981).  
Ao longo das últimas décadas, entretanto, diversas investigações empíricas se debruçaram sobre a 
hipótese de que aspectos não neurais do corpo de um organismo podem ter um papel causal em tua 
cognição ou até mesmo constituir o processo cognitivo do agente. De acordo, a Teoria da Cognição 
Corporificada (ECT) diverge da CCTM no que diz respeito à dependência da cognição aos aspectos 
não neurais do corpo humano e também no que respeita à natureza das representações mentais: 
enquanto a CCTM propõe que a cognição é computação sobre representações mentais através de 
manipulação de símbolos abstratos, amodais e arbitrários, que não fazem referências às suas 
propriedades físicas, a ECT propõe que a representação simbólica não é amodal, ou seja, as 
representações simbólicas são perceptuais, estando ancoradas em sistemas de modalidade-específica 
do cérebro (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krath-Grauber & Ric, 2005).  
Logo, essas duas fortes suposições que emanam de descobertas empíricas da ECT foram investigadas 
no presente estudo, nomeadamente: 1) aspectos não neurais do corpo de um organismo possuem um 
forte papel causal de limitação sobre a cognição; e 2) alguns conceitos estão ancorados em regiões 
cerebrais de modalidade específica. No que respeita à suposição 1), podemos observar alguns 
exemplos de aspectos não neurais do corpo exercendo um papel causal de limitação na cognição, 
como o bico de um tucano e as posições mais lateralizadas de seus olhos que, por exemplo, diminuem 
o campo de visão do animal, impossibilitando-o de poder ter a experiência de enxergar em 3D (Martin 
& Osorio, 2007). No que diz respeito à suposição 2), de acordo com a ECT, conceitos são 
simulações/recriações de experiências passadas (Barsalou, 1999). Entretanto, duas teorias relacionadas 
a conceitos emanam da suposição 2), uma vez que há a teoria de que todos os conceitos são 
simulações de experiências passadas (coporificação conceitual forte) ou que alguns conceitos são 
simulações de experiências passadas, ancorados em sistemas de modalidade-específica do cérebro 
(corporificação conceitual fraca; Mahon, 2015). O presente estudo foca na corporificação conceitual 
fraca, viz. conceitos motores. 
Alinhado à suposição 2), estudos em imaginação motora sugerem que nós utilizamos conceitos 
motores ancorados em regiões cerebrais de modalidade específica (os córtices motores) para 
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realizarmos a simulação de atos motores com o nosso corpo (Jeannerod, 2006). De mesmo modo, de 
acordo com uma vasta gama de estudos que investigam a hipótese de equivalência funcional entre 
imaginação motora e execução motora, regiões sobrepostas e análogas do córtex motor estão 
implicadas quando imaginamos, planejamos e executamos uma ação motora (Jeannerod, 1994). 
Tarefas de cunho comportamental também têm sido aplicadas ao estudo da relação funcional entre 
imaginação e realização motora. Por exemplo, a tarefa de rotação mental de figuras do corpo humano 
consiste na simulação motora de nossos próprios movimentos corporais para ser realizada (Parsons et 
al., 1995). Para realizar essa tarefa, sujeitos tendem a realizar a rotação mental de uma figura do corpo 
humano, trazendo-a a uma posição que assemelhe à posição anatomicamente canônica do membro no 
corpo humano, como se estivessem a realizar uma rotação física de seus próprios corpos. Desta forma, 
imagens de membros orientados em graus de inclinação que refletem posições anatomicamente 
estranhas (por exemplo, imagens inclinadas em 180º em relação à posição canônica de 0º) tendem a ter 
um tempo de resposta (RT) maior e taxa de acerto (ACC) menor do que imagens que refletem 
posições anatomicamente normais e canônicas do membro no corpo (0º, por exemplo; Parsons, 
1987a).  
Mais, estudos sobre percepção musical correlacionam a ativação de regiões motoras do cérebro com a 
percepção de estruturas rítmicas da música, variando em nível de ativação cortical de acordo com o 
grau de complexidade de tais estruturas (Grahn & Brett, 2007). Essas estruturas rítmicas 
compreendem estruturas como a métrica simples, onde, por exemplo, o acento da batida ocorre ao 
longo de intervalos regulares (no caso de um compasso 4/4, o acento da batida sempre ocorre no início 
de cada grupo de quatro unidades de batidas), a métrica complexa, e a não métrica, em que os acentos 
das batidas ocorrem em períodos de intervalos irregulares (o acento da batida, neste caso, ocorre em 
distintos períodos, nem sempre ao início de cada grupo de cada quatro unidades de batidas). Em suma, 
a escuta de estruturas rítmicas métrica simples produz maior ativação em regiões motoras do cérebro 
do que a escuta de estruturas rítmicas métrica complexa ou não métrica (Grahn & Brett, 2007). 
O aumento no nível de ativação cortical em regiões específicas do cérebro é uma das possíveis causas 
para a melhora temporária no desempenho de sujeitos em tarefas de raciocínio espaço-temporal, 
incluindo tarefas de rotação mental, como previsto pelo Efeito Mozart (Bodner, Mutfuler, Nalcioglu & 
Shaw, 2001). Mais especificamente, após escutarem a Sonata 448K de Mozart, sujeitos obtiveram 
melhores resultados em tarefas de raciocínio espaço-temporal, como por exemplo, a Paper-Folding 
and Cutting (PF&C), comparadas às condições controle (relaxamento e silêncio) e outros estímulos 
musicais considerados simples (por exemplo, música repetitiva de Phillip Glass). Entretanto, diversos 
estudos não reproduziram o efeito, e diversos outros atribuem o Efeito Mozart a um artefato de 
preferência e prazer do ouvinte ou em virtude de alterações em níveis de ativação e de humor 
evocados pela escuta musical (Chabris, 1999). 
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Com base nestas assunções, o presente estudo investigou se o desempenho de sujeitos (N = 36) em 
tarefas de rotação mental de imagens corporais teria algum acréscimo após a escuta de peças musicais 
com diferentes níveis de complexidade rítmica, nomeadamente, métrica simples, métrica complexa, e 
silêncio como condição controle, replicando, assim, o Efeito Mozart. Uma peça musical intitulada 
Space Katzle, pelo DJ Motorcity Soul foi selecionada. A versão original é uma peça musical cujas 
batidas e estruturas rítmicas permanecem inalteradas ao longo de toda a sua duração, sendo 
caracterizadas como estruturas rítmicas métrica simples. Esta versão foi, então, editada manualmente, 
onde as posições das batidas foram remanejadas, com o intuito de transformar a segunda versão em 
uma peça musical com estruturas rítmicas métrica complexa de acordo com o estudo de Bouwer, 
Burgoyne, Odijk, Honing e Grahn (2018).   
Os resultados demonstram que, apesar do desempenho dos sujeitos terem sido afetados pelas restrições 
biomecânicas dos seus corpos, uma vez que os tempos de resposta aumentavam e as taxas de acerto 
diminuíam conforme o grau de inclinação da imagem aumentava, sugerindo, então, que a biomecânica 
corporal possui um papel limitador nas respostas às figuras corporais, o Efeito Mozart não foi 
observado, dado que o desempenho dos sujeitos na tarefa de rotação mental figuras relacionadas ao 
corpo humano não diferiu significativamente após sujeitos terem sido expostos aos estímulos 
auditivos. Também foi observado que os níveis de ativação psicofisiológica (arousal) diminuíram após 
sujeitos escutarem a versão métrica complexa ou permanecerem em silêncio, e os níveis de humor só 
se alteraram na dimensão vigor/atividade após sujeitos permanecerem em silêncio. Não foram 
observadas diferenças significativas nos níveis de valência entre os três estímulos, demonstrando que 
os sujeitos não demonstraram preferência por nenhum estímulo específico. 
Para se explicar a falha ao replicar o Efeito Mozart no presente estudo, uma lista de hipóteses foi 
elaborada, sugerindo tanto que 1) a corporificação conceitual fraca pode não ser verdadeira para 
imaginação motora, e conceitos motores não estão ancorados em regiões cerebrais de modalidade-
específica, 2) as amostras musicais utilizadas no presente estudo não foram adequadas para evocar 
ativação cortical o suficiente para resultar em uma melhora na performance dos sujeitos, ou 3) o Efeito 
Mozart se dá por razões distintas à ativação cortical de regiões cerebrais de modalidade-específica, 
como acréscimo em níveis de ativação e de humor em consequência da escuta musical ou por se tratar 
de um artefato da preferência e satisfação que o  estímulo auditivo causa nos sujeitos (não observados 
nos resultados). Entretanto, dada a ausência de métodos de mapeamento cerebral, como PET Scan, 
fMRI, ou EEG, a conclusão à respeito de qual destas três hipóteses é verdadeira torna-se impossível, 
uma vez que não foi possível observar quais áreas cerebrais foram ativadas durante a escuta dos 
estímulos musicais e/ou durante a tarefa de rotação mental de figuras relacionadas ao corpo humano. 
A utilização de uma destas técnicas fortaleceria uma ou mais hipóteses que visam explicar a falha em 
observar-se o Efeito Mozart no presente estudo, pois assim seriam identificadas as áreas cerebrais que 
xvi 
 
de fato foram ativadas durante a escuta dos estímulos auditivos e/ou durante a realização da tarefa 
subsequente.  
 
Palavras-chave: Teoria da Cognição Corporificada, corporificação conceitual, imaginação motora, 
percepção rítmica, Efeito Mozart 
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Introduction 
Ever since we are young, the mere thinking of doing some ordinary tasks seems to be more unpleasant 
than others. Thinking of going to an appointment with the dentist, for instance, may not cause us the 
same excitement as imagining that there will be an important tennis match tomorrow and we will score 
the match-point after a 3-hour clash with the opponent. Whereas imagining a spoon excavator poking 
our teeth in order to remove soft caries sometimes makes us wince and shiver even before we lie down 
before the procedure begins, the mental image of scoring the match-point and consequently lifting the 
Roland-Garros
1
 tournament’s trophy may result in feelings of joy, excitement and a faster heart beat as 
a physiological body response. Although these are too extreme examples that relate mental imagery to 
physiological responses from the body, one may ask why does mental imagery elicit such bodily 
responses and how do these responses take place. In general, why does imagining our bodies in 
specific situations may lead us to specific feelings and bodily-reactions? 
Apart from these physiological bodily responses that emerge when imagining an upcoming event or a 
physical action, imagining a bodily action relies on our own body features. Let’s think about lifting the 
Roland-Garros’ trophy again. Why do we usually imagine lifting the object upwards with both hands, 
and not sideways with our non-dominant hand only? Why do we usually estimate the weight and other 
attributes of the object (i.e., whether the trophy’s handle is cold or the base is made of wood)? Why do 
we ‘feel like’ that we are moving our arms or having our teeth being poked when we are thinking 
about lifting the trophy or at the dentist, respectively, even when we are not at the dentist or in front of 
a podium, waiting for the trophy? 
Although all questions raised above require different answers, by either imagining ourselves having 
our teeth being poked by a spoon excavator or lifting Roland-Garros’ trophy and feel the excitement of 
it, we typically evoke mental imagery (Kosslyn et al., 1995a). Mental imagery is defined as a quasi-
perceptual experience in which we simulate or re-create perceptual experiences across sensory 
modalities, in the absence of the appropriate external stimuli (Pearson et al., 2012; Thomas, 2019). As 
Kosslyn et al. (2001a, p. 635) point out, mental imagery occurs when perceptual information is 
accessed from memory, giving rise to experiences such as, as they describe, “seeing with the mind’s 
eye’, or “hearing with the mind’s hear”. Hence, as Kosslyn and Thompson (2000) argue, since mental 
imagery draws on mechanisms used in perception, some of the parts of the brain used in visual 
perception (i.e., seeing a picture) are used in visual imagination (visual mental imagery) (Farah, 2000; 
Kosslyn and Thompson, 2000; Behrmann, 2000); likewise, the auditory cortex is involved when we, 
for instance, remember the song from our favourite Pop-Rock band or when musicians imagine a new 
                                                          
1
 The Roland-Garros tournament, also known as the French Open, is a major tennis tournament held every year between late 
May and early June at the Stade Roland-Garros, in Paris. The tournament is regarded as being the most important tennis 
tournament played on a clay surface, and is one of the four Grand Slam tournaments held every year, along with the Australia 
Open, Wimbledon and the US Open.      
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melody when they are about to write a new song (auditory mental imagery; Zatorre and Halpern, 
2005). However, although mental imagery draws on mechanisms related to our perceptual system 
(Kosslyn et al., 1995a; Kosslyn et al., 2001a; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005), the processes underlying 
mental imagery should be distinguished from those involved in perception as such: firstly, perception, 
as Kosslyn et al. (1995a) define, is the registration of physically present input directly from our senses 
– sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste, whereas, as described above, mental imagery lacks this 
appropriate external stimulus; thus, perception does not require us to activate information in memory 
when the stimulus is not present, unlike mental imagery, in which we retrieve information from long-
term memory to create or re-create experiences in our minds (Kosslyn et al., 2001a; Cumming and 
Williams, 2013). 
Apart from relying on perceptual mechanisms, several studies have suggested that mental imagery also 
draws on mechanisms related to motor control and planning, giving rise to another category of 
imagery: motor imagery (Parsons, 1987a; Parsons, 1987b; Georgopoulos et al., 1989, Jeannerod, 1994; 
Parsons et al., 1995; Hamada et al., 2018). According to the motor imagery literature, some of the 
same parts of the brain used in the physical execution of a movement are also used when we imagine 
that we are executing a motor action (Jeannerod, 1994, 1995, 2001). Accordingly, studies that 
employed brain-mapping techniques have shown that a common network of brain motor centres, 
including areas such as, for instance, in the premotor and in the motor cortices when we carry out a 
motor action and when we imagine or plan to physically execute a motor action (Roland et al., 1980; 
Ryding et al., 1993; Parsons et al., 1995; Grafton et al., 1996; Porro et al., 1996; Gerardin et al., 2000). 
Returning to the trophy lifting example, according to the motor imagery literature, imagining oneself 
lifting a trophy consists of a simulation of the past experiences of lifting the trophy or similar objects, 
which takes into consideration the affordances we may have with the object, the biomechanical 
constraints of our body, the physical properties of the object, etc., in which brain areas activated 
during this imagery task overlaps those of motor execution (Jeannerod, 1994).   
The hypothesis that mental imagery relies on perceptual and motor mechanisms has also been 
investigated through behavioral paradigms from Cognitive Psychology. Perhaps, one of the most 
investigated cognitive tasks that involve mental imagery is a mental rotation (MR) task (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971). In order to carry out a MR task, subjects have to imagine a spatial transformation of 
one or more objects depicted on a computer screen or piece of paper at different orientations and 
degrees of inclination, and then mentally rotate the object(s) in order to match it (them) with a target 
stimulus or make a judgment about whether the objects are the same or mirror images (Hotstetter & 
Alibali, 2008). According to a wide range of studies, there is compelling evidence that some MR tasks 
relies on mechanisms involved in motor imagery, in special, when we carry out MR of of bodily-
related pictures (Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Parsons, 1987a; Parsons, 1987b; Wexler et al., 1998). 
Likewise, studies that employed brain-mapping techniques (Parsons et al., 1995; Hamada, 2018) have 
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also reported the activation of some of the same motor areas involved in motor imagery when subjects 
carried out MR of bodily-related pictures.      
The empirical findings that mental imagery relies on the same mechanisms involved in perception and 
motor actions suggest that cognitive activities, such as visual and motor imagery, are embodied 
(Barsalou, 1999). In other words, according to conceptual embodiment, one way in which cognition 
can be embodied, concepts used in mental/motor imagery tasks are deployed through simulations of 
past experiences, in which it is theorized that all concepts are deployed this way (strong embodiment) 
or some concepts are deployed this way (weak embodiment). This particular simulation of past 
experiences relies upon systems of perception, action and introspection, in which some of the same 
neural substrates involved in these systems are recruited when a physical input is not available, 
visual/motor imagery seem to be a modality-specific process, as Niedenthal et al. (2005) claim. This 
account for cognitive activities departs from previous theories of mind, such as the Classical 
Computational Theory of the Mind (CCTM; Fodor, 1983), which claims that cognition is based on the 
computation of amodal, abstract and arbitrary symbols with semantic values and syntactic properties 
in a language of thought. 
Apart from the claim that visual/motor imagery are modality-specific processes, the present study aims 
to approach the Embodied Cognition Theory (ECT) claim that the specific body we have plays a 
strong causal and constraining role in cognition. For instance, we have two eyes positioned where they 
are, which makes binocular vision possible and, therefore, allows us to have particular cognitive 
experiences (for instance, to see things in motion, to see things in depth, etc). Alternatively, if we had 
our eyes positioned elsewhere in the body (on the sides of our heads, like some birds have), it is 
possible to hypothesize that we would not have the same cognitive experience that we have due to the 
fact that our eyes are positioned where they are. We would probably experience vision differently than 
we currently do and, therefore, our visual perceptual would be different, we would perceive things in 
motion differently, we would have different patterns of eyes saccades when we read a book, our visual 
imagery of our favorite tennis player or even ourselves lifting the Roland-Garros’ trophy would 
probably be different, etc. The body as a constraint on cognition has been also observed in imagery 
tasks, since biomechanical constraints of the body seem to play strong causal role in subjects’ 
performance at tasks that supposedly rely on motor imagery (Parsons, 1987a, 1987b).   
In line with the ECT assumption that simulations of past experiences take place in modality-specific 
brain systems for perception, action and introspection (Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey & Rupert, 2003), 
in which the motor areas seem to be involved in cognitive processing of motor imagery tasks, it has 
been observed that some of these motor areas are also implicated in music perception. More 
specifically, by employing brain-mapping techniques, it was found out that some areas in the motor 
cortices are involved in the processing of musical rhythms, since these cortical areas have been 
activated while subjects were exposed to distinct musical rhythms (Zatorre, Chen & Penhune, 2007; 
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Chen, Penhune & Zatorre, 2008a). More specifically, Grahn and Brett (2007) have found out that 
perception of rhythmic stimuli is correlated with distinct patterns of activation in the motor areas, in 
which stimuli with simple rhythmic patterns (Metric Simple) elicited higher cortical activation than 
stimuli with more complex rhythmic patterns (Metric Complex). 
By taking into consideration that 1) according to conceptual embodiment, we run perceptual 
simulations in modality-specific systems of perception, action and introspection, in which some areas 
in the motor cortices of the brain are active during motor imagery tasks, and these simulations 
constitute and constrain cognitive experiences, affecting cognitive tasks, such as MR tasks of bodily-
related pictures, and 2) music increases activation in sensorimotor areas, varying in degree of 
activation according to the rhythmic patterns a subject is exposed to, an interesting question then 
emerges: does listening to music increase MR performance? 
In order to investigate the question elaborated above, the present study has been divided in four 
chapters: the first chapter is a literature review of the topics described above. The theoretical 
background chapter comprises a discussion of empirical findings that emerged from studies related to 
ECT, motor imagery and music perception. This chapter also focuses on the discussion of the mental 
imagery phenomena, describing the differences and similarities between visual imagery and motor 
imagery. Very importantly, this chapter also aims to show how MR of bodily-related pictures is linked 
with motor imagery processes through the discussion of empirical findings in the literature of this 
topic, suggesting that this specific task is accomplished through simulation of one’s own bodily 
movements. Finally, the findings of studies in the field of music perception in which activation in the 
motor areas has been found out are presented, as well as it is discussed the relationship between music 
and performance of cognitive abilities, in special, the influence of music in spatial reasoning tasks, 
namely, the Mozart Effect. The first chapter of this study, then, ends with the hypotheses raised in line 
with the findings from theoretical and empirical studies described in the chapter.  
The second chapter of the present study describes the empirical study that was carried out. Subjects 
(N=36, mean age = 21.7, Standard Deviation: 3.08) performed a MR task under control condition 
(Silence) and experimental conditions (music with simple rhythmic patterns and music with complex 
rhythmic patterns, namely, Metric Simple and Metric Complex Music, respectively). This chapter 
describes methodological features employed in the present study, such as the process of stimuli 
selection, the procedure applied in the experiment, the selection of subjects, the instruments used to 
measure the power of the independent variables over the dependent variables, the technological 
apparatus and the experimental design.  
Results are presented in the third chapter of this study. Statistical analyses are carried out and the 
results emerged are then discussed in the light of the theoretical and empirical content described in the 
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first chapter. Finally, the limitations of the present study are reported and suggestions for future 
studies are made, followed by the conclusion, in the fourth and fifth chapters, respectively.  
This study converges with distinct fields within the realm of Cognitive Science, such as Philosophy, 
Psychology and Neuroscience. The first chapter of the present study discusses the philosophical 
grounds of the ECT and the mental imagery phenomena, as well as it describes empirical studies that 
adopted behavioral paradigms from Cognitive Psychology or brain-mapping techniques from 
Cognitive Neuroscience. Having these findings as a base, the experiment adopts a behavioral 
paradigm often used in studies in Cognitive Psychology, a MR of bodily-related parts. Finally, based 
on the results emerged from the experiment, implications to ECT and to previous empirical studies 
described in the first chapter are discussed.  
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I. Theoretical background 
1 Embodied Cognition Theory in Cognitive Science 
In the past few decades, the role of the body and its non-neural parts
2
 in cognition has led to a good 
amount of work within the scope of Cognitive Science. Works in areas such as linguistics (e.g. Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1980), cognitive psychology (e.g. Glenberg, 1997), philosophy of Mind (e.g. Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch, 1991), robotics (e.g. Maris & te Boekhorst, 1996), and neuroscience (e.g. 
Pulvermuller, 2013), have directed attention and emphasized the bias that an “(organism’s) body plays 
in an organism’s cognitive process” (Shapiro, 2007, p. 338), in which it has been argued that extra-
neural parts of the body are literally part of the mind (Shapiro, 2010). In sum, the claim that ‘cognition 
is embodied’ has become one of the most discussed claims in Cognitive Science (Wilson & Golonka, 
2013). However, this interest in the specific role of the body and its structural features in cognition is 
not particularly an avant-garde theory in Cognitive Science; on the contrary, ECT is often viewed as 
an alternative and a contrast to previous theories of how the mind works in Cognitive Science, in 
particular, the CCTM (e.g. Varela et al., 1991; Barsalou, 1999; Shapiro, 2007, 2010; Foglia & Wilson, 
2013; Wilson & Foglia, 2017). The next topics of this section will thus approach the historical context 
of CCTM and ECT within Cognitive Science, and will describe some of the differences and 
similarities between them. 
   
1.1 The Classical Computational Theory of Mind  
The cognitive revolution in the 1950’s changed the scientific and intellectual landscape, in which 
behaviorism had dominated experimental psychology for decades, since the beginning of the 20
th
 
century (Thagard, 2019). Back then, as Miller (2003) points out, it was proposed that psychology 
should be redefined as science of behavior, being restricted to examining the relation between 
observable stimuli and observable behavioral responses. The argument was that mental events were 
not publicly observable, and the only objective evidence available and that could be observed was 
behavior. Thus, topics such as mental events, consciousness and mental representations were then 
banished from scientific discussion (Gallistel, 2001; Miller, 2003; Thagard, 2019). 
Along with works that criticized the behaviorist approach in areas such as linguistics (Chomsky, 1956) 
and psychology (Miller, 1956) and the subsequent redefinition of these areas, the emergence of 
disciplines such as neuroscience and computer science and the first works in artificial intelligence, 
new theories of mind based on complex representations and computational procedures began to be 
                                                          
2
 Diverse terms have been used to refer to the claim that non-neural parts of the body play either a constraining or a 
physically constitutive role in cognition in the literature. Hereafter, terms such as “structural features of the body”, 
“embodiment”, “bodily structures”, “bodily variation”, “extra neural parts of the body” will exclusively refer to the role of 
the non-neural parts of the body in cognition, excluding the neural parts of the body, namely, the brain processes, from each 
one of these terms.  
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developed under the umbrella of an unifying and interdisciplinary field: Cognitive Science (Varela et 
al., 1991; Miller, 2003; Thagard, 2019). 
After the cognitive revolution, information processing models came to dominate psychological 
theories of cognition (Gallistel, 2001). For instance, one of the mainstream accounts of cognition in 
philosophy of mind and Cognitive Science, the CCTM
3
 proposes that cognition is, in essence, the 
manipulation of abstract atomic symbolic information in virtue of simple syntactic properties (Fodor, 
1975), in which intelligent behavior is causally explained by Turing-style computations carried out on 
symbols that represent what they stand for (for instance, the symbol 7 represents the number 7; 
Piccinini, 2009). In other words, as Varela et al. (1991) describe, the CCTM consists in the hypothesis 
that cognition is computation over mental representations, adding to this that cognition is the 
manipulation of atomic symbols with semantic values that represent features of the world or represent 
the world as being a certain way through purely syntactic computations.  
This computational process over mental representations can be exemplified as follows: The sentence 
MARY LOVES JOHN is composed by three atomic symbols, such as MARY, LOVE, and JOHN. 
Each one of these atomic symbols are primitive representations with semantic values, which can be 
combined according to syntactic rules, giving rise to complex representations, such as MARY LOVES 
JOHN (Fodor, 1975). Thinking in sentences like MARY LOVES JOHN, for instance, as Fodor (1989) 
points out, occurs in a language of thought (sometimes called Mentalese), a system of mental 
representations that proposes that thought has compositional structure that relies on systematic 
syntactic rules. Hence, the meaning of a complex representation - such as MARY LOVES JOHN – is 
a function of the meaning of each one of these symbols and the way they are combined according to a 
set of formal syntactic rules (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Rescorla, 2017). In sum, mental activity, as 
Fodor (2001) posits, occurs through Turing-style computation upon objects, such as symbols, in a 
system of finite set of mental representations, such as the language of thought. 
In line with the Turing-style computation over symbols, the CCTM recognizes the possibility that, 
since the mind is literally a computing system, computation could be realized in different physical 
systems, such as a computing machine in a robotic body, a human brain, silicon chips, calculating 
machines, a brain-in-a-vat, disembodied spirits, etc. (Fodor, 1981; Rescorla, 2017). Since computation 
takes place over mental representations, these systems could all have mental states (Fodor, 1981). 
                                                          
3 The CCTM is a version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), which states that mental states, such as thoughts, 
beliefs, desires, and perception have “intentionality”. In other words, these states refer to things or are about something. Such 
intentional states are the result of a functional relation between the cognitive agent and the symbolic propositional content of 
the mental states (Pitt, 2018). For instance, to believe that Donald Trump is the current president of the United States of 
America is the result of the relation between the agent and the propositional content that Donald Trump is the current 
president of the USA, which is different to the desire or fear that Donald Trump is the current president of the USA (although 
the mental representation is the same - that Donald Trump is the current president of the USA -  to believe that Donald Trump 
is the current president of the USA involves a specific functional relation between the agent and the mental representation 
which is distinct to the fear that Donald Trump is the current president of the USA).           
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Under the CCTM perspective, mental representations are conceived as abstract, amodal and arbitrary 
symbols (Fodor, 1975; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). More specifically, these symbols are abstract 
because the content of mental representations are abstract objects (i.e. properties, relations, 
propositions), amodal because these symbols make no reference to physical or sensory modalities (the 
amodal symbols that represent the color of objects in their absence are not the same of amodal 
representations of colors during visual perception), and arbitrary because the symbols are arbitrarily 
related to their referents in the world (words have no inherent relation to the objects, people, or 
commands – for instance, there is no reason why one symbol rather than another is used to represent 
the concept “table”; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Foglia and Wilson, 2013; Nathan, 2014; Pitt, 2018).  
The CCTM view dominated Cognitive Science to such an extent that it was often taken to be 
Cognitive Science itself in the 1960’s and the 1970’s, or “the only game in town” (Fodor, 1975; 
Varela et al., 1991). However, this status did not free CCTM from criticism. As it will be described in 
the next section, new ways of thinking about the mind have been developed throughout the last few 
decades. 
 
1.2   4E Cognition  
As observed in the last section, the CCTM states that cognition is computation over mental 
representations, occurring through Turing-style computation upon abstract, amodal and arbitrary 
symbols in a language of thought (Varela et al., 1991; Fodor, 2001). Accordingly, computation can be 
realized in different cognizing organisms, such as the human brain, silicon chips, etc. (Fodor, 2001). 
An organism’s body, under the CCTM, is often viewed as “peripheral to understanding the nature of 
mind and cognition”, according to Wilson and Foglia (2017, p. 1).  
In the last few decades, however, the development of research paradigms have given rise to new ways 
of thinking about how the human mind works, departing from some of the tenets of the CCTM 
(Rowlands, 2010; Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018). More specifically, these perspectives about the 
mind are inspired by and organized not around brain processes, but rather some “combination of the 
ideas that mental processes are embodied, embedded, enacted and extended”, giving rise to 4E 
cognition (Rowlands, 2010, p. 14).  
Although each one of the 4E’s are supposedly grouped together as a “unitary alternative to classic, 
computational, cerebral, cognitivist approaches” such as the CCTM (Gallagher, 2017, p. 70), each one 
of them has different features and different perspectives regarding the weight of  the concept of 
embodiment in cognition (Gallagher, 2011). The next few topics of this section will elucidate the 
characteristics of each one of the positions of 4E Cognition (Cognition as Embodied, Embedded, 
Extended and Enactive) in the light of the experiment proposed in the present study. 
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1.2.1 Embodied Cognition (ECT) 
The general characterization of the ECT and the centrality of the extra-neural bodily structures for 
cognition that have been studied in the fields mentioned above are described by the embodiment thesis 
(Wilson and Foglia, 2017, p.7): 
“Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply dependent upon 
characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent’s beyond-the-brain body 
plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent’s cognitive 
processing”.     
According to the embodiment thesis, as Foglia and Wilson (2013) point out, the non-neural parts of 
the body play a significant causal role in cognition through distinct roles in cognitive activity, such as 
a constraint on cognition or a physically constitutive for cognitive processes, as described next.    
At a more general level, cognitive activity is significantly shaped by the specific structural features of 
an organism’s body, constraining how the world is experienced by the agent (Dawson, 2014). By 
taking an example from another organism rather than the human beings, some birds, for instance, a 
toucan, are not able to experience 3D vision, due to the beak between its eyes and to the actual 
location of their eyes in their heads (Martin & Osorio, 2007). Some other birds, on the other hand, 
have a wide range of vision (for instance, an American Woodcock has a visual field of 360º in the 
horizontal plane and 180º in the vertical plane), allowing these species to detect predators/preys more 
easily (Jones, Pierce and Ward, 2007). As far as human vision concerns, however, we have two eyes 
positioned where they are, which makes binocular vision possible and, therefore, allows us to have 
particular cognitive experiences like seeing things in 3D, but as our visual field is not as wide as the 
American Woodcock, we are not allowed to experience 360º vision in the horizontal plane. Based on 
this example of how the position of our eyes may constrain our conscious experiences, as Shapiro 
points out (2004), the specific bodily structures of an organism account for similar experiences and 
conceptions of the world between conspecifics and differences between organisms with different 
bodily structures (e.g. humans can see in 3D, while toucans cannot; American woodcock can see in 
360º, while humans cannot). 
In line with Shapiro’s (2010) claim, Wilson and Foglia (2017) draw attention to two implications that 
the body as a constraint may account for cognition. Firstly, some cognitive processes may be easier or 
more difficult, or even impossible, as a function of the specific body the cognitive agent has – 
understanding a sentence such as “Harry picked up and squashed the ball with his hand” might be 
easier to understand “Harry picked up and squashed the ball with his eye”, since the human eye cannot 
materially pick up and squash any object, unlike the human hand (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). 
Secondly, bodily variation may account for variation in cognitive experiences among conspecifics – as 
it will be further described in the following sections of this study, subjects with limb amputations have 
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slower response in tasks that demand spatial transformation of one’s own body, such as MR tasks of 
bodily-related pictures (Nico, Daprati, Rigal, Parsons & Sirigu, 2004). 
Further, Gallagher (2017) points out that the extra-neural parts of the body also have a constraining 
role in other higher cognitiVE tasks, such as, for instance, conceptualization. In line with this claim, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 19) claim that the “peculiar nature of the body also contributes to 
conceptualization and categorization”, very much reflected in metaphors. In this case, as the authors 
claim, metaphors are built based on our bodily experiences and rely on how our body is perceived in 
space, in which we use our bodies in space as a point of reference to construct spatial metaphors, e.g.: 
“What’s up”; in this case, “up” is bodily-based and reflect to something, in English language, positive; 
differently, “I’m feeling down” has the word “down” as bodily-based too, and, in this case, would 
mean something negative. In sum, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980/1999), these metaphors are 
considered as a bridge between embodied experiences and how we perceive our body in space and our 
conceptual knowledge. Alternatively, if we were flat, spherical beings, without any reference of what 
would mean spatial concepts such as ‘front’, ‘down’, ‘up’, ‘back’, we would not be able to construct 
these spatial metaphors, and processes such as conceptualization/categorization would be much 
different without these metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
Apart from the causal influences described by the ‘body as a constraint’ on cognition, Shapiro (2010, 
p.4) argues that “the body and the world play a constitutive rather than (just) a causal role in cognitive 
processing”. In this case, in order to be considered an element that constitutes cognition, Shapiro 
(2010) claims that if this given element is central to cognition, then cognition would be different or 
would either fail to exist without its presence.  
As an example of the structural features of the body playing a physically constitutive role in cognition, 
the specific shape of a bat’s ears plays a computational role in echolocation (Dawson, 2014). More 
specifically, the bat performs high precision propagation of acoustic pulses through its mouth or nose 
at the ultrasonic frequency of 30 kilohertz (KHz), which, in turn, will situate the bat in the 
environment in order to detect its prey. Once the bat finds its prey, the bat employs different strategies 
to approach and capture it, such as, for instance, emitting ultrasonic frequencies out of the range of the 
prey’s hearing (MacIver, 2009; Dawson, 2014). In sum, as MacIver (2009, p. 488) claims, “the 
conformation of skin and supporting tissue of the ear in the bat forms a computational device that 
solves a key problem in the localization of prey in three-dimensional space”.  
As observed, under the cognition as embodied perspective, non-neural bodily structures play a major 
constraining or constitutive role in perception and in many higher cognitive activities, such as 
reasoning, imagery, memorizing, decision-making, conceptualization, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 
Shapiro, 2010; Gallagher, 2011). The constraining and constitutive role that the non-neural parts of a 
body’s organism will be further approached on later sections of the present dissertation, such as 
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section 1.3, in which an interpretation of ECT is discussed, namely, conceptual embodiment – a view 
that states that concepts are simulations of perceptual, motor and introspective experiences, making 
the case for both constitutive and constraining role of the non-neural parts of the body in cognition -  
and section 3.6, in which empirical examples of how the bodily non-neural structures constrain motor 
imagery will be provided.    
 
1.2.2 Embedded Cognition 
On the embedded cognition view, the physical interaction between the body and the world plays a 
causal constraining role in the possible behaviors of organisms in an environment, since cognition 
deeply depends on the natural, social and cultural environment the agent is inserted in (Wilson & 
Foglia, 2017). The embedded cognition view relates to the ECT view described in the previous topic 
as both of them state that the experience of having a body with sensorimotor capacities plays a strong 
constraining role in cognition, as stated by the embodiment thesis; however, the scope of embedded 
cognition view stresses the nature of a body and how this body affects or is affected by the 
environment, and consequently, the cognitive experience that derives from this binding between body-
brain-environment (Varela et al., 1991; Shapiro, 2010; Dawson, 2014).      
The echolocation case described in the previous section can be seen as an example of how the 
coupling between environment and the organism’s body can affect cognition. In that case, the bat 
relies on the shape of its ear to emit sonic waves in order to situate the bat in the environment. By 
receiving feedback from the environment, the bat is able to navigate through the environment and seek 
for its prey (Dawson, 2014). In sum, according to Rupert (2004, p. 4), the working hypothesis of 
embedded cognition is that “cognition depends very heavily, (…) in organismically external props and 
devices and on the structure of the external environment in which cognition takes place”. Very 
importantly, though, Rupert’s (2004) working hypothesis on embedded cognition does not entail that 
cognition can be extended to world, as stated by the extended thesis (this view will be approached in 
the next topic), but that cognition takes place in the brain as a result of the binding between brain-
body-environment (Shapiro, 2010). 
The embedded view of cognition has incorporated insights from the ecological psychology proposed 
by Gibson (1979), which assumes that cognition is a result of the interaction between a given 
organism and the environment this organism is inserted in (Hofstetter & Alibali, 2008). As an example 
of a constraining role in cognition, Gibson (1979) proposes the concept of affordances, in which the 
environment and its qualities and features allow us to perform certain actions with objects and with the 
environment. According to Hostetter and Alibali (2008), our ability to perceive emerge from the need 
to interact with the world, in other words, to engage in affordances with the environment. Thus, 
without the possibility of engaging in affordances in the environment, we would not be able to 
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perform a number of potential actions important for survival, ultimately playing a constraining role in 
cognition.   
In an example of how affordances relate to cognitive processes, Wheeler (2014) describes a complex 
mathematical operation: a pen and a paper provide people with affordances to write down 
mathematical operations and aid with the calculation process. Since the affordances provided by the 
pen and the paper when one carries out complex mathematical operations aid with the task, which 
probably would not have been possible to be carried out without these objects, a system of brain-body-
pen-paper has played a causal role in the cognitive processing of adding numbers, facilitating 
cognition. Although the pen and paper provide subjects with the affordances to write information 
down on a piece of paper and aid with the complex mathematical operations, they are just resources 
that help with the task, and not “qualified as part of the cognitive architecture”, since the mathematical 
operations are still carried out in the brain, in this case (Wheeler, 2014, p. 375). 
  
1.2.3 Extended Cognition 
According to Gallagher (2011/2017), this view emphasizes the environment and makes claims about 
the role of instruments, objects and things in the environment and how they constitute cognition. 
Under this view, instruments and devices outside of the body, such as calculators and notebooks 
(Clark, 2001) are part of the cognitive architecture. In sum, the extended cognition approach claims 
that the components of this system, instead of just playing a strong causal role in cognition, are 
constitutive of the cognitive process (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).  
In the mathematical example provided in the previous section, the pen and the paper used for helping 
one to carry out a complex mathematical operation are considered constitutive of the mathematical 
operation, hence, part of the cognitive architecture involved in the task. In other words, cognition is 
extended beyond the brain into the world and the objects we utilize to solve cognitive tasks (Shapiro, 
2010).  
In line with the idea of the pen and the paper as playing a constitutive role in a mathematical 
operation, Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that the role of certain environmental entities is 
functionally equivalent to those of internal cognitive states, and for that, these environmental entities 
should be regarded as part of our cognitive systems. The authors further exemplify this claim with the 
notebook example: when using a notebook, people could store information there, which will be 
available to consciousness in the future. In this case, as the authors point out, the notebook plays the 
role of our biological memory, eventually helping one to retrieve a piece of information in the future. 
In sum, on this view, cognitive systems extend beyond of the boundary of an individual’s body, in 
which aspects of the environment may also constitute the agent’s cognitive system, assuming that 
these cognitive systems are functionally equivalent to our bodily cognitive systems responsible for 
13 
 
memorizing information, calculating mathematical operations, etc (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 
2001; Clark, 2008; Wilson & Foglia, 2017).  
 
1.2.4 Enactive Cognition
4
 
Proposed by Varela et al. (1991), under the enactive view, brain, body and environment are 
dynamically coupled at multiple levels, in a way that forms a highly structured dynamical system in 
which cognition is distributed across these elements (Gibbs, 2006). 
Within this dynamical system, the relation between perception and action forms a perception-action 
loop, in which action contributes to perceptual processes and actions are substantially guided by our 
perception of the world, shaping cognitive processes. Thus, both are inseparable for cognition under 
the enactivist account (Varela et al., 1991; Shapiro, 2010; Gallagher, 2011). More specifically, Varela 
et al., (1991) claim that we have bodies with sensorimotor contingencies that interact with the 
environment, and this interaction between both results in an action-perception loop. Likewise, 
O’Regan and Nöe’s (2001) account of visual perception states that visual perception does not consist 
in activation of neural representations in the brain after input of visual stimulus onto the retina. 
Conversely, O’Regan and Nöe (2001, p. 946) claim that the experience of vision is actually 
“constituted by a mode of exploring the environment”, in which the interactions between the visual 
apparatus and the environment follow an organism’s sensorimotor contingencies5, viz. the 
characteristics of the visual apparatus and physical properties of the stimulus this visual apparatus is 
responding to, like hues of colors (sensory contingencies), and activities such as eye movements and 
other muscles of the body involved in seeing, like the orbicular muscles (motor contingencies). 
O’Regan and Nöe’s (2001) account of vision perception is an example of this perception/action loop, 
since the authors claim that that vision is a way of acting, a mode of exploration of the environment 
mediated by our sensorimotor contingencies. In line with O’Regan and Nöe’s (2001) account of visual 
perception, Varela et al. (1991, p. 174) claim that perception also contribute to the “enactment of this 
surrounding world”: perception of a visual stimulus and the physical properties of this stimulus (e.g. 
the brightness of the sunlight) in turn influences our sensorimotor contingencies (e.g. the brightness of 
the sunlight may result in successive eye blinks).  
O’Regan and Nöe’s (2001) account of visual perception described above, as Gallagher (2011) points 
out, suggests that this coupling between sensorimotor contingencies and environmental affordances 
that accounts for visual perception replaces other accounts offered by traditional theories of mind in 
Cognitive Science, such as the CCTM, in which neural computations and mental representations are 
                                                          
4
 The enactive approach for cognition has been used in different ways in the literature. Here, the first approach to enactive 
cognition, which gave rise to subsequent interpretations, drawn out by Varela et al. (1991) is described. 
5
 As defined by Wilson and Foglia (2017, p. 15), sensorimotor contingencies are “a set of rules concerning how sensory 
stimulation varies as a function of movement” 
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accredited with much of the work involved in visual perception. In line with this claim, the enactive 
cognition approach proposed by Varela et al. (1991, p. 9) suggests that, rather than being neural 
computations over mental representations of the world, cognition is “the enactment of a world and 
mind on the basis of a history of the variation of actions that a being in the world performs”. In other 
words the enactivist account proposed by Varela et al. (1991) suggests the replacement of mental 
representations and neural computations over them by the history of embodied interactions between an 
organism’s physiology, its sensorimotor contingencies and the environment6 (Myin & Degenaar, 
2014; Wilson & Foglia, 2017).    
Despite being often regarded as opposed to CCTM when it comes to explaining the nature of cognitive 
phenomena in various degrees (Shapiro, 2014) not all strands of 4E described in this section share the 
same opposition to all claims posited by the CCTM, in particular, the claim that cognition is 
constituted by mental representations over symbolic structures (Fodor, 1975, 1981; Thagard, 2019). 
Also, as Gallagher (2011) points out, there seems to be a few incompatibilities between these strands. 
In special, extended cognition seems to be consistent with functionalism and weak computationalism 
(Menary, 2010), leaving open the possibility of distinct systems realizing and constituting mental 
processes, such as calculators, notebooks, etc. “diminishing” any special role of the living body in 
cognition, since these instruments can augment or even take over bodily functions in cognition 
(Gallagher, 2017). This particular claim that cognition can be extended beyond the body is 
incompatible with ECT, for instance. As Wilson and Foglia (2017, p. 22) point out, although the non 
neural parts of the body can play a constitutive role in cognition and cognitive processing can be 
distributed across neural and non-neural systems of the body, “all non-neural resources are contained 
within the boundaries of the body”, meaning that these resources cannot be extended beyond the 
boundaries of the body. Also, and perhaps more debated within the 4E literature, Extended Cognition 
and Enactive Cognition are incompatible in the sense that, whereas the former would endorse a weak 
computationalism and an appeal to representations, the latter would dismiss them or would claim that 
they have a very limited role in cognition, being replaced by, as stated above, embodied interactions 
between an organism’s physiology, its sensorimotor contingencies and the environment, in an action-
perception loop (Menary, 2010; Gallagher, 2011, 2017; Wilson & Foglia, 2017).           
To bring this section to an end, apart from providing the reader with historical contextualization 
regarding ECT within Cognitive Science, the main reason why these different positions of 4E 
cognition have been described in this section is because the empirical findings from the experiment 
carried out and described in the present study may not necessarily shed light on all of them or they will 
not be on the foreground of discussion of the empirical findings of the present study. Thus, it is 
important to pin down what conclusions can be derived from the particular experiment carried out in 
                                                          
6
 Although the first proposal of enactive cognition (Varela et al., 1991) replaces computation over mental representations by 
history of embodied interactions, not all enactive approaches discard neural computations over mental representations 
completely (e.g. Hutto & Myin, 2013).  
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the present study in the light of the description of the components of 4E cognition above. As it will be 
further described in the objectives and hypotheses section of this dissertation, one of the hypotheses 
raised for the experiment carried out in the present study specifically relates to the claim that an 
organism’s non-neural body parts plays a constraining role in cognition, a central tenet of ECT 
described in 1.2.1. Also, as it will be observed in the following section, conceptual embodiment may 
also shed light on the ECT tenet that the non-neural parts of the body can play a constitutive role in 
cognition as well. Finally, although some of the central tenets from other 4E strands are seen as 
important landmarks for the study of the role of an organism’s non-neural body parts in cognition and 
these strands may also relate to conceptual embodiment (as it will be briefly described in the next 
section, Embedded and Enactive cognition may also relate to conceptual embodiment) they will not be 
on the foreground of the discussion of the empirical findings of the present study. 
 
1.3 Conceptual Embodiment and the CCTM 
Firstly, departing from CCTM’s claim that the mind is literally a computer described in the last 
section, the embodiment thesis highlights the dependence of cognition upon bodily characteristics, in 
which the body plays a constraining or constitutive role in cognition (Wilson & Foglia, 2017). Given 
this emphasis on the influence of aspects of the bodily movements and the organism’s body anatomy 
on cognition, the embodiment thesis challenges the ‘mind is a computer’ claim in terms that 
computation over mental representations can be realized in physical systems other than an organism’s 
body (Tirado, Kathin-Zadeh, Gastelum, Jones & Marmolejo Ramos, 2018). For instance, as Gallagher 
(2011) claims, according to cognition as embodied, the brain-in-a-vat
7
 thought experiment would fail: 
as Damasio (1994) points out, in order to be able to replicate the same conscious and 
phenomenological experiences of an embodied brain, the brain in a vat would have to receive the same 
inputs the embodied brain receives, including biological inputs (e.g. hormonal), which are a subset of 
interactive body-brain systems, and not the product of brain processes alone (Cosmelli & Thompson, 
2010). Even if the supercomputer were able to provide the brain with the necessary inputs to replicate 
human consciousness, this would suggest that the vat could be regarded as a surrogate body and 
“‘body-type’ inputs are required for a normally minded brain after all” (Damasio, 1994, p. 228). 
Shapiro (2010) also describes another inconsistency between the brain-in-a-vat and cognition as 
embodied, more specifically, the physically constitutive role a body might have in cognition. As stated 
in the ECT section of this study, if the structural features of an organism’s body are constituents of 
cognition (e.g. the shape of the bat’s ears in echolocation), then “the brain alone does not suffice for 
                                                          
7
 In short, as Thompson and Cosmelli (2011) describe, the brain-in-a-vat is a thought experiment that consists of a mad 
scientist removing a human brain from a human body and placing it in a vat, connecting its neurons to a super computer that 
would simulate reality. This disembodied brain-in-a-vat would then continue to have normal conscious experiences, since the 
computer provides the brain with electrical impulses that an embodied brain actually receives and simulates the interaction 
between the brain and the environment. All in all, the main point of the argument is that the brain alone suffices for creating 
consciousness, provided it has the appropriate inputs and connections to the external environment.     
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cognition” (Shapiro, 2010, p. 162). However, if the envatted brain suffices for cognition, then it would 
be the case that the brain alone suffices for cognition, and the constitutive role of the body in cognition 
must be false. Conversely, if the constitutive role of the body in cognition is true, then the brain alone 
would not suffice for cognition (Shapiro, 2010).            
Another major distinction between the CCTM and the ECT that has been widely approached and 
discussed, especially in the 4E cognition literature (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey & 
Wilson, 2003; Shapiro, 2014; Gallagher, 2017), is the nature of mental representations. As Gallagher 
(2011) points out, not all strands of 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended and enactive) share 
a common opposition to mental (symbolic) representations. On the contrary, as Niedenthal et al. 
(2005, p. 185) claim, the processing of mental content may involve the computation of “internal 
symbols of some sort” in some of these approaches.  
As observed in section 1.1, the CCTM proposes that high level cognition, such as categorization, 
memory, language comprehension, etc. is performed by abstract, arbitrary and amodal symbols, 
bearing arbitrary relations to physical or sensory modalities that produced them (Fodor, 1975; 
Pylyshyn, 1984; Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal, et al., 2005). For example, when someone sees the words 
BLUE CAR on a piece of paper, the information perceived from the visual input is sent to the visual 
area responsible for translating the written script, the visual word form area (Dehaene & Cohen, 2011), 
into a new representational structure with amodal symbols, such as, for instance, feature lists. This 
feature list consists of a functional symbolic system of words represented in a language of thought that 
describes the blue car – the car is a physical object, it is a machine, it has engine, it has wheels, it has 
seats, it has a color, in this case, blue, and so on. The mental representation of the blue car, then, 
involves the processing and combination of these symbolic amodal descriptions of the object. As a 
result, the representation of a BLUE CAR = the symbol “physical object” + the symbol “machine” + 
the symbol “engine” + the symbol “wheels” + the symbol  “seats” + the symbol “blue”. (Fodor, 1983; 
Pylyshyn, 1984; Barsalou & Hale, 1993; Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003). In sum, in the concept 
processing, according to CCTM, the input information, in this case, the written words “BLUE” + 
“CAR” are transduced into a new representational language, the language of thought, which is 
inherently non perceptual (Barsalou, 1999). Thus, within this account for conceptual processing 
proposed by the CCTM, the sensory system is regarded as being a receptor of input of representations 
from the external world and the motor system typically allows for behavioral output (Niedenthal et al., 
2005; Foglia & Wilson, 2013).             
In contrast, conceptual embodiment proposes that concepts are simulations of perceptual experiences 
grounded in their physical context, in modality-specific systems of the brain (Barsalou, 1999; Mahon, 
2015; Niedenthal et al., 2005). More precisely, Barsalou (1999) proposes that, instead of computing 
representations of amodal symbols that make no reference to physical or sensory modalities and that 
are arbitrarily related to their referents in the world, cognitive representations are inherently 
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perceptual. In other words, instead of amodal symbols, Barsalou (1999) claims that mental 
representations are grounded in perceptual symbols, neural representations stored in sensorimotor 
systems that represent schematic components of perceptual experience and arise across “sensory 
systems that underlie perception of a current situation, motor systems that underlie action, and 
introspective systems that underlie emotion, motivation and cognitive operations” (Niedenthal et al., 
2005, p. 186). In sum, Barsalou (1999) proposes that the transduction between a sensory input (e.g. a 
visual representation of a BLUE CAR) to amodal representations in a language of thought is not 
necessary.   
As Barsalou (1999) describes, during perceptual experience, information about perceived events in the 
environment and in the body (online processing) are captured by systems of neurons in sensorimotor 
areas and are stored in long-term memory, as perceptual symbols. However, since this storage of 
information is selective, not all information present in the perceived event may be stored; hence, the 
perceptual symbol represents only schematic components of the perceived experience, and therefore, 
can be biased (Barsalou et al., 2003). The symbol formation process can operate on more than one 
modality aspect of the perceived experience, such as vision, audition, haptics, olfactation and 
gustation. This multimodal representation system then supports diverse forms of simulation across 
distinct high-level cognitive processes, such as imagery, conceptualization, memory, etc. (Barsalou, 
1999; Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008).  
The conceptual processing of BLUE CAR can also be used as an example of simulation of previous 
perceptual experience. In order to comprehend a concept’s meaning while we read the words BLUE 
CAR on a piece of paper, apart from employing the visual word form area (Dehaene & Cohen, 2011) 
we run a mental simulation of blue car that we have seen in the past, and the sensory (in this case, 
visual) representation of the blue car is activated. As Barsalou et al. (2003) describes, when we see a 
blue car for the first time, neurons in modality-specific systems capture the visual representation of the 
car once the stimulus is perceived and store this visual information of the blue car in memory. The set 
of features of the blue car that was originally perceived at first (e.g. the car is blue, it has four wheels, 
it has seats, it has windows, etc) is then partially reactivated in the absence of the visual stimulus of a 
blue car, through simulation (as noted in the last paragraph, perceptual symbols only provide with a 
schematic representation of perceptual components of a BLUE CAR, since simulations are always 
partial and contain distortions). Apart from retrieving the features of the blue car that we perceive 
when we see the object from memory, we may also simulate the car being driven by us, since the 
object provides us with specific affordances. As it is multimodal, we may also simulate the sounds of 
the blue car’s engine, the smell of the smoke being released by its exhaust pipe, etc. The perceptual 
simulation of a BLUE CAR during conceptual processing, according to conceptual embodiment and 
unlike the framework proposed by CCTM, in which a sensory input is transduced into non-perceptual 
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amodal symbols in a language of thought, ‘approximates’ the simulated concept to the actual 
perception of BLUE CAR (Barsalou, 1999).   
According to the description of conceptual embodiment provided in this section, conceptual 
embodiment may fit into the cognition as embodied, cognition as embedded and enactive cognition 
positions within 4E cognition, in which examples of body as a constitutive or body as a constraint on 
cognition (embodied), the binding between world-brain-body playing a causal role in cognition 
(embedded), and perception being a process of interaction between agent and the world in an action-
perception loop can be observed (enactive). More specifically, simulations, as Barsalou (2008, p. 618) 
defines, are “the reenactment of perceptual, motor and introspective states acquired during experience 
with the world, body and mind”. Since reenacted experiences reflects on the interaction between the 
world, the body and the mind, these three elements can be seen as constituents of perceptual, motor 
and introspective states that underlie simulations. Accordingly, then, since simulations rely on the 
perceptual experiences, motor and introspective experiences we have, it seems like these experiences 
consequently shape the concepts we possess. In other words, conceptual processing is carried out 
through simulations (Barsalou, 1999); if simulations are the reenactment of perceptual, motor and 
introspective experiences, then concepts are the reenactment of these experiences. Since the kinds of 
perceptual, motor and introspective experiences we have shape conceptual processing, and these 
experiences are shaped by the binding world-body-mind, it is plausible to say that the body embedded 
in an environment constitutes conceptual processing. For instance, the BLUE CAR conceptual 
processing does not entail that a global car description across all experiences with car we have had in 
the past are going to be delivered, but rather, a specific experience we have had with a blue car in the 
past (Barsalou, 2003). Also, as Barsalou (1999) points out, when storing perceptual symbols while 
viewing a blue car, for instance, a subject’s selective attention focuses on a few aspects of the object 
(e.g. the color, the wheels, the doors, etc.); as a result of this approach, the perceptual records of the 
blue car are integrated spatially, according to the aspects of the object the subject’s selective attention 
focuses on.  In sum, the concept of BLUE CAR seems to be constituted by the information deployed 
in simulations of the kinds of experiences we have had in the past related to blue cars.  
Conceptual embodiment also makes the case for the constraining role of the body in cognition. First, 
as Barsalou (1999) claims, perceptual symbols systems change according to bodily systems. For 
instance, Barsalou (1999) argues that since conceptual system is grounded in experiences, and these 
experiences are shaped by bodily systems embedded in an environment, different animals that have 
different bodily and perceptual systems are likely to have different conceptual systems. Likewise, an 
infant’s perceptual system, which develops throughout time, is likely to be different to an adult’s. 
Also, both affordances and bodily constraints are likely to play a role in simulations and, 
consequently, conceptual processing. As Barsalou (1999, p. 594) claims, “a constraint arises when a 
schematic perceptual symbol cannot be applied to a simulated entity”. For instance, the simulation of 
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“driving my lamp cautiously” results to be more difficult than “driving my car cautiously”, since the 
schematic perceptual symbols of a lamp can hardly be applied to the simulation of “driving 
(something) cautiously”. A lamp does not provide with the affordance of being driven. On the other 
hand, in the “driving my car cautiously”, the schematic perceptual symbol of the car can be applied to 
the simulated entity of “driving (something) cautiously”, due to the affordance that can be realized 
with the car and by the subject. 
Two degrees of conceptual embodiment have been drawn out: first, strong embodiment entails that 
“all aspects of all concepts are represented in a modality-specific format”, leaving no space for 
abstract, modality-neutral representations; conversely, weak embodiment means that some concepts are 
grounded in modality-specific areas, while others are “also represented at an abstract (or amodal), 
modality-independent level” (Mahon, 2015, p. 420). Whereas the former account of embodiment 
claims that perceptual symbols located in modality-specific systems of the brain account for higher 
cognitive processes, in which these symbols are acquired during online cognition and later used in 
offline cognition through simulation (Niedenthal et al., 2005), the latter is often recognized as a 
‘hybrid’ sort of representational processing, in which amodal symbols may also be grounded in 
modality-specific systems and linked to modality-specific representations (Mahon, 2015). This 
grounding, according to Pulvermüller (2005), is done through ‘neural cell assemblies’, cortical areas 
responsible for binding information from different semantic representations. Finally, connecting with 
the constitutive or constraining roles that the body may have in conceptual processing highlighted in 
the last paragraph, according to strong embodiment, the body embedded in an environment plays a 
constitutive role in simulations that, in turn, underlie all concepts; similarly, bodily structures then 
constrains simulations for all concepts. Alternatively, the body embedded in an environment would 
constitute the simulations that underlie some concepts, and the body would constrain simulation just 
for some concepts as well, according to weak embodiment.   
Niedenthal et al. (2005) describe the pros and cons of the CCTM and the conceptual embodiment 
accounts for the nature of concepts. First, on the one hand, as the authors claim, the CCTM lacks 
empirical evidence that states that the brain contains amodal symbols. Niedenthal et al. (2005) point 
out that the arguments in favor for the existence of amodal symbols and their role in cognition come 
from theoretical assumptions of how the mind might work, rather than empirical evidence. On the 
other hand, in the last few decades, it has been observed a great amount of empirical work that 
suggests that at least some concepts and higher cognition processes are grounded in modality-specific 
systems for perception, action and introspection, in other words, concepts and cognitive processes are 
grounded in their physical context and the format of cognitive representations is modality-specific 
(Wilson, 2002; Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Foglia & Wilson, 2013; Mahon, 2015). 
Next section will discuss some of these empirical works in conceptual embodiment. 
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   1.3.1 Empirical findings in Conceptual Embodiment  
Most of the findings that provide the hypothesis that, at least, some concepts are grounded in 
modality-specific systems of the brain with suggestive evidence come from distinct Cognitive 
Neuroscience studies that have observed the neuronal activation of modality-specific areas for 
perception and action in the brain while subjects undergo some cognitive tasks. For instance, through 
an fMRI, Hauk et al. (2004) observed that, when presented with action words related to face, arm or 
leg actions, the Primary Motor Area and the Premotor Cortex involved in tongue movements, finger 
movements and foot movements were activated. By employing a PET scan, Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib & 
Rizzolatti (1997) observed that, whereas naming a tool silently activated the Broca’s area, when 
subjects silently observed the tool or when they silently named the use of the object (e.g. HAMMER = 
hit the nail), the left Dorsal Premotor Cortex (PMd), the left Ventral Dorsal Premotor Cortex and the 
left Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) were activated, suggesting that neural areas activated when we 
physically manipulate the object are also activated to understand the object semantics. Simmons, 
Martin and Barsalou (2005) observed that the right Insula/Operculum and the left Orbitofrontal 
Cortex, both areas implicated in gustatory processing, were activated when participants merely 
observed the pictures of foods. Finally, through an fMRI, Fehr, Code and Herrmann (2007) observed 
that when subjects did different arithmetic operations of different levels of complexity, such as 
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, the cortical network involved in finger movements.  
In line with the findings described above, it has been reported that lesions in modality-specific systems 
produced deficits in categorical knowledge. For instance, in a lexical decision task with action verbs, 
nouns with strong visual associations and pseudo words, Neininger and Pulvermüller (2003) observed 
that subjects with right frontal lesions (areas involved in motor control) had worse performance at the 
lexical decision task when exposed to action verbs compared to nouns with strong visual associations. 
Conversely, subjects with lesions in the right Temporo-Occipital Areas (a visual area) had the opposite 
pattern of performance. Likewise, subjects with motor neurone disease showed more impaired 
comprehension and production of verbs compared to nouns (Bak, O’Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface & 
Hodges 2001).  In sum, these findings corroborate with the claim that, in order to carry out these tasks 
described above that required offline processing, we rely on the same modality-specific systems that 
were once engaged during an online experience with a given object; therefore, we carry out different 
forms of simulation grounded in those systems, in which lesions in modality-specific systems may 
result in selective impairments in cognitive processing (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003; 
Niedenthal et al., 2005; Barsalou, 2008).     
Notwithstanding, the amodal architecture proposed by the CCTM has its own advantages, as some 
argue (e.g. Niedenthal et al., 2005, Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). For instance, Niedenthal et al. (2005, 
p. 186) argue that since representations employ amodal symbols through feature lists, propositions, 
semantic networks, etc., expressing the “content knowledge across different domains of knowledge, 
21 
 
from perceptual images to abstract concepts” seems to be easier under the CCTM, especially abstract 
concepts, compared to conceptual embodiment. Although it has been a matter of criticism and 
skepticism, perhaps posing the most significant threat to the account that all concepts are grounded in 
modality-specific systems (e.g. Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Mahon, 2015), the processing of 
abstract concepts has also been the scope of much work under conceptual embodiment (Shapiro, 2014; 
Kaschak, Jones, Carranza & Fox, 2014). As Kaschak et al. (2014) claim, the overall idea behind the 
conceptual processing of abstract concepts relies on the assumption that abstract concepts are 
“grounded in particular domains of concrete experience” (p.122), in which they could be represented 
metaphorically (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) or through simulations (Barsalou, 1999). Some studies in 
Cognitive Psychology have addressed the hypothesis that abstract concepts are mapped to domains of 
concrete experiences.   
For instance, the concept TIME is grounded in spatial representations around one’s body, as Shapiro 
(2010) argues. By employing a priming paradigm, in which both English and Mandarin speakers had 
to respond true or false to target sentences (e.g. March comes earlier than April) after exposure to 
horizontal and vertical primings (Figure 1.1). Boroditsky (2001) found out that TIME is described as 
having horizontal dimensions (front = future, back = past) for English speakers, and vertical 
dimensions for Mandarin speakers (up = future, down = past). Likewise, exposure to abstract concepts 
with an emotional valence, such as PEACE, is correlated with typical body responses (Pecher et al., 
2011). In experiments where subjects had to move their arms toward or away from the stimulus 
according to the emotional valence it represents with no prior instructions given, when abstract 
concepts with positive valence were displayed on the screen, participants always made an arm 
movement towards the screen (e.g. ENJOYMENT), and the opposite pattern was observed for abstract 
concept with negative valence (e.g. ANGER; Chen and Bargh, 1999).               
Despite these studies, it seems that the claim that the conceptual processing of concrete nouns and 
action verbs are grounded in modality-specific systems is clearer compared to the processing of 
abstract concepts, since, due to the large number of abstract concepts, it is not feasible to claim that 
they can all be represented by perceptual simulations based on concrete experience (Barsalou, 1999). 
In other words, it is not feasible to investigate whether strong embodiment is true or not, due to the 
large number of concepts. As such, findings from Cognitive Neuroscience still cast doubt on whether 
the conceptual processing of abstract concepts is actually grounded in modality-specific systems. In a 
Meta-Analysis study, Wang, Conder, Blitzer & Shinkareva (2010) observed differences in neural 
representations for concrete and abstract nouns. Whereas it was observed that the processing of 
concrete nouns elicited the engagement of the perceptual system, the latter elicited greater engagement 
of the brain areas involved in the verbal system, such as the inferior frontal gyrus and middle temporal 
gyrus. The same distinction in terms of neuronal activation in processing concrete and abstract 
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concepts was observed in other studies that employed fMRI techniques (e.g. Pulvermuller, 1999; 
Shallice and Cooper, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Examples of horizontal spatial prime (top) and vertical spatial prime (bottom). 
Retrieved from Boroditsky (2001). 
        
Bearing in mind this struggle in accounting for conceptual processing of abstract concepts as grounded 
in modality-specific systems, ‘middle ground’ theories of conceptual processing have been raised in 
order to account for the processing both amodal symbols and modality-specific representations during 
conceptualization. With grounding by interaction, Mahon and Caramazza (2008) claim that, although 
all concepts are represented at an abstract level, sensory and motor information would only provide 
some concepts with relational context and grounding this abstract symbol with the physical world. In 
other words, concepts could be modality-specific representations, but they do not necessarily have to 
be modality-specific representations. For instance, the concept BEAUTIFUL is abstract, and has no 
specific physical referent in the world, since people can be beautiful, objects can be beautiful, words 
can be beautiful. Hence, as Mahon and Caramazza (2008) claim, whether modality-specific systems 
may be activated when one thinks something like “That mountain is beautiful”, the physical referent of 
the mountain can be instrumental for the instantiation of the concept BEAUTIFUL, but that does not 
mean that the concept BEAUTIFUL itself is grounded in modality-specific systems or is represented 
in a modality-specific format.   
Concrete concepts are also targeted by the grounding by interaction framework (Mahon & Caramazza, 
2008). For instance, the concept DOG can be associated to a wide range of dog pedigrees (e.g. 
German Shepherd, Chihuahua, Stray Dog, Poodle). Since we run perceptual simulations in order to 
understand sentences and not computation over amodal symbols (Barsalou, 1999), understanding 
sentences such as “The dog jumped over the chair” or “The dog is hidden behind the wardrobe” would 
evoke different simulations of past experiences that we have had with dogs. Whereas in the first 
sentence it is typically easier to imagine a German Shepherd carrying out the action due to its size and 
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strength, in the second sentence the Poodle is typically instantiated to the concept of DOG and being 
able to hide in narrow spaces. Thus, two distinct concepts of DOG are instantiated according to the 
sentence. Conversely, according to the grounding by interaction framework, the same abstract concept 
of DOG is deployed in both cases, despite the physical attributes of the DOG being different in the 
two sentences. In sum, although we have had experiences with dogs in the past and these experiences 
might be grounded in modality-specific systems, the concept of DOG itself may not be constituted by 
modality-specific representations. What the grounding by interaction proposes is that the concept of 
DOG is constituted by abstract representations and these abstract representations may be generalized 
across our modality-specific representations of dogs (Kaschak et al., 2014).  
In line with the grounding by interaction framework raised by Mahon and Caramazza (2008), 
Louwerse (2008) and Louwerse and Connell (2011) are more specific in terms of pointing out the 
stages at which abstract and sensorimotor processes take place during conceptualization: whereas 
abstract information is processed at earlier stages, in which the concept input will be interpreted, and 
sensorimotor information is used at later stages of language processing, which will provide further 
detailed representation of the concept (Kaschak et al., 2014).   
The assumptions from conceptual embodiment and CCTM presented in this section have been 
examined in the last few decades through the employment of different research methods and 
paradigms by distinct areas of Cognitive Science, such as Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive 
Neuroscience, for instance. The following sections of this dissertation will discuss some of the 
findings that emerged from investigations about mental/motor imagery in the light of weak conceptual 
embodiment and the ECT discussed so far. 
 
2 Mental Imagery  
2.1 The mechanisms of visual mental imagery 
Mental imagery is a topic that has been exhaustively studied throughout the centuries by distinct 
fields, from the ancient Greek philosophers (e.g. Plato and Aristotle) until more recent achievements 
in the development of Brain-Computer interface devices. Although somewhat related, most of these 
findings go beyond the scope of the present study. Thus, this section will specifically discuss the 
mechanisms involved in visual mental imagery and the distinct accounts of visual mental imagery that 
can be found in the Cognitive Science literature.   
First, as pointed in the introductory notes of the present study and in last section, conceptual 
embodiment questions whether cognition is made up of computation of amodal symbols that bear no 
correspondence to the referents they stand for; in other words, these amodal symbols would have no 
link with their sensory origin, being considered “raw” data that would be transduced into a code in a 
language of thought format (Fodor, 1975; Pecher, 2013). Adding to that, conceptual embodiment 
24 
 
claims that concepts are grounded in modality-specific areas of the brain, as a result of simulations of 
past perceptual experiences (Barsalou, 1999). With the emergence of Cognitive Science, the debate 
around mental imagery has been about the type of code and the content conveyed by the images 
(Iachini, 2011), giving rise to distinct theories about the imagery phenomena.  
In terms of visual mental imagery, Pylyshyn (1973, 1981) proposes that imagery has a language-like, 
abstract and discursive format, in which images are like linguistic descriptions of visual scenes with no 
spatial properties of their own (Pylyshyn, 2003; Thomas, 2019). Accordingly, Pylyshyn (1981) claims 
that images and words derive from the same code, expressed by abstract and amodal symbols in a 
language of thought architecture. Hence, according to this framework, imagery follows the same steps 
as other cognitive functions such as memory, language and thought, in which perceptual information is 
transduced into a non-perceptual representational language made of abstract and amodal symbal that 
are then computed (Pylyshyn, 1999). This process, as Pylyshyn (1978) points out, is independent of 
simultaneous activation of early visual processing areas, since these areas are cognitively impenetrable 
and imagery is cogntivitely penetrable.
8
 Thus, under this perspective offered by Pylyshyn (1973, 
1981), the perceptual systems (in this case, the early visual processing systems) are separated from 
cognitive processes (imagery) and work according to different principles (Iachini, 2011; Foglia and 
Wilson, 2013).         
This account of mental imagery provided by Pylyshyn (1980) has been, in parts, confronted by other 
theories of imagery. First, instead of being processed by the same unitary system, Paivio’s (1971, 
1986) dual coding theory suggests that language-based and image-based stimuli are processed by 
different systems, known as logogens (for propositional discrete symbols that represent linguistic 
information) and imagens (for percept-like symbols that represent perceptual information). Visual 
mental imagery would belong to the latter group (Jeannerod, 1995; Iachini, 2011). In line with the 
concept of imagens proposed by Paivio, according to the analog theory, mental representations are, up 
to a certain extent, like pictures, or quasi-pictorial, sharing spatial properties and key elements that 
actual pictures have (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, 1981). The analog theory does not question particularly 
whether propositional representations with amodal/abstract symbols are deployed in imagery, but 
whether these symbols provide a reasonable account of imagery alone (Iachini, 2011). It is proposed 
by the analog theory that these propositional representations are stored in long-term memory in a 
format of amodal symbols (responsible for abstract information about the image) along with analog 
(literal) symbols (responsible for information about the shape of the image and other spatial 
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 On the one hand, as Pylyshyn (1999) claims, early visual processes are cognitively impenetrable as they are inflexible and 
autonomous from people’s beliefs and goals. For instance, in the case of visual illusion, although sometimes we reach to the 
conclusion or we are told that a particular image is an illusion, when we look at the image again we still feel deceived by it. 
On the other hand, imagery is considered as cognitively penetrable, since, according to Pylyshyn (1981), imagery is the 
symbolic representation of our beliefs, goals and so on (in this regard, when people imagine something, they use their tacit 
knowledge to simulate what would happen in the real world according to their beliefs).     
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attributes)
9
. These symbols give rise to conscious mental images in short-term memory, maintained in 
the visual buffer, a functional structure that comprises cortical areas involved in vision and 
topographically organized, which is responsible for depicting the spatial structure shape of an image 
and preserving the distances between the parts of the referent object (for instance, when we imagine a 
table, the referent object has four edges. The visual buffer depicts the spatial structure of the imagined 
table and preserves the distances between the edges of the object; Kosslyn, 1980, 1981, 1983, 2005; 
Iachini, 2011). The image generated in the visual buffer is perceived and processed by the visual 
system along two pathways: one runs from the Occipital lobe ventrally to the Inferior Temporal lobe, 
whose areas are responsible for processing image features such as shape, color and texture, while the 
other runs in the dorsal pathway to the posterior parietal lobe, being responsible for the spatial 
properties of the image (i.e. positions of the image in space and comparison between spatial location 
of two images). Thus, according to the analog theory, mental images are “reconstructed and processed 
in the visual system, (…) being percept-like representations similar that bear similarity with 
corresponding external referents” (Iachini, 2011, p. 7).   
Findings from Cognitive Neuroscience provide suggestive evidence that visual mental imagery shares 
common neural substrates as visual perception and provide a clear picture of the specific cortical areas 
involved in both. The relation between the mechanisms involved in both visual perception and visual 
mental imagery has been investigated through neuroimaging techniques, such as PET scan (Kosslyn, 
Thompson, Kim & Alpert 1995b), fMRI (O’Craven & Kanisher, 2000) and TMS (Kosslyn et al., 
1999), which test the neural basis of imagery in humans objectively (Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson, 
2001a). In sum, as Behrmann (2000, p. 51) points out, when subjects perform visual mental imagery, 
primary and secondary visual areas of the occipital lobe, such as areas 17 and 18, known as areas V1 
and V2, respectively, are activated. Accordingly, as the author describes, when we perceive a visual 
stimulus, the information is received via the retina of the eye and transmitted through various visual 
pathways to the brain. The information is then sent to the primary visual area (area 17 or V1) and 
secondary visual areas (area 18 or V2) before it is sent to the parietal areas of the brain, responsible for 
representing and coding the spatial information of the stimulus. Also, areas responsible for motion 
perception of a visual stimulus (Goebel, Khorram-Sefat, Muckli, Hacker & Singer 1998), the colour 
perception of a stimulus (Howard et al., 1998) and face and place recognition (O’Craven & Kanisher, 
2000) are also activated during visual mental imagery. This suggests, as Behrmann (2000) claims, the 
evidence of shared mechanisms involved in perception and visual mental imagery both at low level 
(visual areas of the Occipital lobe, such as areas 17 and 18) and high level (visual areas of the 
Temporal and Parietal lobes) of the visual processing pathways (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). 
                                                          
9
 Very importantly, these are information about the images, not the images per se. As Kosslyn (2005) points out, images are 
not stored in long-term memory. Rather, images are created in the visual buffer by activating the stored memories in the 
format of analog and amodal symbols in the long-term memory. 
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Apart from the findings elucidated above, that visual mental imagery shares common neural substrates 
as visual perception (Kosslyn, 1975, 1980, 1981; Behrmann, 2000), and in line with the suggestion 
that imagery maintains spatial properties and other key features of a visually perceived image due to 
the involvement of the visual system during imagery tasks, findings from Cognitive Psychology 
reinforce the hypothesis that features of representation and the way of processing the representation in 
imagery and in visual perception are equivalent (Iachini, 2011).  
More specifically, two classic experiments have investigated whether imagery has some of the same 
properties as visual perception. For instance, Kosslyn, Ball & Reizer (1978) carried out an experiment 
in which subjects studied a map of a fictional island containing seven landmarks such as a hut, a tree, a 
rock, a well, a lake, sand and grass, separated by different distances, and learned to generate accurate 
images of the map (figure 1.2). In a test phase, subjects were then asked to mentally scan the map and 
ask questions about the distances between the locations of the hut, the tree and the other landmarks 
depicted in the map. As a result, Kosslyn et al. (1978) observed a linear relationship between the 
distances of the landmarks that were mentally compared and the RTs provided by the participants. In 
sum, more time was required to scan further distances between the landmarks compared to shorter 
distances, meaning that mental images seem to reflect the spatial properties of observed pictures. Since 
spatial relations between the observed picture and the mental image seem to be preserved, this result 
was interpreted as an evidence for the analog/pictorial representation of mental images.        
In line with this mental scanning experiment, Shepard and Metzler (1971) presented participants with 
pairs of 3D cubes (Figure 1.3), presented at different degrees of inclination, in which the cubes could 
be either the same shape or mirror images. After exposure to the stimuli, participants had to quickly 
judge whether the two pictures were the same shape or mirror images by pulling a lever
10
. As reported 
by Shepard and Metzler (1971, p.701) “to make the required comparison, participants first had 
imagined one object as rotated into the same orientation as the other (...)”. In other words, participants 
made a mental rotation (MR) of the depicted cubes in order to judge whether they were the same 
shape or mirror images. As a result, Shepard and Metzler (1971) observed that the time required to do 
the judgment task linearly increased as a function of the angular difference between the two objects. In 
sum, this cubes are transformed in mental images that seem to move along continuous trajectories as 
they are transformed, in which, as observed in Shepard and Metzler’s (1971), larger transformations 
demand more time. In order to carry out these image transformations, as Shepard and Judd (1976) 
point out, subjects employ similar visual mechanisms as in apparent motion of objects (e.g. an optical 
illusion that makes a still object appear to move) in which they mentally simulate that the cubes are 
being rotated (Wexler, Kosslyn & Berthoz 2018). Additionally, depending on the strategy employed 
by the subject in order to mentally rotate the cube to provide an answer, as Kosslyn, Thompson, 
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 As part of the procedure of these mental rotation tasks, participants are encouraged to remain still and are usually asked not 
to move any other part of their bodies apart from the hand to pull the lever. 
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Wraga & Alpert (2001b) point out, in order to carry out a MR of these images, subjects may also make 
them turn through a motor simulation of the object.  
    
 
Figure 1.2: Fictional map depicting 7 distinct landmarks used in Kosslyn et al’s (1978) experiment 
(Retrieved from Kosslyn et al., 1978) 
 
As Tomas (1997) points out, one major empirical challenge to the quasi-pictorial account of mental 
imagery is that both mental scanning and MR can be performed by congenitally blind individuals (e.g. 
Marmor & Zaback, 1976; Iachini & Ruggiero, 2010). In order to carry out these tasks, congenitally 
blind individuals typically use haptic exploration through a coordination between tactile, 
proprioception and motor control (Kerr, 1983; Tomas, 1997), and most studies with this population 
show that, although RTs are usually slower than sighted individuals’, the pattern of results is similar to 
both groups (e.g. linear increase of RTs as a function of angle disparity in MR tasks) (Carpenter & 
Eisenberg, 1978). The exploratory physical movements using the sense of touch employed by 
congenitally blind individuals while carrying out these tasks and the similar patterns compared to 
sighted individuals reported in these studies suggest that congenitally blind individuals maintain the 
spatial representations that are present in mental images that sighted individuals use to carry out tasks 
that involve visual mental imagery, however, this spatial representation arises from a different 
modality rather than the visual. As the empirical results show similar patterns of response, this mental 
spatial representation of congenitally blind individuals is functionally similar to sighted individuals’ 
(Kerr, 1983; Farah, Hammond, Levine & Calvanio, 1988; Iachini & Ruggiero, 2010). Finally, as an 
implication to the theories of imagery, it seems that some aspects of imagery are shaped by the nature 
of sensory experience that may be evoked by multiple modalities, in this particular case of 
congenitally blind individuals, through the tactile exploration of the stimuli in order to carry out the 
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MR and mental scanning tasks (Kerr, 1983; Arditi, Holtzman & Kosslyn, 1988; Iachini & Ruggiero, 
2010; Gibbs, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Examples of drawings of cubes presented to subjects in Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) 
experiment. Picture A) depicts the same pair of cubes displayed in 80º of inclination in the picture 
plane. Picture B) shows the same pair of cubes displayed in 80º of inclination in depth. Picture C) 
shows a different pair of cubes.  (Retrieved from Shepard and Metzler, 1971). 
 
Also, as Kosslyn et al. (2001a) point out, although parallel deficits in imagery and perception 
capacities have been observed in brain-damaged patients (e.g. Farah, 1984), it has also been observed 
that patients who had impaired visual object recognition (agnosia) could still perform mental imagery 
tasks normally (Behrmann, Winocur & Moscovitch, 1992). Likewise, Farah (1984) reports that, even 
though brain-damaged patients were able to perceive and recognize visual stimuli, their ability in 
generating imagery was damaged. Taking these two examples into account, it is suggested that both 
visual imagery and perception share many neural mechanisms, however, that does not mean that all 
brain areas activated during visual perception are activated during visual mental imagery, and the 
same principle applies otherwise. Kosslyn et al., (1997) observed that 2/3 of the cortical areas 
activated either in visual mental imagery or in visual perception are activated in both cases. Thus, as 
Kosslyn, Thompson & Alpert (2001a) conclude, lesion in one specific area that is involved in visual 
perception but is not involved in visual mental imagery will likely damage visual perception, but not 
visual mental imagery, whereas lesion in areas that are involved in both visual perception and mental 
imagery may damage both functions.      
In sum, in line with the findings from Cognitive Neuroscience, if imagery works in terms of re-
activation of some  of the neural structures that are used in perception in the absence of physical input 
(e.g. visual or tactile perception, as we have seen in the examples above), then imagery is the case of a 
modality-specific cognitive process that is grounded in sensorimotor areas, relying on “representations 
similar to the original sensorimotor experiences” (Iachini, 2011, p.10), being also a case of conceptual 
embodiment described in the last section, since it seems that visual mental imagery consists of modal 
simulation of visual (or in the case of congenitally blind individuals, tactile) processing grounded in 
modality-specific areas of the brain (Barsalou, 2008). However, as Kosslyn (1980) proposes, visual 
29 
 
mental imagery may also involve amodal symbols, responsible for abstract information about the 
image, along with these analog symbols anchored in modality-specific perceptual systems.  
      
2.2 The case of motor imagery 
As Gallese and Lakoff (2005) claim, although the same embodied nature observed in visual mental 
imagery described in the last section is shared with motor imagery, as both occur in the absence of a 
physical input (Jeannerod, 1994), some of the neural mechanisms employed in motor imagery differ 
from those of visual mental imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2001a; Jeannerod, 2006).     
As Jeannerod (1994, 1995) points out, one aspect that differs motor imagery from visual mental 
imagery is that, in the former, images are experienced from a first-person perspective (1PP), in which 
an agent mentally simulates his/her own bodily movements without physically executing them. In this 
internal perspective, as Holmes and Calmels (2008, p. 435) argue, the “self is the agent of the 
behavior”, in which there is no subjective distance between the self and the imagined experience 
(Jeannerod, 1995). As an elucidative example, the agent imagines that he/she is lifting Roland Garros’ 
trophy. In the mental image, the agent can visualize his/her own arms lifting the trophy, but cannot 
visualize his own face, because the image comes from his/her own perspective. This process, as 
Jeannerod (1994) argues, necessarily involves a kinesthetic
11
 representation of the action, in which the 
agent feels himself/herself lifting Roland Garros’ trophy and his/her own body is the force that 
generates the action.  
Conversely, when the agent experiences the image by placing himself/herself in “someone else’s 
shoes”, in a beholder or spectator position (Jeannerod, 1994; Holmes and Calmels, 2008; Mendes, 
2015), the agent is experiencing the image from a third-person perspective (3PP). In this case, there is 
a distancing between the self and his/her imagined experience (Jeannerod, 1995). For example, 
imagining lifting the Roland Garros’ trophy through a 3PP would be similar to as if the agent was 
visualizing himself/herself lifting the trophy on the television. This process involves a spatial 
representation of the action in which the action is executed by the subject himself/herself outside of 
his/her own body, hence, it is not considered motor imagery, but visual mental imagery, since it is an 
external, exogenous force that generates the action over the imagined body (Jeannerod, 1994; 
Jeannerod, 1995; Iachini, 2011). Through this perspective, then, the agent would be able to visualize 
the trophy being lifted and all his/her body parts, including the face and other parts of the body the 
agent cannot visualize under the 1PP. Finally, although some authors (e.g. Collins, Smith & Hale, 
1998) consider that the kinesthetic representation of an action can only be observed under the 1PP, 
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 As Mendes (2015, p.12) points out, the kinesthetic representation consists of the “one’s sensations of ‘how it feels’ to 
perform an action”, which involves the awareness of the position of our bodily parts in space and how we perform our bodily 
movements (Callow & Watters, 2005). In the example provided, the kinesthetic representation of lifting Roland Garros’ 
trophy would consist in the sensations of how it feels to lift the trophy, such as muscle contractions, the texture of the trophy 
that is perceived through the touch of the hand, the weight of the object that is felt while it is being lifted, etc.    
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some authors (e.g. Callow & Hardy, 2004) claim that these kinesthetic representations may also be 
observed under the 3PP as long as the external agent represented in the image is the agent 
himself/herself (then, in the example above, according to these authors, imagining themselves lifting 
the trophy in a 3PP would also involve a kinesthetic representation of the action).                      
Another difference that can be observed between visual mental imagery and motor imagery is the 
brain areas involved in both functions (Jeannerod, 1994). Motor imagery may not necessarily involve 
the activation of some of the neural substrates involved in visual perception and visual mental imagery 
described in the last section. More specifically, motor imagery can include only the kinesthetic feeling 
of a particular imagined motion, but not necessarily any visual representation of the motion 
(Jeannerod, 1995; Stevens, 2005; Iachini & Ruggiero, 2010). One example of the difference in terms 
of brain areas activated in visual mental imagery and motor imagery can be provided by Parkinson’s 
disease patients. As Dominey, Decety, Broussolle, Chazto & Jeannerod (1995) observed, although 
motor imagery ability is relatively slower for Parkinson’s disease patients due to damages in the motor 
cortices, the authors did not observe impairment in visual mental imagery abilities.          
In line with the differences in terms of brain areas involved in the visual mental imagery and motor 
imagery elucidated above, Jeannerod (1994) points out that whereas visual mental imagery shares 
some of the same brain mechanisms as visual perception, a correlate can be established between motor 
imagery and motor representations of actions, or the “motor physiology”, as he refers (p. 4).     
The relation between motor imagery and motor execution is part of a broader framework of action 
representations called motor cognition. As Jeannerod (2006, p. v) defines, motor cognition is “the way 
actions are thought, planned, intended, organized, perceived, understood, learned, imitated, attributed, 
or in a word, the way they are represented”, in other words, the “covert stages of action” (Jeannerod, 
2001). Apart from these stages involved in action representations, as Jeannerod (2001) points out, 
studies of motor cognition have also investigated other processes related to the covert stages of action, 
such as the recognition of tools and objects, learning by observation, or understanding other peoples’ 
behavior. The following section will discuss some of the empirical findings regarding motor imagery 
within the motor cognition framework described above. 
 
2.3 Empirical findings in motor imagery 
First, Jeannerod (2001) reports a series of studies in which brain-mapping techniques were employed 
in order to measure the neuronal activity of cortical areas activated during action execution, intended 
action, the imagination of an action and even the observation of someone else’s action. In sum, the 
neuronal network that comprises action execution, intended action and the imagination are the Primary 
Motor Cortex (Porro et al., 1996), the Basal Ganglia and the Putamen (Gerardin et al., 2000), the 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (Bifoksi et al., 1999), the Cerebellum (Ryding, Decety, Sjolhom, Stenberg & 
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Ingvar, 1993; Parsons et al., 1995; and Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga & Rizzolatti, 1996), the Premotor 
Cortex, the Inferior Lobule and Intraparietal Sulcus in the Parietal Cortex (Decety et al., 1994), areas 
in the Pre-Frontal cortex, such as the Dorsolateral part, the Cingular Gyrus, and the Ventral and 
Caudal zone (Frith, Friston, Liddle & Frackowiak 1991; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Decety and Someville, 
2007) and the pre and posterior parts of the Supplementary Motor Area (SMA; Roland, Lassen, 
Lassen & Skinhoj, 1980).  
Although these cortical areas have been reported to be activated during different processes underlying 
motor cognition, namely motor preparation, motor imagery and motor execution, some elucidations 
should be made. First, the amount of cortical activation in these areas vary in degree, and according to 
Jeannerod (2001), the Premotor Cortex and the SMA are regarded as the most activated areas when it 
comes to executing, intending, and imagining motor actions. Also, very importantly, as Roth et al. 
(1996) point out, although there is a correlation in terms of neuronal activation between both imagined 
and executed motor actions in these areas mentioned above, the degree of activation is less strong 
when motor actions are imagined rather than executed, since the degree of cortical activation for 
imagined motor actions is never more than 30% of the physical execution. Finally, as Dechent, 
Merboldt & Frahm (2004) point out, the activation of the primary motor cortex seems to be transient 
during motor imagery tasks, in which the activation lasts only a few seconds of the imaged task, 
subsequently vanishing. 
In most of these studies described above, subjects had their neuronal activity mapped while either 
executing an action with the body (e.g. contracting their biceps) and imagining the same action. 
Alternatively, these studies have also been replicated in cognitive tasks such as MR tasks of bodily-
related pictures, in which participants observed body parts on a screen (hands, feet, head or the whole 
body) and had to either make a laterality judgment of the stimulus or match the pictures onto a target 
picture. As it will be thoroughly described later in the present study, subjects employ motor imagery 
techniques while carrying out MR tasks of bodily-related pictures (Parsons, 1994). Neuroimaging 
studies in MR of hands (Parsons et al. 1995; Kosslyn, DiGirolamo & Thompson, 1998; de Lange, 
Helmich & Toni 2006; Hamada et al., 2018) observed that brain regions known to participate in the 
planning and execution of bodily movements were activated. As these authors describe, these areas 
include the Prefrontal and Insular Premotor areas, the SMA, the Anterior Cingulated, the Superior 
Premotor Cortex, the Cerebellum and the Basal Ganglia. Since these areas overlap with the areas 
involved in motor imagery tasks, Hamada et al. (2018, p. 1597) suggest that “when performing MR, 
subjects at least use partly the same strategy as when performing motor imagery”.  
These findings, in part, extend to MR of pictures of objects. In this case, Kosslyn et al. (1998, 2001a) 
observed that the activation of cortical areas that overlap with those involved in motor imagery varied 
according to the strategy used by subjects to mentally rotate pictures of multi armed-like objects. 
Subjects were instructed to either imagine the rotation being done by exogenous forces (e.g. by an 
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electric motor) or by an endogenous force (e.g. as if they were physically turning the object depicted 
in the picture). Through a PET scan, Kosslyn et al., (1998, 2001b) observed activation in the motor 
regions of the brain when subjects employed the endogenous strategy to mentally rotate the object in 
the picture, but not when they imagined this rotation being done by an exogenous force.       
Apart from the study of actions executed by the agent him/herself, motor cognition also comprises the 
observation of other people’s actions. In this regard, much work has been devoted to explaining how 
action observation of other people can influence our own actions (e.g. Rizolatti and Craighero, 2004). 
First, Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti (1992) and Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & 
Rizzolatti (1996) reported a series of studies with macaques in which it was observed a circuit of 
neurons in the rostral part of the inferior premotor cortex (area F5) that fired both when the animals 
physically executed an action and when they observed another animal executing the same action. 
These neurons are called mirror neurons, and are bimodal due to their visual and motor properties – 
these neurons are activated when the macaques see other macaques physically executing the same 
action they had just executed, hence, these neurons possess both visual and motor properties 
(Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001). As Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) and Decety and 
Sommerville (2007) claim, mirror neurons are important for understanding the actions and the 
consequences of other people’s actions, and for learning new motor skills and motor knowledge by 
imitation. Finally, Gallese and Goldman (1998) claim that the same mechanisms involved in observing 
others’ actions are the same mechanisms that are activated when we imagine or intend to execute a 
physical action.  In terms of brain areas activated in action observation, imagined and intended actions, 
it was observed significant activation in the precentral motor cortex (Hari et al., 1998), cerebellum 
(Grafton et al., 1996), and the SMA (Stephan et al., 1995).   
Concomitantly, it was also found out that motor imagery has an effect on the autonomous nervous 
system and on the physiological bases that are also observed in action execution. Accordingly, when 
asking subjects to only imagine bending their arms not to execute the physical action, Jacobson (1932) 
observed movement-relevant electrical activity of the target muscles through an electromyography 
(EMG). Likewise, also through EMG recordings, Shaw (1940) observed a linear increase in the 
activation of forearm muscles as a function of imagined weight lifting of different weights (e.g. higher 
activation of forearm muscles when subjects imagined lifting heavy weights). Oishi, Kimura, 
Yasukawa, Yoneda & Maeshima (1994) recorded several activities of autonomic effectors 
simultaneously, such as heart rate (HR), skin conductance response (SCR) and respiration rate (RSR) 
while subjects performed motor imagery of a speed skate sprint. Compared to rest, HR, SCR and RSR 
were increased by 57%, 51% and 76%, respectively.   
Behavioral findings have also reported the relation between the time and effort needed to perform the 
same action both mentally and physically. For instance, Decety and Michael (1989) found out that the 
time that subjects used to write their own signature was the same when they carried out this action 
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both physically or mentally; the same isochrony principle was found when subjects executed or 
imagined walking the same distances, namely 5, 10 or 15 meters, in which the blindfolded subjects 
were asked to either walk or imagine walking these distances. As a result, walking times increased as a 
function of the distance covered (more time to cover 15 meters than 10 and 5, respectively). In the 
imagined condition, the same pattern was observed, in which the times in imagining walking the 
distances were found to be similar to its physical counterpart.  
It has been argued, though, that this isochrony principle between the imagined and the physically 
executed action is due to the tacit knowledge that subjects would have when they walked for longer 
distances – if the distance is longer, the duration of the action should increase, and subjects would 
consequently report increase of times in the imagined condition as a function of their tacit knowledge 
of the differences between the walking distances (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1973). Thus, under this tacit 
knowledge account of the isochrony principle between the imagined and physical action, in the 
imagery condition, participants would be simply replicating the temporal sequence they had registered 
when they physically walked the distances (Jeannerod, 1994). However, as Jeannerod (1994) argues, if 
duration of a mentally imagined action is a function of muscular force and other variables, then it is 
hypothesized that duration times between the imagined and actual physically executed action should 
differ when subjects physically walk a distance with or without a load, since the load would not affect 
the imagined condition, only the physical execution of the action. This hypothesis had been 
investigated by Decety, Jeannerod & Prablanc (1989), in which participants had to physically and 
imagine walking a given distance with and without a 25kg backpack. In the physical condition, 
participants were asked to keep the same speed as when they walked with or without the backpack; 
hence, whenever they had to physically walk with the backpack, they had to employ greater force in 
order to carry out the physical task in the same time as they carried out the task without the 25kg load. 
As a result of the imagining task, it was found out that duration of imagined walking with a 25kg was 
30% superior to the imagined walking without the load, even though the time spent to physically 
execute the task was the same for both conditions. As Jeannerod (1994) suggests, subjects were not 
just replicating the estimation of duration times they had experienced when they physically walked the 
distances, but that the force applied while subjects carried the 25kg backpack must have been used as a 
cue so they could evaluate the movement duration in the imagined condition.    
Apart from the isochrony principle between motor imagery and motor execution, motor imagery also 
seems to share the same kinematic principles (properties of executed movements) as motor execution. 
In other words, it has been observed that motor rules and biomechanical constraints of the body also 
characterize the properties of motor images. For instance, Johnson (2000) presented a dowel in distinct 
orientations in front of subjects that had to verbally indicate which grip posture (overhand or 
underhand) they would employ in order to grasp the dowel and move it away. As a result, Johnson 
(2000) observed that the time subjects spent in order to give a response regarding the grip posture they 
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would use to execute the task linearly increased as a function of the angular distance the subjects’ 
hand would have to cover in order to grasp the dowel in the most comfortable hand position, avoiding 
biomechanically awkward trajectories. Likewise, Frak, Paulignan & Jeannerod (2001) found that 
subjects’ judgment about the feasibility in grasping a cup of tea (in this case, to say whether grasping 
the cup would be easy or difficult) linearly varied according to the orientation of the cup’s handle, in 
which subjects provided a faster response when the cup was in a orientation in which we are 
accustomed to physically grasp than when the cup was in another orientation. Taken together the 
results of these two studies described above, Jeannerod (2006) supposes that subjects employed 
implicit motor imagery used on a daily basis when they perform these actions (e.g. physically grasping 
a cup of tea), and consequently, the results resemble the biomechanical constraints of the body.        
Much work examining the functional effects of motor imagery on motor execution through mental 
training has been carried out in some other fields, such as sports psychology, music learning, 
physiotherapy, etc. Amongst the many findings in sports psychology, for instance, Murphy, Nordin & 
Cumming (2008) observed that groups of professional golfers who underwent a three-week program 
of motor imagery and physical practice combined had better performance improvement in bunker 
shots compared to those groups assigned only to the physical practice of the movements, and did not 
perform any motor imagery of the task. Likewise, mental rehearsal and physical practice of a musical 
piece led to superior performance for guitarists compared to physical practice alone (Theiler & 
Lippman, 1995). Finally, Liu, Chan, Lee & Hui-Chan (2004) observed that the relearning of 
movements of daily tasks (e.g. putting the clothes on hanger and fold the laundry) in stroke patients 
assigned to mental practice of activities of daily living plus physiotherapeutic treatment was 
significantly better than subjects who received the conventional treatment only.  
As an explanation for these three findings regarding the functional effects of motor imagery on the 
physical execution of actions, on Jeannerod’s (2006) account, by mentally rehearsing a physical 
action, the activation of the motor system may facilitate future execution of the action. Jeannerod’s 
(2006) hypothesis is supported by experimental data. For instance, by mapping the motor cortical area 
using a TMS when subjects learned a five-finger exercise on the piano, in which some were assigned 
to the physical practice and some to the mental training group, Pascual-Leone et al. (1995) observed 
that the levels of excitability of the motor cortex of subjects assigned to the mental training group 
increased the same way over the five days of training as compared to subjects assigned to the physical 
practice group.                    
Given the empirical findings described above, according to Jeannerod (1995, p. 1419) “motor images 
are endowed with the same properties of those of the corresponding motor representations, and 
therefore have the same functional relationship to the imagined or represented movement and the same 
causal role in the generation of this movement”. This claim raised by Jeannerod (1995) is regarded as 
the functional equivalence hypothesis between motor imagery, motor preparation and motor execution 
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(Jeannerod, 1994). In the light of the functional equivalence hypothesis raised by Jeannerod (1994), 
the next section will thoroughly discuss the motor representations that underlie motor imagery and 
motor preparation of one’s own actions, and the relationship between these two instances of motor 
representations. 
 
2.4 Motor imagery and motor preparation of one’s own actions 
The findings described in the last section  about the brain mechanisms, the physiological correlates 
and the relationship between time and force in the imagery of physically executed movements have 
raised questions regarding the nature of motor representations of actions. In line with these findings, 
Jeannerod (1994, p. 193) hypothesizes that motor representations for acting and imagining are one of 
the same thing, underlying a “continuum between motor preparation and motor imagery”, which 
contrasts to “classical ideas of a unitary symbolic representation for the different types of mental 
activities, including motor representation”.  
As observed in section 2.1 of this present study, the account that mental images can be expressed by 
language-like amodal, abstract symbols in an unitary representational system, has been confronted by, 
for instance, the view proposed by Paivio’s (1971/1986) with his dual coding theory, and by Kosslyn’s 
(1980) analog theory for visual mental imagery. In line with Paivio’s (1971/1986) dual coding theory, 
Jeannerod (1995) claims that although the linguistic and the imagery systems are functionally 
independent but still interconnected, motor images are difficult to describe verbally (e.g. the details of 
the motion of the leg when a footballer kicks the ball towards the back of the net), unlike visual 
images and the features of the represented object (e.g. shape, size, color, etc.). Yet, motor 
representations, as Jeannerod (1994, 1995) claims, are cognitively accessible through the behavioral 
paradigms reported in the previous section (e.g. the matching and the chronometric measure between a 
physically executed movement and its imagined counterpart). 
Although Jeannerod (1994) claims that motor representations of actions underlie a continuum of motor 
preparation and motor imagery that encode the properties of physically executed action (e.g. time 
similarity, effort, biomechanical constraints of the body, etc.) and some of the same neural structures 
are shared by both, the author points out that both differ in terms of nature (or, as we will see, in terms 
of degree). On the one hand, motor preparation has an implicit nature, being a non-conscious process 
that cannot be accessed by the subject’s awareness, in which only the final result (the action) can be 
consciously accessed by the subject. On the other hand, motor imagery and the content of motor 
images can be consciously accessed by the subject.   
This difference between motor preparation and motor imagery is further described by Jeannerod 
(1994, 1995, 2006). First, motor representations, as Jeannerod (1995, p.1427) points out, are defined 
as “internal models of the goal of an action, (in which) the goal of an action can be specified at 
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different levels which represent different aspects of the same action”. In other words, as Jeannerod 
(2006) claims, actions have goals and most of the times we are aware of the goal to be reached and the 
subsequent action that needs to be undertaken in order to accomplish the goal. However, this does not 
mean that we are aware more specifically of how to reach that goal. For instance, when people start to 
walk voluntarily, the intention of that movement is toward a goal (e.g. arriving at a certain place) and 
not the way the legs are moving. Moving the legs in order to accomplish the goal (arriving at a certain 
place) seems to be, in this case, an automatic set of movements. Most of our actions are prepared an 
executed this way, directed at an external object and goal-oriented. Jeannerod (2006, p. 46) 
hypothesizes that this automaticity that underlies most of our actions is a “prerequisite for their 
accuracy”. In fact, the motor preparation of one’s action should have a short life-span, since most of 
the times one action is followed by another action, which is followed by another one, and so on (e.g. in 
order to walk to reach a certain destination, the movement of one leg is usually followed by the 
movement of the other leg, resulting in a motion towards the front). Thus, physically executing a set of 
movements fast and accurately involves a time constraint, which leaves no space for consciousness to 
appear every time we carry out an automatic action. For example, when people learn to execute a new 
motor skill (e.g. a child learning how to swim on a butterfly mode), the movements are usually 
executed under conscious control, in this case, the child has to move his/her arms and legs very slowly 
and probably inaccurately in order to learn the movements of his/her arms and legs to execute the 
swimming on butterfly mode properly. After training, these movements that once were under 
conscious control become automatic and executed faster and more accurately. In sum, Jeannerod 
(2006) argues that consciousness arrive too late when we execute automatic goal-directed actions, 
hence, it should not play a causal role in this stage of planning or organizing the physical execution of 
automatic goal-directed actions.             
Further, Jeannerod (1994, 1995) claims that there is a fine line between motor preparation (non-
conscious) and motor imagery (conscious) along the continuum of motor representations that he 
proposes. More specifically, when motor preparation, which, according to the last paragraph, usually 
has a short life-span in automatic goal-directed actions (Jeannerod, 2006), is prolonged, the intention 
to act would become “a motor image of the same action” (Jeannerod, 1994, p. 193). Likewise, when 
an action is planned and purposely blocked at the last moment, it could also be transformed in a 
conscious mental image. As Jeannerod (1995) claims, in these conditions where action is prolonged in 
the motor preparation stage, or is blocked and not physically executed, the motor memories are not 
erased completely and neurons fired during the motor preparation phase remain activated. These motor 
memories and the neural activation of the motor action after the fail/block in execution would then 
give rise to conscious motor images. The hypothesis that motor images could be originated after 
fail/block of physical execution of an action or due to a delay in the motor preparation stage, are 
supported by studies with amputated subjects (e.g. Schilder, 1935). In these cases, subjects report as if 
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they were feeling movements in the phantom limbs and also report having a clear image of the 
movement that was not executed, suggesting that purposely blocked execution of the action does not 
cancel the representation of the action in the cases of amputated subjects, hence, the representation of 
the action remains accessible to conscious processing (Jeannerod, 1994). 
In sum, as Decety and Grèzes (2006) point out, both conscious (motor images) and unconscious 
(motor preparation) levels are not independent from each other, but rather they represent different 
aspects (that vary in terms of degree) of a continuum inserted within the motor cognition framework 
when it comes to the simulation of motor actions. In the following section, this continuum that 
comprises motor preparation, motor image and motor execution and how are they related to each other 
in motor simulation will be discussed. Also, the relation between motor simulation and weak 
conceptual embodiment will be established.   
 
2.5 Motor simulation  
In the light of the empirical findings described in section 2.3 and the functional equivalence hypothesis 
between motor imagery, motor preparation and motor execution proposed by Jeannerod (1994), a 
theory of motor simulation has been proposed. 
According to Jeannerod (2001) this motor simulation system relies on the motor system, involving a 
network of covert aspects of the action (e.g. motor preparation and motor imagery) and the physical 
execution of the same actions, the overt aspect. As the author hypothesizes, “this simulation network is 
activated under a variety of conditions that relates to action, either self-intended or observed from 
other individual. (…) the function of this process of simulation would be not only to shape the motor 
system in anticipation to execution, but also to provide the self with information on the feasibility and 
the meaning of potential actions” (p. 104). Moreover, as Jeannerod (2006) points out, this simulation 
process requires the activation of the motor system. This hypothesis raised by Jeannerod (2001) on 
how this simulation network would actually work and the conditions in which it is activated will be 
clarified in the following paragraphs.  
First, it is important to note that this simulation theory comprises not only the actions that we perform 
ourselves, but also the perception of other people’s actions. Although the scope of the present study is 
to discuss the accounts of simulation and motor representations of our own actions in the light of weak 
conceptual embodiment and the ECT, it is noteworthy to briefly refer to the simulation present in 
action observation since both types of simulation may recruit some of the same neural structures, but 
may differ in some aspects, and because simulation of other people’s actions allows us to acquire 
motor knowledge that will guide our own actions in the future (Decety & Sommerville, 2007).   
As observed in the section about the empirical findings in motor imagery, it has been found out that 
macaques possess mirror neurons, which are activated when they see other macaques physically 
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performing the same action they had just executed (Di Pellegrino et al.,1992; Gallese et al.,1996; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Likewise, humans’ Precentral Motor Cortex (Hari et al., 1998), Cerebellum 
(Grafton et al., 1998), and the SMA (Stephan et al., 1995) are reportedly implicated when we observe 
other people physically executing an action. These brain areas, as we have seen in section 2.3, are part 
of the mechanisms involved in the motor cognition framework, which comprises motor imagery, 
motor preparation and motor execution. Hence, observation of others’ action shares the same 
representational system as motor imagery, motor preparation and motor execution (Decety and 
Sommerville, 2007). 
When we observe and simulate other people’s actions, Gallese and Goldman (1998) argue that, to 
some extent, we represent their actions much the same way we represent our own. As the authors 
claim, “when one is observing the action of another, one undergoes a neural event that is qualitatively 
the same as the event that triggers actual movement in the observed agent” (p. 498). Moreover, the 
covert simulation and representation of other people’s action may provide us with insights into the 
plans, beliefs and desires that motivate other individuals to perform a particular action, and by doing 
this we understand the action performed by other people, why that action was performed, predict the 
future behavior of that individual, the consequences of that action, and learn how to replicate the 
action in the future ourselves (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi & Gallese, 1996; Jeannerod, 2001; Decety 
and Sommerville, 2007).  
Jeannerod (1994) provides a very interesting example of learning through observation-based 
simulation: a student learning how to play a music instrument (e.g. the piano) observes the teacher 
playing the piano; the student is instructed to later imitate the teacher and play the instrument just like 
demonstrated. Although the student had just observed the teacher playing the piano, he must imagine 
in his mind the teacher’s action (in this case, the way he strikes the piano keys). When they change 
role and the student is on the piano replicating the teacher’s movements that had just been observed, 
the teacher observes him playing and, despite he is not playing the piano himself, he understands the 
student’s action (the way the student plays the piano) and may experience a feeling of how the piano 
should be played. Then, based on this feeling and on his observation, he may provide the student with 
some feedback on how to improve his piano playing skills. In sum, Jeannerod (1994) speculates that 
this imitation-based learning technique is based on the discharge of mirror neurons as both teacher and 
student observed each other playing the piano.  
Although there is evidence that action observation shares the same representational system as our own 
actions, the simulation of other people’s actions may differ from simulation (or some stages of 
simulation) of one’s own actions. The main difference, as Iachini (2011, p.16) claims, is that motor 
imagery “is a simulation processes generated internally, voluntarily, and requires conscious control”, 
whereas the action observation is “generated by en external event, is automatic, and does not require 
conscious control”. Also, action observation is an online process, which occurs in the presence of the 
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stimulus – in this case, the action being observed. On the other hand, motor imagery is the case of an 
offline process that utilize perceptual and motor systems, in which the physical input is not currently 
present (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Borghi, 2011).      
In the case of self-intended actions, Jeannerod (2001) argues that covert actions (e.g. mentally 
prepared or mentally imagined) are actually actions, except for the fact that they are not overtly 
executed. As the author claims, the two stages – the overt and covert stage of actions – are part of a 
continuum in which every physically executed action necessarily has a covert stage. However, not 
every covert stage of an action turns out to be physically executed. This covert stage, as Jeannerod 
(1999) points out, can be seen as a pragmatic representation of the action, which includes the goal of 
the subsequent action, the means to achieve it and the consequences of the action. As reported in the 
empirical findings of motor imagery section, motor representations of an action also include time and 
effort to perform an action, and the motor rules and biomechanical constraints of our body. Finally, as 
described in the last section, the covert stage of an action consists of motor preparation and motor 
imagery. Although we can consciously generate images of our own actions, the process involved in 
generating an action takes place at a more unconscious level in the motor preparation stage (Decety & 
Grèzes, 2006).    
MR of bodily-related pictures seems to be an example of “covert simulation of motor rotation” 
(Wexler et al., 1998, p. 78). As described in the empirical findings of motor imagery section, when 
subjects carry out a MR of bodily-related pictures, they seem to rely upon cortical areas that overlap 
with those involved in motor imagery. Likewise, it has also been reported that, in order to accomplish 
the MR of bodily-related pictures, subjects take their own bodies as a reference, thus imagining as if 
they were physically rotating their own limbs or other parts of the body. By employing this strategy, it 
was observed a correlation between the time to mentally rotate a picture of a hand and to perform its 
overt counterpart, since RTs of pictures depicted in larger degrees of inclination were much higher 
compared to pictures displayed in the canonical orientation, those that actually resembled the 
canonical position of our limbs and our body in space (Parsons, 1987a, 1987b, 1994). Thus, as Wexler 
et al. (1998) point out, when we carry out a MR of bodily-related pictures, we usually plan to rotate 
our own limbs in order to guide us to a response to the stimulus displayed on the screen, but we do not 
physically execute this action (by default, before a MR task, either of cubes or bodily-related pictures, 
subjects are instructed not to move their body while they perform the task). Apart from consisting of 
simulation of bodily movements in a 1PP, MR of bodily-related pictures seem to be an example of a 
task in which the structural features of one’s body play a constraining role in the performance. This 
correlation between performance at MR of bodily-related pictures and the claim from ECT that the 
body plays a constraining role in cognition will be further explored in the following section of the 
present study.   
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Apart from MR of bodily-related pictures, this simulation of an overt action seems to take place when 
subjects also carry out MR of inanimate objects. In this case, however, subjects only simulate the 
action of rotating an object when they carry out the task in which the endogenous force referred in the 
empirical findings of motor imagery is responsible for the MR of the object (e.g. grasping a cube and 
rotating it until the subject is able to provide a response). On the other hand, if an exogenous force is 
responsible for the rotation of the object, subjects do not perform the task imagining as a simulation of 
their hands rotating the object, but rather, by an external force doing it (e.g. an electric motor) 
(Kosslyn et al., 1998, 2001b). 
Jeannerod (2001) provides two hypotheses of why the activation of the motor system does not result in 
overt movements. First, it is claimed that the activation of the motor system during simulation is 
subliminal, therefore, not sufficient to cause the discharge of spinal motoneurons. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the findings by Roth et al. (1996) and Dechent et al. (2004). Whereas the former 
observed that, by comparing cortical activation in the primary motor cortex, the activation elicited by 
motor imagery corresponded to 30% of the total sum of activation of overtly executed tasks, the latter 
reported that the activation of the primary motor cortex lasted only a few seconds, promptly vanishing. 
As an alternative explanation, Jeannerod (2001) proposes that motor execution is blocked before the 
motor preparation stage of an action reaches the motoneuron level, in which an inhibitory mechanism 
would be generated simultaneously to the motor activation. On this account, Jeannerod and Frak 
(1999) suggest that the inferior Frontal Cortex is the area responsible for motor inhibition during 
motor simulation. The authors made this suggestion based on Deiber et al’s (1998) study that used a 
PET scan to observe the activation in cortical areas when subjects both imagined or imagined and 
physically executed finger movements. As a result, in the latter condition, the authors found an 
activation decrease in the inferior prefrontal cortex in comparison to the former condition.   
Brain lesions in the motor areas have been reported to affect the functioning of this simulation network 
proposed by Jeannerod (2001) as studies with patients that suffered from brain lesions in specific brain 
areas have demonstrated that the patients were unable to mentally perform physical actions. This has 
been observed in hemiplegic patients who suffered corticospinal lesions, in which one hand was 
affected by the brain lesion and the other was not. As Sirigu et al. (1995) observed, motor imagery was 
slower for the affected limb compared to the non-affected one. Likewise, Parkinson’s disease patients 
who suffered from lesions in the Basal Ganglia showed the same asymmetrical pattern of performance 
in terms of motor imagery tasks involving their hands (Dominey et al. 1995). Apart from these studies 
indicating an asymmetrical pattern of responses in terms of motor imagery tasks of hand movements, 
impairments that result from Apraxia syndrome also affect motor representations of the patient. In this 
case, as Sirigu et al. (1996) observed, these patients fail to distinguish their own actions from actions 
performed by other people. Finally, patients with lesions in the Prefrontal Cortex, more specifically, in 
the Orbitofrontal areas (Shallice, Burgess, Schon & Baxter, 1989) compulsively imitate actions 
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performed by another person in front of them and cannot refrain from grasping objects. Although there 
are still no studies that investigated if this sort of lesion impaired motor imagery in these patients, 
Jeannerod (2001) supposes that, due to their compulsion in imitating other people and grasping 
objects, these patients would probably immediately transfer their motor images into a motor output. 
In summary, the simulation theory proposed by Jeannerod (2001) predicts that the covert stage of a 
given action is the action itself; however, the covert action has either subliminal neural activation or is 
blocked at some point, not being physically executed. In line with this claim, it has been found that 
both covert and overt actions are part of a continuum in which some of the same neural mechanisms 
are used when we plan, imagine or execute an action. These neural substrates are typically located in 
the Premotor and Motor cortices, as observed in empirical findings of motor imagery; hence, this 
simulation process occurs in modality-specific systems and makes use of the re-activation of neural 
circuitry that is also active in bodily perception, motor action and introspection. In other words, in line 
with this framework that comprises motor cognition and conceptual embodiment discussed in section 
2.2 of the present study, since concepts deploy the simulations of perceptual, motor and introspective 
experiences, then motor concepts deployed in motor imagery seem to be grounded in modality-
specific systems of the brain, namely, the motor cortices; thus, if Jeannerod’s (2001) simulation theory 
is correct, then motor simulations would make the case for weak conceptual embodiment, in which 
some concepts (in this case, motor concepts deployed in motor imagery) are grounded in modality-
specific areas, such as the motor cortices (Barsalou, 1999; Svensson & Ziemke, 2004; Decety & 
Grèzes, 2006). The next section will provide examples of how the non-neural parts of the body can 
play a constraining role in cognitive processes, in particular, in motor imagery.  
 
2.6  Body as a constraint on motor imagery 
As described in the introductory notes and in section 1.2.1 of the present study, one of the central 
tenets of the ECT is that the specific body we have intrinsically constrains the nature of mental 
activity, shaping the cognitive activity and the content of our mental representations, according to 
Foglia and Wilson (2013). More precisely, Wilson and Foglia (2017, p. 7) raise two possible 
implications that the claim that the body constrains cognitive activity may have: 
1) “Some forms of cognition will be easier, and will come more naturally, because of an agent’s 
bodily characteristics; likewise, some kinds of cognition will be difficult or even impossible 
because of the body that a cognitive agent has. 
2) Cognitive variation is sometimes explained by an appeal to bodily variation” 
In line with the two implications derived from the claim that our specific body constrains the nature of 
cognitive processing pointed out by Wilson and Foglia (2017) above, this section will describe some 
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theoretical assumptions and empirical findings of the human body functioning as a constraint on motor 
imagery, in special, in cognitive tasks such as MR of bodily-related pictures.  
First, the claim that the body can play a constraining role in cognition has been studied in a wide range 
of cognitive activities other such as memory (e.g. Dijkstra, Kaschak & Zwaan, 2007), language 
comprehension (e.g. Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), valence of stimuli (e.g. Foroni and Sermin, 2009), 
decision-making (e.g. Casasanto, 2009), etc. Apart from these cognitive activities, the ‘body as a 
constraint’ on cognition can also be observed in studies related to motor imagery. Since motor imagery 
consists of a simulation of overt movements, cognitive tasks that require motor simulation may take 
into account the biomechanical aspects of the body (Jeannerod, 1994, 1995, 2001, 2006).  
As observed in empirical findings of motor imagery of the present study, the time to either respond 
about the grip posture that would be the most comfortable to grasp and object and the judgment about 
the feasibility in grasping a cup of tea linearly increased as a function of the position in which the 
object was displayed on a screen and the biomechanical constraint and the motor rules of the human 
body (Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Frak et al., 2001). Similarly, when subjects observed 
rapidly alternating photographs of the human body in different positions, depicting an apparent 
motion, Shiffrar and Freyd (1990) reported that paths of apparent motion take into account the 
biomechanical constraints of our joints. Finally, when examining the identification of human actions 
and body postures in long-term priming experiments with static pictures of a human model, in which 
subjects had to either describe the pose or judge whether the target picture depicted a possible or 
impossible human pose, Daems and Verfaillie (1999) observed no long-term facilitating priming 
effects in case of pictures depicting impossible human poses compared to pictures depicting 
anatomically possible human poses (Amorim, Isableu & Jarraya, 2006).        
Perhaps one the most studied experimental tasks that can exemplify the ‘body as a constraint’ on 
motor imagery is the MR tasks of bodily-related pictures. According to Wexler et al. (1998), instead of 
physically executing a rotation with the hand or other body parts, in MR tasks we plan the action but 
do not physically execute it. As it is proposed by some authors (e.g. Wohlschläger, 1996; Wexler et 
al., 1998, Kosslyn et al., 2001a;), rather than being a perceptual phenomenon only, MR of bodily-
related pictures is also supposed to be an imagined action in the sense that its only difference to motor 
action is the absence of motor output.  
In line with this link between covert action and MR tasks of bodily-related parts, as Cooper and 
Shepard (1975) point out, people find it easier to mentally rotate body parts in ways that would be less 
awkward to rotate them physically. In this case, it is important to note that the awkwardness in the 
overt execution of a movement referred by Cooper and Shepard (1975) is directly correlated to the 
angle in which the picture of (in this case) the body part, or the whole body, displayed on the screen. 
As it has been reported in several studies, the time to make a laterality judgment of a stimulus reflects 
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the degree of MR needed to bring one’s body parts to a position adequate for achieving the task, 
reflecting on an almost perfect linear increase of RTs with angular stimulus disparity (Parsons, 1987a; 
Parsons, 1987b, Parsons, 1994; Parsons et al., 1995; Wolschlager, 1996; Parsons & Fox, 1998). Thus, 
as Wexler et al. (1998) point out, in the case of the rotation of one’s hand, the angle in which the 
picture is displayed on the screen would limit the biomechanics of the arm joints when one physically 
rotates the hand, hence, RTs and ACC levels in MR tasks of bodily-related pictures reflect the 
biomechanical constraints of the body. The same patterns of RTs and ACC levels have been reported 
in MR of pictures of feet and the whole body, in which the limbs are outstretched in different 
orientations (Parsons, 1987a; Parsons, 1987b). In sum, in line with one of the central claims from 
ECT, more specifically, that an organism’s bodily structures play a constraining role in cognition, 
since subjects employ simulations of their own bodily movements to accomplish the MR of bodily-
related pictures, and performance decrease according to the awkwardness of the position of the body 
part displayed on the screen that ultimately reflects on subjects’ biomechanical constraints, then MR 
of bodily-related pictures could be the case of a task in which one’s bodily structures play a 
constraining role cognition, and consequently, in performance (Parsons, 1987a 1987b, 1994, De 
Lange, Helmich & Toni, 2006). 
As stated in the simulation section of the present study, Kosslyn et al. (1998, 2001b) reported that 
motor imagery strategies can be applied in the MR of objects, provided that subjects simulate the 
rotation of the object with their own hands. When rotating the object through an endogenous force, 
Kosslyn (2001b) observed very similar RTs patterns as those observed in studies of MR tasks of 
bodily-related picture: a linear increase of RTs and decrease in ACC levels according to the angle of 
inclination of the object, suggesting that biomechanical constraints of the body may also play a role in 
MR of inanimate objects when endogenous forces are responsible for the MR of the object. 
Apart from Kosslyn et al’s (1998, 2001b) studies regarding the different strategies employed by 
subjects in order to carry out a MR of inanimate objects, Amorim et al. (2006) investigated whether 
providing inanimate objects (e.g. cubes) with bodily characteristics (e.g. by adding head, hands, and 
feet to the object or displaying the picture of a human pose resembling the shape of the cube) would 
facilitate the MR process and, consequently, speed up the MR required in order to match distinct 
shapes to a target. As a result, Amorim et al. (2006) observed that subjects had lower RTs and higher 
ACC levels when they performed the MR task and, consequently, the picture-matching task of cubes 
with bodily characteristics or the human poses simulating the cubes compared to ordinary cubes. In 
line with these results, Amorim et al. (2006) suggest that the added bodily characteristics to the cubes 
provided spatial embodiment to the objects. This spatial embodiment (Lakoff and Johson, 1999) was 
used to “map one’s body axes (head-feet, front-back, left-right) onto the reference posture”, in this 
case, the cubes (Amorim et al., 2006, p. 344), allowing subjects to perform a simulation of the 
movement by taking their own bodies as a perspective to carry out this simulation, and therefore, the 
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rotation of the objects. This process, as Amorim et al. (2006) claim, facilitated subjects’ performance 
in the MR task by helping maintaining the postural configuration of the object during the task. Finally, 
this study has also reported that subjects had more difficulty (slower RTs and lower ACC levels) in the 
MR and picture matching of pictures of the cubes with bodily characteristics depicting 
biomechanically impossible human poses compared to those that depicted biomechanically possible 
postures.  
In sum, these MR findings elucidated above are consistent with the hypothesis that MR of bodily-
related pictures rely on similar mechanisms involved in the continuum of motor preparation, motor 
imagery and motor execution stated by the functional equivalence hypothesis proposed by Jeannerod 
(1994, 2006), in which the biomechanical constraints of the body are taken into consideration when 
subjects perform the simulation of their body parts to carry out the task, limiting the RTs and ACC 
levels under conditions in which the stimuli depicted on the screen requires biomechanically 
impossible movements by the subject. 
As observed in the simulation section of the present study, brain lesions that affect the modality-
specific systems, such as the motor areas (e.g. Parkinson’s disease) seem to constrain patients’ abilities 
to perform motor imagery of hands movements (Dominey et al., 1995), as well their abilities to 
distinguish their own actions from others’ (Sirigu et al., 1996) and the possibility of turning every 
motor imagery task into a motor output (Shallice et al., 1989). In line with these findings, it has been 
reported that MR abilities are also impaired due to neurological conditions. Fiorio et al. (2007) 
observed that patients with focal hand dystonia, a neurological disease that causes the loss of control 
of hand movements and involuntary contractions of the muscle (Elbert et al., 1998), only had their 
abilities to mentally rotate pictures of hands impaired compared to control subjects; MR of pictures of 
feet remained unaffected. Likewise, in a study with patients affected by idiopathic cervical dystonia 
(CD), a neurological condition characterized by the loss of voluntary neck movements, leading to 
abnormal neck rotations (Jankovic, Leder, Warner & Schwartz, 1991), Fiorio et al. (2007) observed 
that subjects with CD had impaired MR of bodily-related pictures  (heads, hands and feet) compared 
to control groups; however, this condition only affected this specific modality of MR, since RTs and 
ACC levels between CD patients and the control group were not significantly different. 
It has also been observed that MR of bodily-related pictures abilities is impaired due to peripheral 
alterations, such as limb amputation. Although the loss of a limb, either dominant or non-dominant, 
did not impede subjects to perform motor imagery tasks such as MR of bodily-related pictures, Nico et 
al. (2004) observed that the amputees’ group performance was significantly worse than the control 
group in terms of RTs and ACC levels. Interestingly, both groups had similar response patterns, in 
which it was found a correlation in terms of RTs and ACC levels of pictures of hands depicted in 
biomechanically awkward degrees of inclination between the groups. Finally, this impairment in MR 
of bodily related pictures observed in amputees was strongly affected by the side of the limb loss, in 
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which RTs were slower and ACCs levels were lower for stimulus that depicted amputated dominant 
limbs than non-dominant counterparts. 
As an explanation for these findings, Fiorio et al. (2006, 2007), Moseley (2004) and Nico et al. (2004) 
argue that limb amputations cause a disruption in a subject’s body schema. In sum, body schema is a 
long-term organized unconscious representation of the body and the spatial relationships between 
body parts and the environment (Reed, 2002; Gallagher, 2005). Moreover, body schema, as Gallagher 
(2005, p. 24) points out, is a “system of sensorimotor capacities that function without awareness or the 
necessity of perceptual monitoring” that enables/constrains bodily movements. This system, as 
Fredericks (1985) and Moseley (2004) claim, is originated from multimodal sensations from visual, 
tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular inputs and is integrated with our motor system. The body 
schema, as Reed (2002) argues, provides us with the knowledge about our own body movement 
constraints and how a body movement can be performed. For instance, poking the nose with the hand 
requires a coordinated functioning of the knowledge of the movements required to carry out the goal 
of raising our hand and touching our nose in a not-so gently way, and body schema provides us with 
the basis for this knowledge.  
As Reed (2002) and Fiorio et al. (2007) claim, there is a close link between our body schema and the 
abilities to perform MR of bodily-related pictures, since this task involves a spatial transformation of 
our own body parts (Parsons, 1987a). Thus, in line with the results of the abovementioned studies and 
the link between body schema and the abilities to carry out MR of bodily-related pictures, it is 
suggested that limb amputations result in a disruption and change in the body schema system, 
affecting the perception of the limbs depicted on the screen and, consequently, constraining the 
performance in tasks such as MR of bodily-related pictures (Moseley, 2004; Nico et al., 2004; Fiorio 
et al., 2007)
12
.                              
 
 3 Music Perception
13
 
In line with the topics discussed so far in the present study, a good amount of work within the field of 
Music Psychology has investigated how music perception engages the motor cortices (Patel & Iversen, 
2014). First, studies that employed brain mapping techniques have found out that perception of music 
and musical features, such as timbre, pitch, rhythm, melody and harmony, are not solely confined in 
the auditory cortex, but that an interconnected network that comprises sensory, motor, affective and 
cognitive systems is also involved in music perception (Leman & Maes, 2014; Schaefer, 2014). In 
particular, it has been discussed the relationship between brain areas that have also been reported to 
                                                          
12
 Nico et al. (2004) speculate that a functional prosthesis of the limb that reestablishes part of the movements of a normal 
limb could be incorporated as part of the body schema of subjects, and eventually improve their performance in MR of 
bodily-related pictures.      
13
 A Glossary for some of the musical terminologies used in the sections regarding music perception is presented after the 
Appendixes of the present dissertation. 
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underlie motor cognition and how the activation of these areas is elicited when people are exposed to a 
variety of musical stimuli (Jeannerod, 2006; Grahn & Brett, 2007; Chen, Penhune & Zatorre, 2008a; 
Chen, Penhune & Zatorre, 2008b; Leow & Grahn, 2014). Furthermore, in line with the suggestion that 
an interconnected network of sensory, motor, affective and cognitive systems are involved in music 
perception, the relationship between music and mental imagery has also gained relevance in recent 
decades, giving rise to several studies that aimed to investigate the direct causal role that music may 
have over mental imagery and vice-versa (e.g. Quittner & Glueckauf, 1983; Tham, 1994; Rauscher, 
Shaw & Ky, 1993; Theiler & Lippman, 1995). More prominently, it has been observed that after 
listening to particular pieces of music, subjects had better performance at mental imagery-related tasks 
compared to control conditions, such as silence and relaxation instructions. This finding has been 
labeled as the Mozart Effect (Rauscher, Shaw & Ky, 1993), and received much attention in the 
beginning of the 90’s decade, being replicated and discussed in terms of possible brain mechanisms 
that would underlie the effect or, at times, the validity of these findings. This section aims to 
thoroughly discuss 1) the brain mechanisms involved in music perception, in special, brain areas that 
also comprise motor cognition, and 2) the relationship between music and mental imagery. 
 
3.1 Brain mechanisms of music perception 
Music is regarded to be part of the human nature (Koelsch, 2010). As Krueger (2013) points out, 
music is not just an object of mere aesthetic contemplation, but is rather a resource that we can use to 
do different things, from dancing in a party with friends to mourning at a family member’s funeral. 
Since early civilizations (e.g. Ancient Greece), the effects of music perception on our emotions and on 
our cognition has received particular attention. For instance, by proposing that musical scale is based 
on intervals of mathematical rations (e.g. 3:2. 2:1, 5:4, etc.) between notes within an octave, 
Pythagoras found that some of these intervals fit well together and produced beautiful melodies and 
consonant harmonies (Bilotta, Pantano & Talarico, 2000), which were seen as “divine revelations of 
universal harmony” (Miranda, 2002, p. 6). However, instead of being just classified in terms of 
Pythagorean mathematical ratios between them, Aristoxenus, an Aristotelian philosopher, claimed that 
musical intervals should also be classified according to the emotional effects they may have on the 
listener; with Aristoxenus’ claim, the need to focus on scientific studies of the effects of the music on 
the brain had been addressed (Levitin, Grahn & London, 2018). As such, considerable progress has 
been made to address the effects of the music on the brain since then: Nowadays, twenty centuries 
later, not only it has been found out that music perception can virtually modulate activity in limbic and 
paralimbic structures, the core structures of emotional processes (Koelsch, 2010), but it has also been 
widely reported that perception of music also elicits brain activation in areas that comprise network 
systems of language, motor control, emotions, and may share some of the functional properties as 
other perceptual modalities, such as, for instance, vision (e.g. Bodner, Muftuler, Nalcioglu & Shaw, 
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2001; Zatorre, Chen & Penhune, 2007; Koelsch, 2010, 2011; Leman & Maes, 2014). Some of these 
findings will be discussed in the next sections. 
 
3.1.1 Brain areas involved in music perception 
In his model of neural basis of music perception, Koelsch (2011, p.1) suggests that music perception 
involves distinct processes, such as “acoustical analysis, auditory memory, auditory scene analysis, 
processing of interval relations, (analysis) of musical syntax and semantics, and activations of (pre) 
motor representations of actions”. Some of these processes will be discussed below. 
First of all, the process of music perception begins with the extraction of acoustic information 
conveyed by the music. This acoustic information is transduced into neural activity in the cochlea, in 
which the auditory brainstem will progressively extract information from some of the properties of the 
sound just heard, such as periodicity, timbre, and intensity (Langner & Ochse, 2006; Koelsch, 2011). 
Once the acoustic information is transduced into neural activity, the thalamus is responsible for 
projecting these neural impulses into the Primary Auditory Cortex (PAC), which is located in the 
Broadmann’s area (BA) 42, and two adjacent secondary auditory cortical areas, situated in areas such 
as BA 42 and BA 52 (Kaas & Hacket, 2000; Koelsch, 2011). These auditory areas, as Koelsch (2011, 
p. 2) points out, are involved in some more fine-grained analysis of acoustic elements of the music in 
comparison to the auditory brainstem, such as “auditory sensory memory, extraction of inter sound 
relationships, discrimination, and organization of sounds as well as sound patterns (e.g. frequency and 
periodicity of a complex sound), stream segregation, automatic change detection, and multisensory 
integration”. Also, as Zatorre et al. (2007) argue, neurons lateral to the PAC seem to be sensitive to the 
fundamental frequency of a complex tone, suggesting that these cortical areas are part of a hierarchical 
system responsible for pitch coding. Finally, after the transformation of acoustic features of the sound 
into auditory percepts realized by the auditory brainstem and the auditory cortices, the acoustic 
information is ready for conceptual and conscious processing (Zatorre, 1988; Koelsch, 2011).  
During this process of extraction of auditory features of complex sounds, according to Koelsch’s 
(2011) model of neural basis of musical perception, auditory sensory memory operations also take 
place and Gestalten representations of auditory features are formed.  The auditory sensory memory 
network comprises areas located in the auditory cortices, as well as in the Frontal areas, including the 
Ventral Premotor Cortex (area BA 6), the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (BA 45) and the Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus (BA 44). Within these frontal areas, it is likely that the auditory sensory memory carry 
out operations such as attentional processing, sequencing and working memory processing 
(Schonwiesner et al., 2007). Also, during the Gestalten auditory formation process, a fine-grained 
process of grouping and separation of melodic, rhythmic and timbral features of the sound take place. 
This separation and grouping process of acoustic features of a complex sound are important in order to 
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“establish a cognitive representation of the environment” (Koelsch, 2011, p. 4), since this process 
allows us to recognize acoustic objects – a similar operation takes place in order to distinguish the 
voice of an interlocutor from sounds of the environment. Linked to the Gestalten formation stage, 
temporal and inferior prefrontal regions, as well as the right Superior Temporal Gyrus (STG) perform 
the analysis of intervals between the tones of a chord or the tones of a melody, in order to specify 
whether the chord is major/minor, for instance. Finally, these processes that take place during the 
auditory sensory memory operations and in the Gestalten formation are linked with both working 
memory and long-term memory (Näätänen, Tervaniemi, Sussman, Paavilainen & Winkler, 2000; Berti 
& Schröger, 2003). As Koelsch (2011) claims, in order to carry out the structuring of acoustic features 
of a complex sound, structures in the working memory and long-term memory are required (e.g. our 
knowledge about melodic contours, tonal information, musical pieces, etc.). Very importantly to note, 
though, the brain mechanisms that underlie tonal knowledge in working memory may vary between 
musicians and non-musicians. Whereas non-musicians use overlapping structures of phonological loop 
of verbal working memory, which accounts for areas such as the PMd, the Planum Temporale, the 
Inferior Parietal lobe, the Anterior Insula and the Cerebellum, musicians have two different systems 
that account for the ‘tonal loop’ and phonological loop in working memory. Whereas the former 
comprise areas such as the right Globus Pallidus, right Caudate Nucleus and the left Cerebellum, the 
latter comprise the right Insular Cortex (Hickock, Buschsbaum, Humphries & Muftuler, 2003; Peretz 
& Coltheart, 2003; Koelsch, 2011).   
Koelsch’s (2011) model of neural basis of music perception places particular interest in the 
relationship between the brain mechanisms activated in processing language and in music perception. 
More specifically, neuroimaging studies that investigated the brain mechanisms involved in the 
processing of musical syntax (the rules that govern melodic, rhythmic and harmonic construction 
according to the musical culture, like the function a chord has in a harmonic sequence in western 
music) observed that the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 44), in particular its right hemisphere, the 
superior part of the Pars Opercularis, the anterior portion of the STG and the Ventral Premotor Cortex 
are implicated in the musical syntax processing (Parsons, 2001; Janata et al., 2002; Koelsch et al., 
2002; Koelsch, Gunter, Wittforh & Sammler, 2005). It has been found out that the Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus (BA 44) is part of the Broca’s area involved in the processing of language syntax (Friederici et 
al., 2006), suggesting that the processing of both musical and language syntactic structures use some 
of the same cognitive mechanisms in overlapping brain areas. This suggestion is further evidenced by 
studies that used electroencephalography (EEG) and magneto encephalography (MEG), in which it 
was found out that the patterns of early right anterior negativity (ERAN) of the processing of chords 
with irregular functions in a harmonic progression interacted with the left anterior negativity (LAN) 
elicited by linguistic morpho-syntactic violations (Koelsch et al., 2005; Seinbeis & Koelsch, 2008). 
Very importantly to note, this ‘sophisticated’ mechanism in detecting violations in musical syntax is 
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not only observed in musicians; non-musicians seem to acquire such knowledge of music syntax 
during their daily listening experiences (Tillmann, Bharucha & Bingan, 2000; Koelsch, 2011).  
Likewise, by observing the N400, a negative event related potential (ERP), effect elicited after 
participant read a semantically unrelated word to a prime stimulus, which was either another sentence 
or musical excerpts, Koelsch et al. (2004) reported that the N400 effect (a negative deflection of peaks 
of ERPs that are part of the brain responses to visual and auditory words) patterns did not differ 
between the music and language priming conditions, since unrelated target words elicited a clear N400 
effect when followed by the presentation of priming sentences or musical excerpts. The source of the 
N400 effect for both music and language primes was the posterior part of the Medial Temporal Gyrus 
(BA 21/37), an area implicated in semantic processing in language. These findings suggest that 1) both 
can have similar effects in terms of semantic processing of words, 2) music can activate representation 
of either concrete or abstract concepts, and 3) the cognitive mechanisms that decode semantic 
information in language can be identical to those that decode meaningful information from music.  
Finally, in a model proposed by Zatorre et al. (2007), the authors suggest that distinct pathways 
emerge from the PAC, in which one stream is projected directly from the PAC within the temporal 
neocortex, another is projected towards the STG, and another, possibly, reaches the Ventral Stream 
and the Dorsal Streams. Whereas the former is regarded for extracting acoustic features that allow the 
identification of sound sources (Belin & Zatorre, 2000), the Dorsal Stream is regarded to play a similar 
role proposed for the Visual Dorsal Stream (Zatorre et al., 2007). Neurons located in the visual Dorsal 
Stream play a relevant role in the spatial processing of the visual stimulus (Rauschecker & Tian, 
2000). Likewise, Zatorre et al. (2007) suggest that the Dorsal Auditory Cortical Pathway may play a 
similar role in terms of spatial processing of the sounds. These findings suggest that both the auditory 
and the visual system may share some of same principles of functional organization (Belin & Zatorre, 
2000; Rauschecker & Tian, 2000; Zatorre et al., 2007).  
Apart from the suggestion that both auditory and visual systems may share the same principles of 
functional organization, it has been proposed that the Dorsal Auditory Cortical Pathway (in short, the 
Dorsal Stream) may have a role in linking the auditory systems to the motor systems. Firstly, Zatorre 
et al. (2007) claim that this link would be plausible, since the Dorsal Stream is relevant for the spatial 
processing of sounds and for tracking its spectral energy (the energy in the frequency distributed in a 
given sound) over time, and bodily movements occur in both time and space. Secondly, as Hickock 
and Poeppel (2007) propose, the Dorsal Stream may play a role in speech processing, in particular, in 
the sensorimotor and phonological decoding. Thus, due to the computational capacities of the Dorsal 
Stream over spatial and speech processing, it has been proposed that the Dorsal Stream may be an 
interface between sensory and motor networks, in which motor signals would modify the activity from 
sensory structures (Rauscheker & Scott, 2009; Rauscheker, 2011). Thirdly, Warren, Wise and Warren 
(2002) suggest that the Dorsal Stream is implicated in the preparation of motor responses to auditory 
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stimuli (e.g. arm movements towards sound location). Finally, anatomically, the Dorsal Stream links 
caudal auditory regions with Dorsal Frontal Premotor Cortices through Parietal Regions (Patel & 
Iversen, 2014). In line with the link between auditory and motor systems in music perception, the next 
section will thoroughly approach the involvement of motor areas in music perception, in particular, in 
beat perception. 
           
3.1.2 Motor areas in music perception 
As described in the last section, the auditory system is linked with the motor systems, and a good 
candidate for this link is the Dorsal Stream (Rauschecker & Tian, 2000; Zatorre et al., 2007; 
Rauscheker & Scott, 2009; Rauscheker, 2011). Also, a good amount of studies investigated the role of 
the Motor and Premotor areas during music perception, in special, during beat perception. Some of the 
findings that emerged from these studies will be described in this section. 
First, when we listen to a musical rhythm we often respond to it by tapping along with the beat, 
nodding our heads or even dancing, in which we often seek to synchronize these motor actions with 
the beat of the musical piece (Chen et al., 2008b). The synchronization between our motor actions and 
musical rhythms can be observed in infants, in which even before having full control of their motor 
system move rhythmically in response to a rhythmic pattern they listen to (Martin, 2005; Phillips-
Silver & Trainor, 2005; Zentner & Eerola, 2010). This synchronization between bodily movements 
and the music is known as entrainment. 
Entrainment is a concept that emerges from complex systems theory, and this phenomenon occurs 
when “two or more independent oscillatory processes are synchronized with each other, gradually 
adjusting toward – and eventually locking into – a common phase and/or periodicity” (Krueger, 2013, 
p. 3). In the particular case of music entrainment, a self-sustaining oscillatory process in the brain, 
distributed through cortical and subcortical areas, entrain to the rhythm of auditory sequences of an 
input, allowing listeners to coordinate their perception and their reactive bodily behavior (e.g. foot 
tapping) with the musical rhythms as they occur in time (Glass & Mackey, 1988; London, 2004).  
Jones and Boltz (1986, p. 466) describe the three primary stages of entrainment in human cognition: 
“1) perception, which primes the listener to form expectations; if expectations are met, then 2) 
synchronization; and if expectations are not met, then 3) adjustment or assimilation”. In other words, 
the synchronization is much related to our expectations of upcoming events, in the particular case 
being discussed in this section, the occurrence of the beats in a musical piece. This process may be 
facilitated according to how steady, or regularly patterned, the temporal events (in this case, the inter-
onset temporal intervals between the beats in a musical piece) are. Discrepancies between our 
expectations about these temporal events and the temporal events themselves in the music may result 
in lack of synchronization, consequently, lack of entrainment (Clayton, Sager & Will, 2005).      
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Levitin et al. (2018, p. 56) claim that, in order to achieve entrainment, an “internal representation of 
the beat must exist”. That is, in line with the perception stage of the entrainment process, people 
usually search for the beats of the musical piece (“finding the beat”) and, once the beat is found, an 
internal representation of the beat is formed, and predictions are based on the detected structure, and 
this process is known as “beat continuing” (Povel & Essens, 1985; Grahn and Rowe, 2013). As 
Levitin et al. (2018) point out, these processes underlying beat perception and prediction engage the 
motor systems of the brain.          
As such, several studies have been conducted in order to investigate the role of the motor areas of the 
brain in beat perception (e.g. Grahn & Brett, 2007; Chen et al., 2008a, 2008b; Grahn & Rowe, 2009, 
2013). Overall, it has been observed an increase of brain activation in regions of the motor system 
such as the Premotor Cortex, the Basal ganglia and the SMA when subjects listened to monotone 
sequences of musical beats compared to when subjects were at rest (Grahn & Brett, 2007; Chen et al., 
2008a; Grahn & Rowe, 2009).  
More specifically, Grahn & Brett (2007) conducted a study that employed behavioral (reproduction 
task) and neuroimaging (fMRI) paradigms, in which subjects had to listen to three different types of 
rhythmic sequences, namely Metric Simple, Metric Complex and Non-metric. Very importantly to 
note, the authors classified each rhythmic sequence according to integer ratio relationship between 
beat intervals in a given sequence (Essens, 1986). Whereas in the Metric Simple condition the beat 
accents occurred at regular intervals (the beat accent always occurred in the beginning of each group 
of four units of beats), in the Metric Complex and Non-metric conditions beat accents occurred at 
irregular intervals (the beat accent occurred at distinct periods, not always in the beginning of each 
group of four units of beats, in which for the Metric Complex stimulus the same interval ratios as the 
Metric Simple was employed, and for the Non-metric, a distinct interval ratio to both former stimuli 
was used). After listening to these sequences, subjects had to reproduce them as accurately as possible. 
As a result, subjects reproduced the Metric Simple rhythms significantly better than the Metric 
Complex and Non-metric, respectively.  
In another part of Grahn and Brett’s (2007) study, subjects went through an fMRI brain scanning. 
During the scanning, subjects completed a discrimination task, in which they listened to a few 
sequences of beats and responded whether they were the same or not (again, the sequences comprised 
Metric Simple, Metric Complex and Non-metric rhythmic sequences). This task yielded no significant 
differences in discrimination across rhythmic sequences. Finally, apart from showing activation in the 
auditory areas, fMRI data showed higher activation in areas such as the Pallidum, pre-SMA/SMA, 
PMd, the Basal Ganglia, Cerebellum, superior and left inferior STG, Putamen, Ventrolateral Prefrontal 
cortex/insula bilaterally while subjects listened to any rhythmic sequences compared to rest. By 
comparing activation across rhythmic sequences, Grahn and Brett (2007) observed that Metric Simple 
sequences elicited significantly higher activation in the Pallidum, pre-SMA/SMA, and STG bilaterally 
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compared to both Metric Complex and Non-metric sequences, respectively. Also, no significant 
differences were found between activation in any area of interest in the comparison between Complex 
and Non-metric sequences. Regarding the other areas of interest, none of them had higher activation in 
either Complex or Non-metric sequences compared to Metric Simple sequences.  Finally, Grahn and 
Brett’s (2007) study also investigated the differences in brain activation between musicians and non-
musicians. As a result, Grahn and Brett (2007) observed that musicians had higher activation in areas 
such as the pre-SMA/SMA, Cerebellum and right PMd than non-musicians. A similar difference in 
brain activation in the motor areas between musicians and non-musicians are also observed elsewhere 
(Chen et al., 2008a, 2008b; Grahn & Rowe, 2009, 2013)  
The findings that motor areas are engaged while subjects listen to distinct rhythmic sequences have 
been replicated in a good amount of studies. For instance, in Chen et al.’s (2008a) study, subjects had 
to tap along and synchronize their tapping with Metric Simple, Metric Complex and Non-metric 
structures. Meanwhile, subjects had their brain scanned by an fMRI scanner, showing that areas such 
as the left SMA, bilateral Mid-Premotor cortex, bilateral Ventral Premotor Cortex and left Premotor 
Cortex were significantly more activated during the listening and tapping compared to rest. Also, 
again, levels of activation varied across rhythmic sequences (Metric Simple, Metric Complex and 
Non-metric) participants listened and tapped to. In order to verify whether this activation was due to 
the motor action of tapping along with the sequences, in the second part of Chen et al.’s (2008a) study, 
subjects naively listened to the sequences and made no movements with their bodies meanwhile. Brain 
scanning results showed that similar motor areas were activated while subjects only listened to the 
sequences compared to rest, with a few differences between both conditions – the Ventral Premotor 
Cortex was not recruited during the naïve listening condition. Also, by investigating the brain 
mechanisms involved in ‘beat finding’ and ‘beat continuation’ previously highlighted in this section, 
Grahn and Rowe (2013) found that the Basal Ganglia and the SMA are involved in beat continuation, 
and not in beat finding. More specifically, subjects listened to either beat-based rhythmic sequences 
(e.g. Metric Simple sequences) that were preceded either by non-metrical sequences (in this condition, 
they would have to find the beat in the following sequence) or by another beat-based sequence (in this 
case, subject would have to just continue making predictions about the beat structure they were 
already acquainted of). As a result, Grahn and Rowe (2013) found higher activation in the Basal 
Ganglia and the SMA in the former condition compared to the latter, suggesting that these areas are 
more involved in predicting the following beats of a sequence once the temporal structure has been 
found than in synchronizing with the beat.      
In line with the findings that the motor areas are engaged in rhythmic perception, it has been found 
that lesions in motor brain areas may impair beat perception to some extent. By comparing 
Parkinson’s disease patients and control subjects’ performance at a rhythmic discrimination task, in 
which subjects listened to a rhythmic structure (Metric Simple or Metric Complex) twice and had to 
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point out whether the third rhythm was the same or not, Grahn and Brett (2008) observed that controls 
had significantly higher scores in the discrimination task when the third rhythm was Metric Simple 
than Metric Complex. On the other hand, the Parkinson’s disease group did not yield any significant 
score differences in discrimination between the Metric Simple and Metric Complex rhythmic 
sequences. Interestingly, their discrimination levels in the Metric complex condition were similar to 
controls’. These results shed light on the Grahn and Rowe’s (2013) claim above that the Basal Ganglia 
seems to be directly involved in beat processing, more specifically, in extracting the beat structure of 
beat-based rhythms, such as the Metric Simple sequence, since Parkinson’s disease is characterized by 
loss of dopaminergic input into the Striatum and the impairment in the Basal Ganglia (Jellinger, 2001) 
and subjects from that group did not have better discrimination in Metric Simple structures compared 
to Metric Complex ones (Grahn and Brett, 2008).  Likewise, Cope, Grube, Singh, Burns and Griffiths 
(2014) observed that patients with Huntington’s disease and Multiple System Atrophy performed 
absolute and relative timing
14
 tasks significantly worse than control individuals. Whereas the former 
disease is characterized by a predominant degeneration of the Basal Ganglia (more specifically, in the 
Striatum), the latter comprises a degeneration of the Striatum, Substantia Nigra and Cerebellum. Based 
on the data, Cope et al. (2014) conclude that the Basal Ganglia may mediate both relative and absolute 
timings mechanisms. 
Apart from its engagement in music perception, more specifically, in beat perception, the motor areas 
also seem to be involved in music imagery. On this avenue of research, many studies have been 
carried out in order to examine the role of the motor areas in the imagery of music performance. As 
described in section 2.3 of the present study, Pascual-Leone et al. (1995) observed that subjects 
assigned to the mental training group of a five-finger exercise on the piano had similar patterns of 
increased activation in the motor areas compared to subjects assigned to the physical practice over the 
5 days of experiment as the TMS showed. Apart  from the role of motor areas in the imagery of music 
performance, Lima, Krishnan and Scott (2016) suggest that both the SMA and the pre-SMA are 
involved in auditory imagery of speech, syllables, words and music when subjects are instructed to 
generate auditory mental images in the absence of an auditory input. The activation of both areas has 
been reported in studies that employed neuroimaging techniques, such as fMRI , in studies in which 
subjects had to perform imagery of familiar tunes (Herholz, Halpern & Zatorre, 2012) or during the 
imagery of anticipation of sounds sequences (Leaver, Van Lare, Zielinski, Halpern & Rauschecker, 
2009). As Zatorre and Halpern (2005) suggest, there seems to be a cross-modal interaction between 
different sensory modalities (in this case, auditory and motor) during the imagery of music. In line 
with this cross-modality interaction suggested by Zatorre and Halpern’s (2005), the next section will 
discuss more about the effects of music on imagery. 
                                                          
14
 As Leow and Grahn (2014) point out, absolute timing is necessary for perception of non-beat rhythms, such as Metric 
Complex or Non-metric. On the other hand, relative timing is necessary for beat perception of beat-based rhythms, such as 
the Metric Simple, since all intervals are encoded in relation to a beat interval. 
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3.2 Music and Imagery 
In line with Zatorre and Halpern’s (2005) cross-modality interactions between different sensory 
modalities during the imagery of music, some studies have investigated the actual effects of music 
listening on imagery, either visual or motor. This section will discuss some of these studies. 
Most studies that investigated the effects of music on imagery focused on the visual imagery category. 
Firstly, perhaps in one of the first studies that investigated the effects of music on imagery, when 
subjects listened to synthesized music under relaxed conditions and reported their responses to music 
in a written form, by analyzing the content of responses into different categories, such as thoughts, 
emotions, sensations, and images, Osborne (1981) observed that the number of images responses were 
significantly higher than other categories’ responses, suggesting that subjects had more promptly 
imagery responses when listening to music compared to other categories analyzed in the study. 
Quittner and Glueckauf (1983) investigated subjects’ visual imagery production under the control 
condition (which consisted of subjects being instructed to imagine sitting on a bank of a river, 
followed by 3 minutes of free imagery), 3 minutes of deep relaxation, in which after relaxation they 
had to imagine a beach scene, and the listening of two selections of Steven Halpern’s anthology 
volume 1, followed by free imagery. By comparing three variables, namely the vividness of imagery, 
the ease of evocation and the amount of imaging time, Quittner and Glueckauf (1983) observed 
significantly higher ratings in all of these variables when subjects performed imagery under the music 
condition compared to control and relaxation. Likewise, by comparing subjects’ vividness of their own 
movements as an external viewer (visual imagery) or from an internal perspective (motor/kinesthetic 
imagery) while they listened to either upbeat (Kenny G’s “Against Doctor’s Orders”), slow music 
(Gymnopedies 1&2, by Erik Satie), or remained in silence (control condition), Tham (1994) observed 
that ratings of imagery vividness while subjects listen to both types of music were significantly lower
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than control conditions. What is more, although Tham (1994) did not observe any difference in ratings 
of imagery vividness between music conditions, the author observed that ratings of motor imagery 
vividness were significantly lower than vividness of visual imagery across all three conditions.  
The relation between music listening and imagery has also been the scope of studies in Music 
Therapy, giving rise to the Guided Imagery Music (GIM), a method in music therapy proposed by the 
music therapist Helen Bonny in the early 70’s (Bonde, 1999). As Bruscia (2002, p. 46) defines, the 
specific method proposed by Bonny is described as “an individual form of exploring consciousness 
(e.g. in healing, psychotherapy, self-development, spiritual work) which involves spontaneous 
imaging in an expanded state of consciousness to pre-designed (taped) programs of classical music, 
while interacting with a guide, who uses nondirective, non-analytical, music-based interventions, 
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 In order to measure the ratings of imagery vividness along the three conditions by which subjects were exposed to, Tham 
(1994) employed the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (VMIQ) an instrument that uses a 5-point scale in 
which the lower the final score, the higher the imagery vividness reported by subjects.    
55 
 
within a client-centered orientation, all within a session that has the following components: 
preliminary conversation, relaxation induction, guided music-imaging experience, return, and postlude 
discussion”. In other words, the GIM is a method in which the client is invited to share the images 
produced during the listening of a pre-selected tape of classical music, and these images are discussed 
by the end of the session (Bonny & Savary, 1973; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008). This method has been 
constantly modified as therapists may not follow all the GIM steps described by Bruscia (2002) or 
may have incorporated other musical genres into the pre-selected tape proposed by Bonny in the 
original description of the GIM method (Bonde, 1999; Perilli, 2017).  
Apart from Tham’s (1994) work in which the relation between music and motor imagery was 
investigated, a few other studies approached this relation. Kuan, Morris, Kueh and Terry (2018) 
investigated whether elite shooters’ performance at a dart-throwing task would be facilitated by the 
combination of a dart-throwing-related imagery script and music after a 12-session program. By 
comparing the three conditions in which subjects were randomly assigned to, namely control (no 
music, imagery only), relaxing music (Frederick Delius’s Florida suite: III Sunset “Near the 
Plantation”) and arousing music (Edmond Luca’s Conquerors of the Ages “Attila the Hun”), Kuan et 
al. (2018) observed that dart-throwing scores were significantly higher for the relaxing music group 
compared to the arousing music and control groups, respectively. Further, arousing music group’s 
dart-throwing scores did not reach significantly differences compared to control group. Likewise, 
Karageorghis and Lee (2001) compared subjects’ performance at a muscular endurance task in which 
they had to hold the dumbbells in a cruciform position. Subjects were either assigned to motivational 
music group, imagery group or group that combined both music and imagery. As a result, 
Karageorghis and Lee (2001) observed that the task was better performed after subjects listen to music 
and performed imagery combined compared to the two other conditions. Finally, Debarnot and Guillot 
(2013) investigated whether music tempo affected the temporal congruence between physical walking 
(physical practice) and imagined walking (motor imagery). Subjects had to perform both tasks while 
listening to fast music, slow music and in silence. As a result, the authors found out that, compared to 
silence condition, the ability to achieve temporal congruence between both physical and imagined 
walking significantly decreased when subjects performed the tasks under the slow music and fast 
music, respectively.   
Interestingly, two lines of explanation have been used in order to account for the results of the 
experiments described above. First, Tham (1994) hypothesizes that after listening to either slow or 
upbeat music, music activated or primed the right hemisphere of the brain, in which, as the author 
claims, is where “concurrent imagery experiences can be processed” (p. 40). On the other hand, 
control condition did not elicit any priming effect on the right hemisphere of the brain, thus imagery 
performance was not enhanced under this condition. Alternatively, in order to account for the results 
of their study, Kuan et al. (2018) measured subjects’ physiological signals (galvanic skin response, 
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peripheral temperature and heart rate) while subjects listened to both the dart-throwing-related 
imagery script and to either relaxing music, arousing music or no music. As a result, Kuan et al. 
(2018) observed that the physiological indices measured reflected on lower arousal for subjects 
assigned to relaxing music group compared to the arousing group and non music group. Based on 
these data, the authors hypothesize that the combination of relaxing music + imagery led to arousal 
decrease, which, in turn, led to a better performance at a fine motor skill-related task, such as dart-
throwing. 
In line with Kuan et al.’s (2018) account for the results observed in their data, Ballan and Abraham 
(2016, p. 170) propose that “for the GIM method to be successful, multimodal neurons and neurons 
susceptible for cross-modal influences, in both cortical and subcortical areas, must cooperate to 
promote homeostasis (…)”. In other words, Ballan and Abraham (2016) claim that by reducing the 
activation of Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal axis (HPA), the GIM method, which originally 
combines relaxation induction, listening to classical music and imagery, may regulate the client’s 
stress and arousal levels, as well as their emotions, ultimately promoting homeostasis. Likewise, 
reduction in cortisol levels decreased when subjects took part in a GIM session, compared to silence 
(McNinney, Antoni, Kumar, Tims & McCabe, 1997). Additionally, Chanda and Levitin (2013) claim 
that music modulates the HR, body temperature, galvanic skin response, and muscle tension, in which 
slow music is usually associated with decrease in heart rate, respiration and blood pressure. All in all, 
as Kuan, Morris and Terry (2017, p. 3) point out, relaxing music is likely to create a “less tense, less 
formal, and less restrained environment for imagery” possibly due to its characteristics, such as 
repetition, predictability in melody, harmony and rhythm, and the slow tempo (Juslin, 2008). As a 
result, the physical relaxation that emerges from music listening may enhance cognitive responses, 
including better visual/motor imagery performance. The next section will further explore these two 
different accounts, namely the priming/activation proposed by Tham (1994) and imagery as a 
consequence of change of arousal levels after listening to music (Kuan et al., 2017, 2018) in regards to 
the improvement in spatial-temporal tasks after listening to music, known as the Mozart Effect 
(Rauscher et al., 1993). 
 
3.2.1 The Mozart Effect 
Apart from the studies that relied on subjects’ self report about different features of imagery that 
emerged while they were listening to music, the effects of music on imagery have also been studied 
objectively by applying cognitive tasks that rely on imagery.  
One of the most prominent studies that investigated the effects of music on imagery by applying 
spatial-temporal reasoning cognitive tasks was carried out by Rauscher et al. (1993). In that study, in 
the pre-intervention stage, subjects were assigned to three different conditions: music condition, 
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relaxation condition and control condition. In the music condition, they listened to 10 minutes of 
Mozart’s 448K Sonata, in the relaxation condition they listened to 10 minutes of relaxation structures 
to reduce blood pressure, and the control condition just remained in silence for 10 minutes. After the 
pre-intervention stage, subjects then completed a spatial-temporal reasoning task, such as pattern 
analysis test, a multiple choice matrices test and the Paper-Folding and Cutting (PF&C) multiple 
choice test. As a result, Rauscher et al. (1993) observed that subjects had significantly higher scores 
for these tests after listening to 10 minutes of Mozart’s music compared to the other two conditions. 
Pulse rates were measured before and after listening conditions, yielding no interaction between 
listening condition and pulse times, therefore, excluding arousal as an explanation for the effect, 
according to the authors. 
In subsequent works, the Mozart effect was further investigated in which other musical stimuli were 
employed alongside Mozart’s 448K Sonata and control conditions. For instance, in Rauscher, Shaw, 
Levine and Ky’s (1994) and Rauscher, Shaw and Ky’s (1995) studies, subjects were divided into three 
groups, in which one group listened to Mozart’s 448K Sonata, another to a mix of Phillip Glass’ 
minimalist music, British trance music and a spoken story, and the third one remained in silence for 5 
days. By comparing the groups’ improvement, Rauscher et al. (1995) observed that the group that 
listened to Mozart’s 448K Sonata for 5 days yielded higher improvement in the task compared to the 
other two. However, on the same study, the authors compared performance between these groups on a 
short-term memory task, observing that listening to Mozart’s music yielded no significant differences 
in this specific test compared to the other conditions, suggesting that the Mozart Effect is likely to be 
specific to spatial-temporal reasoning tasks (Rauscher et al., 1995). The findings that listening to 
Mozart’s music enhanced subjects’ performance at spatial-temporal reasoning tasks (including MR of 
objects; e.g. Gilleta, Vrbancic, Elias & Saucier, 2003; Aheadi, Dixon & Glover, 2009) more than 
either control conditions or listening to other musical/auditory stimuli were reproduced elsewhere (e.g. 
Rideout & Labach, 1996; Rideout & Taylor, 1997; Rideout, Doherty & Wernert, 1998; Rauscher et 
al., 1997; Rauscher, Robinson & Jens, 1998; Xing et al., 2016).  
The main hypothesis raised in order to explain the Mozart Effect relates to the trion model of the 
cortex, proposed by Leng and Shaw (1991). The trion model is a highly structured mathematical 
realization of the Mountcastle’s (1979) organizational principle for the cerebral cortex, which 
proposes that “cortical column is the basic network in the cortex, and that is subdivided into small 
processing subunits or minicolumns (…)” (Leng, Shaw & Wright, 1990, p. 50). These cortical 
columns comprise a network of trions
16
 with a large number of quasi-stable, periodic spatial-temporal 
firing patterns that can be excited and enhanced by a small change in connection strengths, giving rise 
to temporal sequences that last tens of seconds over large portions of the cortex (Leng et al., 1990; 
                                                          
16
 As Leng and Shaw (1990) describe, a trion represents a mini column and is characterized for having localized, competing 
(between excitation and inhibition) and highly-structured interactions among other trions, in which the firing state of the 
network is updated by probabilistic rules that take into consideration the two previous states of each trion.    
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Leng & Shaw, 1991; Rauscher et al., 1995; Rauscher & Shaw, 1998). According to the trion model, 
these neural firing patterns occur symmetrically, and these symmetric operations are regarded as being 
a key feature of higher brain function, such as spatial-temporal reasoning (McGrann, Shaw, Shenoy, 
Leng & Matthews, 1994). Finally, according to Leng and Shaw (1991), exposure to music may excite 
these cortical firing patterns used in spatial-temporal reasoning, consequently affecting cognitive tasks 
that rely on this particular sort of reasoning. However, as Rauscher et al. (1994) claim, this change in 
firing patterns used in spatial-temporal reasoning is brought about by musical features that could be 
found in complex musical pieces, such as Mozart’s 448K Sonata, not being replicated in pieces with 
highly repetitive structures, such as Phillip Glass’ minimalist music 17.   
In line with the trion model account for the Mozart Effect, brain-mapping studies have investigated the 
brain areas involved during the listening of Mozart’s music. By comparing the differences in 
activation between Mozart’s 448K Sonata and Beethoven’s Für Elise through an fMRI, Bodner et al. 
(2001) observed that areas such as the Dorsolateral Pre-frontal Cortex, the Occipital Cortex and the 
Cerebellum (all areas expected to be important for spatial-temporal reasoning) had been more 
activated under Mozart’s music compared to Beethoven’s. Jausovec, Jausovec and Gerlic (2006), 
replicated the initial test conducted by Rauscher et al. (1993) and through an EEG, collected subjects’ 
event-related desynchronization/synchronization while they listened to Mozart’s 448K Sonata, 
remained in silent or listened to Brahm’s Hungarian Dance. As a result, not only the subjects in the 
Mozart group outperformed those assigned to other conditions in the spatial-temporal reasoning tasks, 
but the authors also found that the Mozart group displayed less complex EEG patterns and more α 
band synchronization in task-relevant areas than controls, and less complex EEG patterns and more -1 
α and γ synchronization in task-relevant areas than those who listened to Brahm’s music. Also, 
Jausovec et al. (2006) found out that exposure to Mozart’s music did not elicit any increase in arousal. 
As a conclusion for this study, Jausovec et al. (2006) claims that the changes spotted by the EEG are 
interpreted as if task-relevant brain areas were being activated during listening to Mozart’s music, 
which may have contributed to the subsequent performance at the spatial-temporal reasoning task. 
Finally, Trimmel, Goger, Spitzer and Geiss-Ganadia (2017) compared the differences in DC 
potentials, a neurophysiological measure of activation process that measures attention-related 
activation, between Mozart’s 448K Sonata, Albinoni’s Adagio, Schubert’s Fantasia in f-minor, and 
white noise. As a result, Trimmel et al. (2017) found that direct current (DC) potentials in prefrontal 
and frontal areas shifted negatively for Mozart’s music, whereas for the other auditory stimuli they 
shifted positively, suggesting that Mozart’s music enhanced attention for the processing of 
environmental information, which would consequently prime spatial information processing. In line 
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 Despite using the term ‘complex’ to characterize Mozart’s music, the Mozart Effect literature does not provide an 
objective account of why Mozart’s music is considered ‘complex’, neither how this complexity would prime the cortical 
areas responsible for spatial-temporal reasoning, consequently enhancing subjects’ performance after listening to Mozart’s 
K448 Sonata. In other words, it is not clear, if anything, which musical elements in Mozart’s music (e.g. harmony, melody, 
rhythm, all these elements combined, etc.) can be exactly regarded as ‘complex’ within the Mozart Effect literature.    
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with Jausovec et al.’s (2006) findings, Trimmel et al.’s (2017) study did not observe any relevant 
differences neither in autonomic responses (HR and SCR) nor in mood levels after subjects listened to 
each one of the musical pieces. 
The Mozart Effect has sparked some controversy among the scientific community. Firstly, a good 
amount of work has attempted to replicate the Mozart Effect, however, with no success (e.g. Stough, 
Kerkin, Bates & Mangan, 1994; Newman et al., 1995; Weeks, 1996; Steele, Ball & Runk, 1997; 
Steele, Bass & Crook, 1999;  McCutcheon, 2000). Secondly, in a meta-analysis conducted by Chabris 
(1999), by comparing Mozart’s music and silence conditions, the author observed a very small effect 
size in performance on various spatial tasks when subjects listened to either Mozart’s music or silence 
(d´ = 0.09), a slightly larger effect size in performance on specific spatial-temporal reasoning tasks, 
such as the PF&C (d´ = 0.14). However, Chabris (1999) observed a significantly larger effect size in 
performance of spatial-temporal reasoning tasks when comparing Mozart’s music with relaxation 
instructions as a control condition. Thus, Chabris (1999) attributed the Mozart Effect to changes in 
subjects’ arousal levels, since relaxation instructions tend to elicit a higher arousal decrease compared 
to listening to Mozart’s music.  
The arousal hypothesis has also been investigated as an account for the Mozart Effect. In Husain, 
Thompson and Schellenberg’s (2002) study, the authors manipulated Mozart’s 448K Sonata. By 
editing the original version, the authors created four different versions of the piece, in which one had 
major mode and fast tempo, the second version had major mode and slow tempo, the third version had 
minor mode and fast tempo, and the fourth version had minor mode and slow tempo. The authors 
hypothesized that the mode of the version (major or minor) would be correlated to changes in mood 
levels, whereas the major mode versions would increase the subjects’ mood levels compared to 
baseline and the minor mode would have the opposite effect, and the tempo of the musical piece (fast 
or slow) would elicit higher arousal levels compared to baseline (fast mode) or lower arousal levels 
(slow mode). Subjects were randomly assigned to any of the four listening conditions and after 
listening to the pieces, completed the PF&C test. As a result, Husain et al. (2002) observed that 
subjects had better performance after listening to major-fast, minor-fast, major-slow and minor-slow, 
respectively. Also, measures of arousal and mood levels both before and after exposure to stimulus 
confirmed the authors’ prediction about the reaction to the pieces would elicit on subjects’ arousal and 
mood levels. Taken together, these results suggest that the Mozart Effect is an artifact of changes in 
arousal and mood levels, as Husain et al. (2002) claim.  
In line with the arousal/mood hypothesis for the Mozart Effect, Schellenberg and Hallam (2005) 
compared children’s performance at the PF&C test after they either listened to Blur (a British Pop-
Rock band), Mozart’s 448K Sonata and listened to the instructions to carry out the task. As a result, 
subjects had better performance after listening to Blur compared to the other two conditions. The 
authors hypothesized that children had better performance after listening to Blur as a consequence of a 
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more enjoyable and pleasant experience they had compared to listening to the other two stimuli. This 
enjoyment and pleasure would be likely to set children in an optimal emotional state to perform the 
task. Likewise, Nantais & Schellenberg (1999) compared the subjects’ performance at the PF&C after 
they listened to Mozart’s music and to a Stephen King’s narrated novel. As a result, subjects who 
enjoyed Mozart’s music more than Stephen King’s story had better performance at the PF&C after 
they listened to Mozart, and the opposite pattern was observed for those who preferred the novel over 
Mozart’s music. 
Taken together, the Mozart Effect and the different accounts for the effect described in this section 
partly laid the foundations for the experiment proposed in this study in terms of procedures realized 
and the hypotheses raised for the results. The hypotheses and the objectives of the present study will 
then be presented in the next section. 
 
4 Objectives and Hypotheses 
To summarize what has been discussed so far in the present study, there are pieces of evidence that 
suggest that simulation of motor actions are carried out in modality-specific systems of the brain, in 
which some of the brain areas that are involved in motor imagery are also involved in motor 
preparation and execution, such as, for instance, the Premotor Cortex (Decety et al., 1994), the Basal 
Ganglia and the Putamen (Gerardin et al. 2000), the Pre-frontal Cortex (Frith et al., 1991), the 
Premotor Cortex (Porro et al., 1996) and the SMA (Roland et al., 1980). Likewise, according to 
conceptual embodiment described in section 1.3, all concepts are grounded in modality-specific 
systems (strong embodiment) or some concepts are grounded in modality-specific systems of the brain 
(weak embodiment), as Mahon describes (2015). The case of motor imagery would relate, then, to 
weak embodiment, since it claims that motor concepts deployed in motor imagery are grounded in 
modality-specific systems of the brain. Both strong and weak embodiments are forms of ECT, in 
which the body can play a strong constraining role and a physically constitutive role in cognition 
(Wilson and Foglia, 2017). Finally, there is also suggestive evidence that MR tasks of bodily-related 
pictures are performed by means of motor imagery, relying on modality-specific systems of the brain, 
namely, the motor cortices (e.g. Parsons et al., 1994, 1995; Kosslyn et al., 1998).  
On the music section of the theoretical background chapter, the brain areas involved in music 
perception, and more specifically, in perception of rhythmic structures of the brain were discussed 
about. By employing brain-mapping techniques such as fMRI, it was observed a correlation between 
activation in the motor areas of the brain, such as the SMA, Basal Ganglia and Putamen, PMd, 
superior and left inferior STG and Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex/ Insula bilaterally when subjects 
listened to monotonic sine tones with different rhythmic patterns, namely Metric Simple, Metric 
Complex and Non-metric (Grahn & Brett, 2007; Chen et al., 2008a, 2008b; Grahn & Rowe, 2009, 
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2013), in which higher activation in these areas were observed when subjects listened to Metric 
Simple rhythmic structures compared to Metric Complex and Non-metric rhythms (Grahn & Brett, 
2007). Somewhat related to these findings, one of the hypothesis about Mozart Effect is the priming of 
brain areas involved in spatial-temporal reasoning, in which, according to the trion model (Leng et al., 
1991), exposure to music may excite these cortical firing patterns used in spatial-temporal reasoning, 
consequently affecting cognitive tasks that rely on this particular sort of reasoning. According to this 
hypothesis, this priming in areas involved in spatial-temporal reasoning due to listening to complex 
music such as Mozart’s 448K Sonata would explain the enhancement in performance that subjects 
showed in spatial-temporal reasoning tasks (including MR tasks; e.g. Gilleta et al., 2003; Aheadi et al., 
2009) compared to control conditions and relaxation instructions (e.g. Rauscher et al., 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1998; Rideout & Labach, 1996; Rideout & Taylor, 1997; Bodner et al., 2001; Jausovec et al., 
2006).   
The empirical findings and theoretical assumptions described in the former sections of the present 
study give rise to the assumptions that have been used in order to motivate and draw hypotheses upon 
the experiment proposed and carried out in the present study. These assumptions are: 
(I) Weak embodiment: some concepts are the simulations of perceptual, motor and introspective 
experiences, grounded in modality-specific systems of the brain (Mahon, 2015).  
(II) Motor imagery is the simulation of bodily movements, carried out in modality-specific 
systems of the brain, namely, the motor cortices (Jeannerod, 2006).  
(III) MR tasks of bodily-related pictures are accomplished by means of simulation of one’s own 
bodily movements to accomplish the task (Wexler et al., 1998). 
(IV) Music activates the motor cortices of the brain, and this activation varies in degree according 
to the rhythmic complexity of the auditory stimulus, in which metric simple rhythmic 
structures elicit higher neuronal activation in these brain areas than metric complex and non-
metric rhythmic structures (Grahn & Brett, 2007). 
(V) Increase of cortical activation and synchronization of specific brain areas used for cognitive 
tasks after music listening results in performance enhancement at the task compared to control 
conditions and other stimuli (Rauscher et al., 1993). 
(VI) Increase of cortical activation and synchronization of specific brain areas used for cognitive 
tasks after music listening are the reason why the Mozart Effect is possible, and not subjects’ 
increase of arousal/mood levels or subjects’ preference for a stimulus (Rauscher et al, 1995; 
Bodner et al., 2001).  
In the light of the assumptions outlined above, the experiment proposed in this study has been 
designed to investigate the influence of distinct auditory stimuli, namely Metric Simple, Metric 
Complex and Silence on MR of bodily-related pictures of a homogeneous group of non-musicians. 
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Hence, the overall research question of the study is does listening to music enhance performance at 
MR of bodily-related pictures? 
Apart from the overall research question described above, the results of the experiment may address 
to other specific questions, such as:  
A) Are motor concepts grounded in modality-specifics systems of the brain, as suggested by the 
weak embodiment in virtue of experimental findings about motor imagery (e.g. Jeannerod, 
2001)? 
B) Do the non-neural parts of the body play a constraining role in cognition? (e.g. Parsons et al., 
1987a, 1987b) 
C) If there are significant differences in performance after subjects listened to distinct auditory 
stimuli, are these differences due to brain activation elicited by the music, as proposed by 
Rauscher et al. (1993) or changes in arousal/mood levels (Husain et al., 2002) or preference 
for a given stimulus (Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999)? 
In line with the assumptions (I-VI) highlighted above and the questions (A-C), the hypotheses for the 
experiment are: 
1) From assumptions (I-V), it is expected that after listening to Metric Simple Music, subjects 
will have significantly better performance at MR of bodily-related pictures compared to 
Metric Complex Music and Silence. This hypothesis sheds light on question A outlined above. 
First, if this hypothesis is true, then we would have some evidence that weak embodiment of 
concepts is true. More specifically, if music activates the motor cortices (according to 
assumption IV), and we perform MR of bodily-related pictures using modality-specific 
systems of the brain, such as the motor cortices (II, III), then the claim that some concepts (in 
this case, motor concepts deployed in motor imagery tasks) are grounded in modality-specific 
systems (weak embodiment claim) might be true. Thus, if weak embodiment is true, then 
question A) is addressed. If weak embodiment is true, it could be the case that both 
constraining and constitutive roles of the body in cognition are true as well. As Barsalou 
(1999) claims, concepts are grounded in modality-specific systems through perceptual 
symbols, being processed by simulations. These simulations, as Barsalou (1999, p. 618) points 
out, are the “reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during 
experience with the world, body and mind”. If the simulations of the kinds of experiences we 
have had actually form the concepts we use to think about motor actions, then it could be the 
case that motor actions we have had in the past are constitutive of motor concepts. In other 
words, it seems like the body, in this case, is constitutive for cognition because the kinds of 
bodily experiences we have had in the past (in this particular case, motor actions) shape the 
ways of thinking about motor actions, which in turn plays a role in forming concepts related to 
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motor actions. Also, as pointed out in section 1.3, weak embodiment is also consistent with 
body as a constraint on cognition, addressing question B). If motor concepts are driven by 
simulations of past motor actions experiences, and these experiences rely on bodily structures, 
then the way we think about motor actions might be constrained by the past experience we 
have had in the past. Finally, the research question outlined above would also be addressed. 
According to the hypothesis outlined in this paragraph, after listening to Metric simple music, 
subjects will have their performance enhanced compared to the other two stimuli, contrary to 
Rauscher et al.’s (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998) assumption that complex music accounts for 
activation of brain areas involved in the task. Since music primes cortical areas responsible for 
cognitive task enhancement in performance (V), MR of bodily-related pictures are 
accomplished by means of motor imagery in the motor cortices (II, III), and listening to 
music (particularly, its rhythmic elements) activates the motor cortices, varying in degree 
according to rhythmic complexity (VI), then it is hypothesized that, if these assumptions are 
true, Metric Simple Music would enhance performance in MR of bodily-related pictures more 
than the other two conditions, reflecting on faster RTs and higher ACC levels when the MR of 
bodily-related pictures is performed after subjects listened to Metric Simple Music compared 
to the other two stimuli. 
2) In line with the hypothesis 1) outlined in the last paragraph and assumptions I-VI, it is 
expected that increase in performance after subjects listened to Metric Simple Music 
compared to Metric Complex and Silence, respectively, because music would have activated 
cortical areas used in MR of bodily-related pictures, and not because there would have been a 
significantly difference in arousal/mood levels or subjects had any preference for the stimuli. 
As it will be fully described in the methodological section of the present study, a few 
instruments will be used in order to assess arousal (the Self-Assessment Manikin - SAM; 
Bradley & Lang, 1994) – and mood levels (Profile of Mood States - POMS; Viana, Almeida 
& Santos, 2001), as well as the valence of the stimuli (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994) before 
and after subjects listen to each auditory stimuli. In line with previous works (Rauscher et al., 
1993; Jausovec et al., 2006; Trimmel et al., 2017), it is predicted that there will be no 
significant differences in arousal/mood levels before and after subjects listened to the stimuli 
nor valence ratings after stimuli exposure, providing suggestive evidence that the possible 
Mozart Effect is due to direct brain activation of areas involved in MR of bodily-related 
pictures (Rauscher et al., 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998). This hypothesis would address question C) 
apart from questions and assumptions already addressed by hypothesis 1). 
3) Finally, in line with assumptions III, it is ultimately hypothesized that, replicating Parsons’ 
(1987a, 1987b) findings, the time to make a laterality judgment of a stimulus reflects the 
degree of MR needed to bring one’s body parts to a position adequate for achieving the task, 
reflecting on an almost perfect linear increase of RTs with angular stimulus disparity. It is 
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predicted that this pattern of responses will be reflected across all auditory conditions (Metric 
Simple, Metric Complex and Silence). In sum, if MR task of bodily-related pictures is 
accomplished by simulations of bodily movements (III), then it is hypothesized that subjects 
will mentally rotate the body parts depicted on the screen as if they were physically rotating 
their own limbs (Wexler et al., 1998). Thus, it is hypothesized that RTs for this MR task will 
be significantly slower for bodily-related pictures with higher degrees of inclination departing 
from the canonical position (e.g. pictures of body parts depicted at 180º of inclination) 
compared to pictures that would resemble the canonical position of these body parts, with 
lower degrees of inclination (e.g. pictures of body parts depicted at 0º degree of inclination). 
Since subjects would employ the strategy of rotating the image of the body part up to the 
canonical position of their own body parts until they provide a laterality judgment response, it 
is plausible to hypothesize that RTs will reflect on the degrees of inclination of the body parts 
depicted on the screen. Likewise, ACC levels are expected to follow the same pattern as RTs, 
in which significantly higher ACC levels will be observed for pictures in a canonical position 
(0º) than for pictures that will require a larger rotation (180º). In sum, it is expected an almost 
linear increase in RTs and decrease in ACC levels according to the degree of inclination of 
each body part depicted on the screen, namely 0º, 30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º and 180º. This 
hypothesis relates to question B) described above, in which the body plays a constraining role 
on cognition since subjects imagine carrying out bodily simulations (III) to accomplish the 
task and body biomechanically constraints is likely to a major role when subjects rotate body 
parts depicted in anatomically awkward positions (e.g. 180º) compared to canonical positions 
(e.g. 0º). 
Also, as pointed out in the Mozart Effect section of the present study, there seems to be a lack of 
account of why Mozart’s music can be regarded as complex within the Mozart Effect literature. In 
other words, Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998) seem to regard Mozart’s music as a complex 
musical piece by comparing its structure with the structure of other musical stimuli, such as Phillip 
Glass’s music, for instance. Phillip Glass’s music is regarded as being highly repetitive and 
predictable, with no significant melodic, harmonic or rhythmic changes throughout the piece (Hetland, 
2000). However, the Mozart Effect literature lacks objective explanation of why Mozart’s music can 
be regarded as complex, or which specific element of Mozart’s music accounts for its complexity (e.g. 
whether it is the melody, or the harmony, or the rhythm, or all these elements combined that account 
for the complexity of the stimulus). 
In line with this lack of account over Mozart’s music complexity, this study also aims to specifically 
investigate whether changing the rhythmic structures of a musical piece accounts for the possible 
Mozart Effect. Consequently, by changing the rhythmic structures of a musical piece with simple 
rhythmic structures into a musical piece with complex rhythmic structures, the latter stimulus would 
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consequently be more complex than the former. By investigating whether a specific musical element 
accounts for the effect (in the case of this study, the rhythmic structures of a musical piece), it would 
then be possible to have a better understanding of the Mozart Effect and, if anything, which specific 
musical element accounts for the effect.  However, due to the reasons pointed out so far, in special, in 
the light of assumption IV, it is expected that, contrary to Rauscher et al.’s (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998) 
hypothesis that listening to complexly structured music enhances performance at spatial-temporal 
reasoning tasks, listening to a musical piece with simple rhythmic structures (Metric Simple Music) 
would result in increase of neural activation in the motor areas and, consequently, performance 
enhancement at MR of bodily-related pictures compared to Metric Complex Music and Silence, 
respectively, as stated in hypotheses 1) and 2).  
As it will be further described in the methodological section, particularly in the sub-section that refers 
to the auditory stimuli selection, selection of the two musical stimuli was based on a study carried out 
by Bouwer et al. (2018), in which the authors investigated what makes a rhythm complex by asking a 
large sample (N = 5297) to rate how complex the rhythmic structures they listened to according to 
their perception. Thus, music selection for the present study, and more specifically, the manipulation 
of rhythmic structures between the Metric Simple and Metric Complex pieces was based on the 
findings that emerged from a study that employed objective methods to discover what makes a rhythm 
complex and harder to be perceived compared to other rhythmic structures (in this case, a survey with 
a large sample).  
As an alternative to hypotheses 1) and 2), if Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998) are correct that 
music complexity is key to the Mozart Effect, and complexly structured music elicits higher activation 
and synchronization of neural patterns (V), it could be the case that subjects’ performance at MR of 
bodily-related pictures after listening to Metric Complex Music could be significantly better compared 
to the other two conditions. That alternative would sharply contrast with assumption IV outlined 
above.  
Finally, in case either one or both hypotheses 1), 2) and 3) described above are not verified by the 
experiment, it could be the case that one or more assumptions (I-VI) listed above may not be true. If 
that is the case, then a thorough discussion regarding the assumptions outlined in this section will be 
carried out in the discussion section of the present study, in the light of experimental results.    
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II. Method 
1 Subjects 
The experiment was approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Lisbon.  
36 (thirty-six) students of Sports Science from the Polytechnic Institute of Castelo Branco (Mean age: 
21.07 years old, Standard Deviation: 3.08), Portugal, participated voluntarily in the experiment. 
Subjects answered a demographic questionnaire along with the informed consent (Appendix I) 
informing their age, gender, nationality, and their level of musical expertise. The sample comprised 30 
(thirty) males and 6 (six) females, in which a total of 5 (five) were left-handed. In order to define 
whether a subject was a musician or not, this study employed the same criteria as in Grahn and Brett’s 
(2007) and Aheadi et al.’s (2009) studies. In those studies, subjects with five or more years of formal 
musical education and current regular musical activities were classified as musicians, and those with 
less than five years of formal musical education were classified as non-musicians. According to the 
questionnaire subjects answered in this study, all of them had less than five years of musical 
education, thus, all subjects were non-musicians.  
This criterion of exclusion of musicians from the sample was opted in the light of previous studies 
described in chapter 1. This study aimed to investigate whether performance at MR of bodily-related 
after subjects were exposed to Metric Simple Music, Metric Complex Music and Silence would differ 
significantly. Grahn and Brett (2007) observed that musicians had higher activation in the motor areas 
during exposure to the stimuli compared to non-musicians. As hypothesized in the first chapter of this 
study, if activation in these motor areas leads to improvement in performance at tasks such as MR of 
bodily-related pictures, then musicians would have an advantage over non-musicians. Thus, it was 
opted to recruit subjects that would form a homogeneous group, in this case, students of sports that 
had no previous formal musical education. This limitation is addressed in the section that describes the 
limitations of the present study and in the suggestion for future studies. 
Apart from the criterion of exclusion elucidated above, it was also asked in the questionnaire whether 
subjects had a sight/hearing deficit that would impair their performance at the MR of bodily-related 
tasks (in this particular case, a visual deficit) or during the auditory phase of the study (hearing 
deficit). All subjects reported having no sight/hearing deficit, being sound for the experimental tasks. 
Finally, no subject reported a major health issue that would impair their performance at the task. 
The last criterion of exclusion adopted in the present study relates to subjects’ motor imagery abilities. 
As such, subjects filled out the Movement Imagery Questionnaire 3 (MIQ3; Appendix II) adapted to 
European Portuguese (Mendes et al., 2016), in which they had to imagine carrying out motor actions 
through a 1PP or 3PP. The difficulty to imagine these movements were rated on a Likert-scale ranging 
from 1 (“very difficult to image”) to 7 (“very easy to imagine”), and the threshold of 36 points at the 
MIQ3 was established as a criterion of exclusion, since scores under 36 points at the MIQ would mean 
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that subjects would have poor imagery abilities. All subjects scored at least more than 36 points in 
total (Mean = 64,33; SD = 14,08), generating no exclusions on the basis of low scores at the MIQ3 
adapated to European Portuguese (Mendes et al., 2016).    
Sample size was based on Rauscher et al.’s (1993) study about the Mozart Effect, in which the authors 
recruited 36 subjects to participate in their experiment. Also, since subjects were assigned to groups 
that were counterbalanced and received each pre-treatment (in this case, an auditory stimulus) in 
different orders, six different groups were created to satisfy all order possible of exposure to auditory 
stimuli across the three days of experiments, as it will be more detailed in the experimental design 
section. Thus, the sample size had to be a number multiple of 6 (six), and 36 (thirty-six) fills in this 
requirement. 
  
2 Materials 
2.1 Selection of musical stimuli 
Subjects were exposed to three different auditory stimuli prior to the completion of MR of bodily-
related pictures. Since this study aims to specifically investigate whether the rhythmic structures of a 
musical piece accounts for the possible Mozart Effect in the light of assumption IV outlined in the 
objectives and hypotheses section, that claims that music activates the motor cortices of the brain, and 
this activation varies in degree according to the rhythmic complexity of the auditory stimulus (Grahn 
& Brett, 2007), two different musical stimuli were used as auditory stimuli before subjects completed 
the MR of bodily-related pictures.  
As such, a minimalist/techno musical piece written by Motorcity Soul named “Space Katzle” was 
selected (Supplementary Material). This musical piece is characterized for the lack of structural 
changes in its rhythm, in which the kickdrum beats remain regularly grouped in a simple quadruple 
meter (4/4) for the whole duration of the musical piece, in which the accented note occurs in the 
beginning of each group of four units. In other words, the kickdrum beats occurred at regular intervals 
between each other, and this pattern of beat distribution and regular occurrence remains the same 
throughout the entire musical piece. Figure 2.1 depicts an example of a group of four beats regularly 
grouped in a simple quadruple meter (4/4). This rhythmic structure observed in Motorcity Soul’s 
“Space Katzle” seems to fit Grahn and Brett’s (2007) description of a Metric Simple rhythmic 
structure they used in their study, in which beat accents occurred at regular intervals, regularly 
grouped, in the beginning of each group of four units of beats, in the case of a quadruple 4/4 meter. 
Thus, since the rhythmic patterns of Motorcity Soul’s “Space Katzle” fit the criteria of Metric Simple 
rhythmic structure described by Grahn and Brett (2007), this musical piece was selected as the music 
sample used as the Metric Simple Music auditory stimulus in the experiment.  
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Apart from the drumbeats, the rhythmic section of the musical piece also comprised other musical 
instruments, such as egg shakers, hi-hat, woodblock, and cymbals. The rhythmic structures of these 
instruments followed the same Metric Simple pattern, in which the beats were also regularly grouped 
within a simple quadruple meter. Also, the musical piece consisted of other synthesized musical 
instruments that formed the melodic and harmonic section. In order to highlight the rhythmic section 
of the musical stimulus over melodic and harmonic features (since the rhythmic features of the music 
is the variable being studied), a music editing software called Ableton Live 10 was used. Thus, for this 
Metric Simple version of “Space Katzle”, the original version was edited, for which the loudness of 
the kickdrum beats and other rhythmic instruments were raised by 10 decibels (dB) compared to the 
synthesized instruments that formed the melodic and harmonic sections of the musical piece.  
Finally, the original version of “Space Katzle” can be regarded as belonging to a minimalist techno 
genre. This musical genre is characterized by the lack of structural rhythmic/melodic/harmonic 
changes throughout the musical piece, being highly repetitive at times (Rauscher et al., 1994). The 
total duration of this musical piece was 08:25, the same as Mozart’s 448K Sonata. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 An illustration of groups of beats regularly grouped in four bars of a simple quadruple 
meter (4/4). The beats within the circles are the accented ones, placed in the beginning of each bar. 
Musical sheet rendered through www.noteflight.com 
 
For the Metric Complex version of “Space Katzle”, the original version was also edited. However, 
contrary to the Metric Simple version, the edition was more elaborated than altering the loudness of 
the rhythmic components of the musical piece in order to highlight them over synthesized instruments 
that formed the musical piece’s melodic and harmonic structures. The editing of the Metric Complex 
version was based on Grahn and Brett’s (2007) and Bouwer et al’s (2018) definitions of Metric 
Complex rhythmic structures. According to Grahn and Brett (2007), in a Metric Complex rhythmic 
structure, beat accents occurred at irregular intervals. In other words, unlike the Metric Simple 
rhythmic structure, the beat accent occurs at distinct periods, not always in the beginning of each 
group of four units of beats. The beats are not regularly grouped together along the quadruple meter 
(4/4) structure, so the first note of a group of four units of beats is not always the accented one. By 
carrying out a survey with 5297 subjects, Bouwer et al. (2018), subjects had to rate the rhythmic 
complexity of a musical stimulus, in which subjects had to rate how difficult it was to find and follow 
the beat. As a conclusion for that study, Bouwer et al. (2018) found out that in rhythmic structures 
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with accents missing in the beginning of the grouping of four beats, the beat is more difficult to find 
and rhythmic perception may be impaired as a consequence. Also, musical novices rated rhythms with 
some accents off the beat (i.e. 5 offbeat accents in a grid of 16 beats) as slightly more difficult than 
those with few accents off the beat (i.e. 1 offbeat accent in a grid of 16 beats), regardless of the 
number of beats missing from the group of beats in a quadruple meter (4/4) structure. In sum, Bouwer 
et al’s (2018) objectively measured what are the key features that make a rhythmic structure hard to 
perceive by exposing subjects to 60 different monotonic samples with distinct rhythmic sequences and 
asking them to rate the complexity of each sequence on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very 
difficult), according to their own perception.    
In line with Grahn and Brett’s (2007) and Bouwer et al.’s (2018) studies on rhythmic perception and 
definitions of Metric Complex rhythms, the original version of “Space Katzle” was then edited with 
Ableton Live 10, in which some of the beats from the synthesized instruments that formed the 
rhythmic section of the original tune, such as the kickdrum, the hi-hat, the woodblock, the egg shaker, 
and the cymbals were removed from the places where they were positioned in the original version. In 
other words, in line with Bouwer et al. (2018) findings, some of the beats that were originally placed 
in the beginning of the grouping of four other beats were removed and placed in offbeat positions 
along the simple quadruple meter (4/4). Figure 2.2 depicts an example of a group of notes not placed 
regularly along a few bars of a simple quadruple meter, constituting a Metric Complex rhythmic 
structure, according to Grahn and Brett (2007). In sum, the rhythmic structure designed in this new 
version of “Space Katzle” seems to fit Grahn and Brett’s (2007) description of a Metric Complex 
rhythmic structure; thus, this version was used as one of the experiment’s auditory stimuli, namely, 
Metric Complex Music. The total duration of this musical piece was, like the Metric Simple version, 
08:25. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 An illustration of groups of notes not regularly grouped along four bars of a simple 
quadruple meter. The circled beats represent the missing beats in the beginning of each bar. The beats 
within the rectangles represent the beats placed in offbeat positions. Musical sheet rendered through 
www.noteflight.com  
 
There are a few reasons why Mozart’s 448K Sonata used in Rauscher et al.’s (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998) 
and in most studies about the Mozart Effect was not used in the present study. First, although listening 
to Mozart’s music improved subjects’ performance at spatial-temporal reasoning tasks compared to 
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other musical stimuli and control conditions (e.g. Rauscher et al., 1995), in some studies the same 
effect was observed with other musical stimuli (e.g. Rideout et al., 1998; Nantais & Schellenberg, 
1999). It has also been found that subjects who listened to musical stimuli from musical genres other 
than classical music (e.g. Pop Rock) outperformed those who listened to Mozart’s music at a spatial-
temporal reasoning task (Schellenberg & Hallam, 2005). Thus, the Mozart Effect has been observed 
when musical stimuli other than Mozart’s 448K Sonata was employed, meaning that the Mozart Effect 
is not specific to Mozart’s music. Secondly, in order to investigate assumption IV described in the 
objectives and hypotheses section of the present study, two musical samples with distinct degree of 
complexity, namely Metric Simple and Metric Complex, would have to be generated. Mozart’s music 
would not have been the most suitable stimulus to be employed in order to investigate this particular 
assumption for a couple of reasons. First, since Mozart’s music does not employ a particular rhythmic 
instrument (it is a four-hand piano musical piece), changing Mozart music’s rhythm would necessarily 
affect other musical features of the musical piece, such as its melody. Thus, the rhythm variable would 
not have been the only variable changed in the edition. Secondly, classifying Mozart’s music in terms 
of Metric Simple or Metric Complex, in the light of Grahn and Brett’s (2007) definition, would not be 
as clear as the attribution of Metric Simple to “Space Katzle’s” original version due to the reasons 
highlighted above. Mozart’s music has a few rhythmic variations in which the tempo changes 
throughout the piece. In other words, the musical piece either speeds up or slows down at some stages. 
Finally, as it will be discussed in the procedural design below in this chapter, subjects were asked to 
pay attention to the rhythmic structures of the musical stimuli, in which they were asked by the end of 
musical listening if they had found the rhythmic structures easy or difficult to follow on a scale from 1 
(very difficult) to 9 (very easy). Due to the lack of rhythmic structures such as groups of beats in 
Mozart’s music and subjects’ lack of musical expertise, this discrimination task would probably not 
have been possible. 
In line with the majority of the studies about the Mozart Effect, silence was selected as an auditory 
stimulus correspondent to control condition.               
 
  2.2 Bodily-related pictures 
For the MR of bodily-related pictures task that subjects carried out in the experiment, pictures of 
hands and feet (Appendix III) were selected and manipulated through Microsoft Office Picture 
Manager. This manipulation consisted of rotating the pictures into new degrees of inclination from the 
canonical (0º degree) position. The new degrees of inclination were 30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º and 180º, 
and all of them, apart from the pictures displayed in 180º, were inclined both to the right hand side 
(clockwise) and to the left-hand side (anti-clockwise) from the canonical position. Thus, 336 was the 
total amount of images selected to be used in the experiment. These pictures formed the critical block 
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list. Pictures of left and right hands and feet were equally distributed across the block lists, appearing 
randomly on the screen. For the practice trials, 72 more pictures of hands and feet were selected 
(Appendix IV). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are examples of pictures displayed in the canonical position of the 
human anatomy (0º) and inclined in 150º to the right hand side. Those trials were not computed.  
 
Figure 2.3: Picture of a human hand displayed in the canonical position of the human anatomy (0º of 
inclination). 
 
Figure 2.4: Picture of the same human hand as Figure 2.3 inclined in 150º to the right-hand side 
(clockwise) from the canonical position (0º). 
 
The bodily-related pictures were presented through E-Prime version 2.37, and were divided into 8 
block trials of 14 pictures each. Every block trial had the same number of bodily-related pictures 
oriented in all seven different degrees of inclination (0º, 30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º, and 180º). Each trial 
started with a fixation cross displayed at the center of the screen for 500ms, which was also displayed 
between the appearances of each picture for 300ms. A feedback was provided for every correct and 
incorrect responses provided by the subjects. This feedback notice remained displayed for 300ms 
between each picture appearance. Also, two practice blocks with 14 pictures each were added to the 
whole trial blocks; however, these practice trials were not computed. The 8 blocks were presented 
randomly across the 3 days of experiment, as well as the two practice blocks. The order of 
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presentation of pictures was also randomized within the block trials and practice trials. All pictures 
were presented at the center of the computer screen. 
 
2.3 Apparatus 
Two apparatus were used in order to present subjects with the auditory stimuli and the bodily-related 
pictures for the MR task.  
First, musical stimuli were reproduced through a JBL Xtreme Black 2.0 speaker. The musical stimuli 
were stored in the experimenter’s mobile phone, a TP-Link Neffos X1 Max, and they were reproduced 
via Bluetooth connection with the speaker. The JBL Xtreme Black 2.0 speaker was placed in the 
middle of a round table, and subjects were asked to sit comfortably on chairs around the speaker. 
Volume was set to 56dB, and experimenter always asked subjects if that volume was too loud or too 
low. Subjects never complained about the volume of the musical stimuli. 
Bodily-related pictures were presented through a software for Psychological tests called E-Prime 
version 2.37, which was installed in different computers at the Polytechnic Institute of Castelo Branco. 
All computers had Windows 10 installed; however, some of them were portable laptops (4), while 
others had a System Unit (2), not being portable. Although the former types of computers had smaller 
screens than the latter types (13,3” x 17”, respectively), resolution was 1366 x 768 pixels for all of 
them. Thus, the size of the images did not differ from one computer to another. Subjects were asked to 
use the same computer across the 3 days of experiments. All pictures were displayed on colors. 
Brightness of the pictures may have differed from one computer to another since they were equipped 
with different graphics systems. However, this variable may not have interfered with the completion of 
the tasks. Finally, subjects seated straight in a chair in front of their computers, approximately 20cm 
away from the computer screen.       
 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
3.1  Counterbalanced paradigm 
In line with previous Mozart Effect experiments (e.g. Rauscher et al., 1993; Rideout et al., 1998; 
Gilleta et al., 2003) and studies that measure the effects of music on imagery (e.g. Quittner & 
Glueckauff, 1983), the present study employed a counterbalanced paradigm, in which all subjects were 
exposed to all three different auditory stimuli (Metric Simple Music, Metric Complex Music and 
Silence) in different orders. Subjects (N = 36) were divided into 6 groups of 6 individuals each (1 
female per group), satisfying all possible combinations of order of auditory stimuli presentation. Table 
2.1 describes the order in which each group was presented with the auditory stimuli along the three 
days of experiment.  
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 Session 1  
 Auditory Stimulus 
Session 2 
Auditory Stimulus 
Session 3 
Auditory Stimulus 
Group 1 Silence Metric Simple Music Metric Complex Music 
Group 2  Metric Simple Music Metric Complex Music Silence 
Group 3 Metric Complex Music Silence Metric Simple Music 
Group 4 Silence Metric Complex Music Metric Simple Music 
Group 5 Metric Simple Music Silence Metric Complex Music 
Group 6 Metric Complex Music Metric Simple Music Silence 
 
Table 2.1: Order of auditory stimulus presentation to each group along the three days of experiment. 
Each session represents a day of experiment; thus, session 1 = day 1, session 2 = day 2, and session 3 
= day 3. 
  
As described in the section regarding selection of bodily-related pictures, the order of block trials was 
also randomized and presented in different orders throughout the three days of experiment; thus, 
subjects made a laterality judgment to all bodily-related pictures that were selected and presented.   
According to Pollatsek and Well (1995), counterbalancing order of auditory stimuli presentation is 
suitable to control for order effects that experiments that employ repeated-measures design might 
convey. For instance, assuming that subjects were exposed to all three different auditory stimuli in the 
same order during the three days of experiment (e.g. first day – Silence, second day – Metric Complex 
Music, third day – Metric Simple Music), subjects could have had better performance when exposed 
to the Metric Simple Music than to the other two auditory stimuli because they are more familiar with 
the testing environment or the task of MR of bodily-related pictures itself. Alternatively, exposing 
subjects to all treatments in all orders possible may attenuate this issue (Myers, Well & Lorch Jr, 
2010). Thus, assuming that subjects are sensible to practice and improve their performance throughout 
the three sessions, since different groups performed the task after exposure to different auditory 
stimulus, this particular improvement would not have been due to a particular stimulus, but would 
rather be due to practice effect. Thus, the order effect, in this case, would be controlled.  
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3.2 Experimental procedures and instruments 
After answering the demographic questionnaire (Appendix I) and the MIQ3 adapted to European 
Portuguese (Appendix II; Mendes et al., 2016), subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six 
groups described in counterbalanced paradigm section above.  
On the first day of experiment, subjects were briefed about the tasks they would be doing. First, 
subjects were asked to fill in the SAM (Appendix V; Bradley & Leng, 1994) and the POMS adapted 
to European Portuguese (Appendix VI; Viana et al., 2001) before starting with the listening task. 
These two instruments were chosen as instruments to measure subjects’ arousal and mood levels 
during the experimental procedures in the light of Husain et al.’s (2002) study.  
First, in that study, Husain et al. (2002) employed similar self-report instruments in order to assess 
subjects’ arousal and mood levels before and after exposure to distinct versions of Mozart’s music. 
These instruments that measure arousal and mood levels based on subjects’ self-report are regarded as 
valid by some authors (Thayer, 1970; Dermerd & Berscheid, 1972; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 
1992; Husain et al., 2002), in which the correlation between the self-report and physiological 
measures, such as skin conductance and heart rate is as high as .62 factorial weight (Thayer, 1970). 
Secondly, since subjects were performing the listening task at the same time, at least six (6) apparatus 
such as HR monitors or other instruments that provide direct physiological measures would have been 
necessary for use along the three days of experiments. This amount of instruments was not made 
available for the experiment. Also, using one or two heart rate monitors to measure six (6) subjects’ 
physiological signals, for instance, would have consumed much time; as Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 
1995, 1998) claim, the Mozart Effect is temporary, only lasting for around 15 minutes after exposure 
to auditory stimulus. Therefore, using an instrument that would be time-consuming would be 
counterproductive in terms of investigating the hypotheses raised for the present study.      
As far as the SAM (Bradley & Leng, 1994, p. 49) concerns, this instrument “directly measures the 
pleasure, arousal and dominance associated with a person’s affective reaction to a wide variety of 
stimuli”, such as reaction to pictures, sounds, painful stimuli, advertisements, among many others. In 
the case of arousal measure, the SAM (Bradley & Lang., 1994) comprises a 9-point rating scale that 
varies from 1 (“completely non-aroused”) to 9 (“completely aroused”), in which graphic depiction (in 
other words, drawn pictures) is associated to each point of the rating scale, as Figure 2.5 shows. 
Finally, studies carried out by Greenwald, Cook and Lang (1989) and Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, 
Hamm (1993) found a high correlation between the self-report arousal measures with cardiac and 
electrodermal responses, suggesting that the SAM is a reliable method to measure subjects’ arousal 
levels.      
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Figure 2.5: Graphic depiction of the rating scale of the arousal dimension measured by the SAM. The 
image on the far left corresponds to number 1 (“completely non-aroused”) of the scale, and the image 
on the far right corresponds to number 9 (“completely aroused”).  
 
In order to assess subjects’ mood, this study employed the POMS adapted to European Portuguese 
(Viana et al., 2001). This instrument consists of 36 adjectives assigned to 6 different subscales, such 
as:  
1)  Tension-Anxiety, which comprises adjectives such as tense, calm, nervous, impatient, 
anxious and unquiet.     
2) Depression-Dejection, which comprises adjectives such as sad, unworthy, discouraged, lonely, 
downhearted, and gloomy. 
3) Hostility-Anger, which comprises adjectives such as angry, annoyed, bad-tempered, bitter, 
furious and irritated.  
4) Fatigue- Inertia, comprising adjectives such as exhausted, sleepy, tired, worn-out, weary and 
bushed.  
5) Vigor-Activity, comprising adjectives related to subjects’ levels of arousal, such as lively, 
active, energetic, full of pep, alert and vigorous.  
6) Confusion-Disorientation: confused, mixed-up, muddled, uncertain, competent and effective  
As mentioned, all these adjectives were presented to subjects in European Portuguese, as translated 
and validated by Viana et al. (2001). According to the authors, the factorial structure and internal 
consistency of the subscales are satisfactory. The internal reliability of subscales are high (Cronsbach 
Alpha = .75 for Tension-Anxiety, .88 for Depression-Dejection, .85 for Hostility-Anger, .91 for 
Fatigue-Inertia, .88 for Vigor-Activity, and .72 for Confusion-Disorientation). Also, as McNair et al. 
(1992) argue, these subscales are correlated with similar measures from other instruments. For 
instance, the Depression-Dejection subscale is highly correlated with the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, 1978). Subjects had to rate each one of the 36 adjectives on a scale from 0 (“nothing”) to 4 
(“very much”) in accordance to their affective state at a given moment, yielding a score from 6 to 30 
for each subscale.  
After filling in the SAM and the POMS, subjects were asked to sit comfortably on chairs placed 
around a round table, and the JBL Xtreme Black 2.0 was placed in the centre of the table. Subjects 
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then listened to the auditory stimulus correspondent to their group in a given day, in accordance with 
Table 2.1. As mentioned in the section regarding selection of auditory stimuli, both Metric Simple 
Music and Metric Complex Music were 08:25 long. Therefore, subjects were asked to remain in 
silence and refrain to move while they listened to the auditory stimulus. Also, experimenter asked 
subjects to pay attention to the rhythm of the musical piece, as they would have to answer to a 
question related to it after the listening task. When assigned to the Silence condition, subjects had to 
remain in silence for the same length as the musical stimuli.  
Having performed the listening task, subjects were asked to fill in the SAM and the POMS again. At 
this time, however, the SAM also included the measure of the valence dimension (Appendix VII), in 
order to measure the enjoyment of each auditory stimulus. This instrument is similar to the SAM that 
measured subjects’ arousal levels described earlier in this section, since it also comprises a scale from 
1 to 9 in which graphic depiction is associated to each point of the rating scale (Figure 2.6). 
Nevertheless, 1 indicated that subjects rated the stimulus “extremely unpleasant” and 9 indicated that 
subjects found the stimulus “extremely pleasant”. Also, each drawn picture that corresponded to each 
number of the scale differed from the pictures used in the SAM for arousal ratings. 
Finally, in line with Grahn and Rowe’s (2013) study, after listening to any of the musical stimuli, 
subjects rated the subjective difficulty in following the beats of the musical piece throughout the 
listening task. As such, on a Likert-Scale from 1 (“very difficult”) to 9 (“very easy”), subjects had to 
place an “x’ on the point of the scale that represented how difficult it was to follow the musical beats. 
In line with the research question of the present study and the hypotheses in which the rhythmic 
complexity of the stimulus would play a role in the performance at MR of bodily-related pictures, the 
employment of this scale aim to investigate 1) whether subjects’ perception of the rhythmic sequences 
differed between stimuli, and 2) whether subjects’ perception of the rhythmic sequences was 
correlated with increase/decrease of performance at MR of bodily-related pictures. 
       
 
Figure 2.6: Graphic depiction of the rating scale of the valence of the stimulus measured by the SAM. 
The image on the far left corresponds to number 1 (“extremely unpleasant”) of the scale, and the 
image on the far right corresponds to number 9 (“extremely pleasant”).  
 
After these procedures, each subject was then allocated to a computer to perform the MR of bodily-
related pictures. Before commencing the task, experimenter asked subjects not to move their bodies 
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during the MR task (apart from their fingers when they provided a response, obviously), and to strictly 
look at the computer screen while performing the task. Subjects were asked to remain in silence during 
the task.  
Apart from these preliminary instructions, experimenter explained that a few messages would appear 
on the screen before subjects started the task. When subjects logged in, a welcome message popped up 
on the screen with instructions similar to the ones provided by the experimenter before commencing 
the task. Subjects had to press the SPACE BAR in order to advance to the following message. 
Followed to that message, another message with more specific instructions appeared on the screen. 
These instructions referred to the task itself. Subjects were going to see pictures of hands and feet 
oriented in diverse degrees of inclination. They had to press the keyboard button LEFT ARROW () 
for stimuli they judged to belong to the left-hand side of the body (left hands and left feet) or RIGHT 
ARROW (), for stimuli they judged to belong to the right-side of the body (right hands and right 
feet). Also, subjects were told they would have limited time to respond to all trials. In fact, since the 
Mozart Effect predicts that the effect is temporary, lasting no longer than 15 minutes after subjects 
were exposed to the musical stimulus (Rauscher et al., 1993), subjects were given 15 minutes to finish 
the task. All subjects finished the task in time across the three days of experiment. After that message 
displayed on the screen, another briefing message appeared on the screen, informing subjects that they 
would then commence the practice trial once they pressed the SPACE BAR. Once pressed the SPACE 
BAR, subjects started the practice trial (Appendix IV). When practice trial was over, another message 
appeared informing that the practice trial had been done successfully and the critical trials (Appendix 
III) would begin once subjects pressed the SPACE BAR if they wished to continue with the 
experiment. Otherwise, they could drop out of the experiment. After performing the critical trials, a 
“thanks” and “goodbye” message appeared on the screen. On the first two days of experiment, 
subjects were released from the room after having finished the MR of bodily-related pictures tasks. On 
the third and last day, however, after completion of MR of bodily-related pictures, subjects were asked 
by the experimenter to provide their impressions and feedback about the experiment. 
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  III. Results 
1 Statistical analysis 
  1.1 Dependent and independent variables 
Firstly, statistical analysis aims to verify the effects of the independent variables over the dependent 
variables (Petrica, 2003). For this study, the main independent variables, those manipulated by the 
experimenter, are the auditory stimuli (Metric Simple Music, Metric Complex Music, and Silence) and 
the degrees of inclination of the limbs displayed on the computer screen (0º, 30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º 
and 180º). The dependent variables (those that will be measured and will measure the effect of the 
independent variables) will be the RTs and ACC levels of MR of bodily-related pictures. In other 
words, the statistical analysis will take into consideration the effects of the auditory stimuli in 
performance at MR of bodily-related pictures in order to investigate whether the Mozart Effect is 
replicated in the present study; additionally, the degrees of inclination of the limbs depicted on the 
screen target hypothesis 3) described in the objectives and hypotheses section of the present study, 
which investigates whether structural features of the body constrain performance, on the basis that 
subjects employ motor imagery strategies (simulation of bodily movements in a 1PP) to carry out the 
task and how the biomechanical constraints of their own bodies reflect on performance. Although the 
selected pictures of bodily-related parts may give rise to other independent variables that could also be 
investigated (e.g. palm x back of the limbs, left x right limbs, hands x feet), the present study will 
focus on the degrees of inclination of the limbs displayed on the screen, since it relates to hypothesis 
3) in more depth than other variables that may arise from the features of the bodily-related pictures.  
In line with hypothesis 2) of the present study, which predicts that the Mozart Effect is not due to 
increases in arousal/mood levels or an artifact of subjects’ preferences for a particular stimulus, the 
effect of the independent variables (in this case, the auditory stimuli only) over dependent variables 
other than the RTs and ACC levels in MR of bodily-related pictures was measured. More specifically, 
these dependent variables are the differences in scores that subjects had at the SAM for arousal before 
and after they were exposed to the auditory stimuli, differences in scores at the POMS before and after 
exposure to musical pieces or Silence, and the differences in SAM scores for valence between all 
stimuli after the listening task.   
Finally, since the subjective perception of the difficulty in following the beats across both musical 
stimuli was measured through a 9-point Likert-Scale, subjects’ beat perception can also be 
characterized as a dependent variable that aims to measure the extent to which subjects managed to 
perceive a particular feature of both stimuli used as an independent variable in the present study, 
namely the beats of the Metric Simple and Metric Complex musical pieces. 
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  1.2 Data distribution 
Data were analyzed through IBM SPSS 2.5 for Windows. Descriptive statistics (Mean values and 
Standard Deviation) were calculated for every variable being studied. The interpretation of statistical 
tests used a significance level of α=0.05 and a 95% confidence interval (Silva, 2017).   
In order to verify the normality of data distribution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for RTs and ACC 
levels yielded by subjects’ performance at MR of bodily-related pictures after exposure to all three 
stimuli was applied. As Table 3.1 shows, RTs for MR of bodily-related pictures after subjects listened 
to both musical conditions yielded a low p-value, such as D(36) = 0.167, p. = 0.032 for Metric Simple 
Music, and D(36) = 0.219, p. = 0.001 for Metric Complex Music, meaning that a large data deviation 
within these variables in the population recruited for the study. Likewise, a large deviation within 
these variables in the population was also found for the ACC levels of MR of bodily-related pictures 
after subjects listened to the Metric Complex stimulus – D(36) = 0.204, p. = 0.003 (Table 3.2). Thus, 
since some of the data from RTs and ACC levels after subjects listened to the musical stimuli do not 
meet with parametric assumptions, non-parametric tests, such as the Friedman Test and the Wilcoxon 
matched pairs test were subsequently used in order to verify the effect of the independent variables 
over the dependent variables. 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality 
 
Statistic DF Sig. 
Silence RT 0.138 36 0.151 
Metric Simple RT 0.167 36 0.032 
Metric Complex RT 0.219 36 0.001 
 
Table 3.1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for data distribution of RTs in MR of bodily-related pictures 
after subjects were exposed to the three auditory stimuli. 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality 
 
Statistic DF Sig. 
Silence ACC levels 0.140 36 0.151 
Metric Simple ACC levels 0.134 36 0.182 
Metric Complex ACC levels  0.204 36 0.001 
 
Table 3.2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for data distribution of ACC levels in MR of bodily-related 
pictures after subjects were exposed to the three auditory stimuli. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for data distribution was also applied to verify whether data 
distribution was normal or not normal for all other variables investigated in this study, such as 
differences in arousal levels before and after subjects listened to any stimuli (Table 3.3), differences in 
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mood levels before and after subjects listened to any stimuli (Table 3.4), valence ratings only after 
subjects listened to any stimulus (Table 3.5), and ratings of beat perception after subjects listened to 
Metric Complex Music or Metric Simple Music (Table 3.6) showing that data distribution did not 
meet with parametric assumptions; hence, non-parametric tests were also employed for their 
respective statistical analyses.  
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality for 
SAM ratings 
  Statistic DF Sig. 
Before Silence 0.194 36 0.005 
After Silence 0.171 36 0.025 
Before Metric Simple 0.153 36 0.075 
After Metric Simple 0.222 36 0.001 
Before Metric Complex 0.237 36 0.000 
After Metric Complex 0.138 36 0.151 
 
Table 3.3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for data distribution of SAM ratings for arousal levels before 
and after subjects were exposed to the three auditory stimuli. 
    
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality for 
POMS scores 
  Statistic DF Sig. 
Before Silence 0.114 36 0.200 
After Silence 0.102 36 0.200 
Before Metric Simple 0.198 36 0.004 
After Metric Simple 0.149 36 0.086 
Before Metric Complex 0.121 36 0.200 
After Metric Complex 0.091 36 0.200 
 
Table 3.4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for data distribution of POMS scores before and after subjects 
were exposed to the three auditory stimuli. 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality for 
Valence ratings 
  Statisfic DF Sig. 
Valence for Silence 0.163 36 0.040 
Valence for Metric Simple  0.195 36 0.005 
Valence for Metric Complex 0.149 36 0.090 
 
Table 3.5: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for data distribution of SAM for ratings of stimulus valence 
after subjects were exposed to the three auditory stimuli. 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for beat perception ratings 
  Statistic DF Sig. 
Beat Perception Metric Simple 0.205 36 0.002 
Beat perception Metric Complex 0.201 36 0.003 
 
Table 3.6: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for data distribution of ratings of beat perception in a 9-point 
Likert-Scale after subjects were exposed to the Metric Simple and Metric Complex music. 
 
2 Results of MR of bodily-related pictures 
  2.1 Results by sessions and auditory stimuli 
Means and standard deviations for RTs and ACC levels for MR of bodily-related pictures after 
subjects were exposed to the three auditory conditions (Metric Simple Music, Metric Complex Music, 
and Silence) are provided in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. The first analyses employed a Friedman 
Test in order to verify whether subjects’ performance at MR of bodily-related pictures varied as a 
function of the session order (session 1, session 2, and session 3) and listening conditions (the three 
auditory stimuli).  
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SDs) of 
RTs in all auditory conditions 
  N M SD 
Silence RT 36 1310.13 439.86 
Metric Simple RT 36 1402.31 588.29 
Metric Complex RT 36 1384.22 650.14 
 
Table 3.7: Means and Standard Deviations for RTs (in milliseconds) after subjects were exposed to 
silence, Metric Simple Music and Metric Complex Music, respectively.  
 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SDs) of 
ACC levels in all auditory conditions 
  N M SD 
Silence ACC levels 36 87.10 10.90 
Metric Simple ACC levels 36 85.83 09.68 
Metric Complex ACC levels 36 86.80 11.97 
 
Table 3.8: Means and Standard Deviations for ACC levels (in percentage) after subjects were exposed 
to Silence, Metric Simple Music and Metric Complex Music, respectively. 
 
First, a Friedman test was performed to examine whether there was significant differences in RTs and 
ACC in sessions 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Statistical analysis showed significant differences across RTs 
in sessions 1, 2 and 3, X²(2, N= 36) = 32.067, p. = 0.00 (Figure 3.1). By comparing RTs of each 
session through Wilcoxon T-tests, it was found out a significant difference amongst the 3 possible 
combinations (p. < 0.00 in the comparison between sessions 1 and 2; p. < 0.00 in the comparison 
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between sessions 1 and 3; and p. = 0.09 in the comparison between sessions 2 a 3), in which faster 
response times were produced in session 3 (M=1192.16, SD=356.86) than in session 2 (M= 1320.15, 
SD=518.09), than in session 1 (M=1584.76, SD=689.23), respectively. However, this improvement in 
performance was not reflected on the ACC levels, since the Friedman test yielded no significant 
differences in ACC levels for MR of bodily-related pictures across sessions 1, 2 and 3, respectively [ 
X
2
(2, N=30) = 3.297, p. = 0.192] (Figure 3.2).   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Graph with the mean RTs (in milliseconds) and SDs (error bars) yielded by subjects at 
MR of bodily-related pictures for each session, regardless of auditory condition. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Graph with the mean ACC levels (in percentage) and SDs (bars) yielded by subjects at 
MR of bodily-related pictures for each session, regardless of auditory condition. 
Conversely, a Friedman test yielded no significant differences in RTs and ACC levels for MR of 
bodily-related pictures after subjects were exposed to any of the three auditory stimuli, namely Metric 
Simple Music, Metric Complex Music, and Silence, across the three days of experiments [X
2
(2, N=36) 
= 0.467, p. = 0.792 for RTs, and X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.883, p. = 0.643 for ACC levels], as shown in Figures 
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3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Taken together, these results suggest that, as expected, subjects improved 
their response speed at MR of bodily-related pictures along the sessions; however, this performance 
was not significantly better after subjects were exposed to any auditory stimuli. Hence, the Mozart 
Effect was not replicated in the present study. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Graph with the mean RTs (in milliseconds) and SDs (error bars) yielded by subjects at 
MR of bodily-related pictures after exposure to all three auditory stimuli, namely Silence, Metric 
Simple and Metric Complex, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Graph with the mean ACC levels (in percentage) and SDs (bars) yielded by subjects at 
MR of bodily-related pictures after exposure to all three auditory stimuli, namely Silence, Metric 
Simple and Metric Complex, respectively. 
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  2.2 Results by pictures’ degrees of inclination 
Apart from the RTs and ACC levels yielded by subjects along sessions 1, 2 and 3, and after exposure 
to auditory stimuli prior to the task, the response rates for bodily-related pictures displayed in different 
degrees of inclination (30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º, 180º, inclined clockwise and anti-clockwise from 0º) 
were measured. Table 3.9 shows the mean and SD values of RTs and Table 3.10 corresponds to mean 
values and SDs for ACC levels for those pictures.  
      Mean (M) and Standard Deviations (SDs) for RTs 
in degrees of rotation, clockwise and anticlockwise 
  N M SD 
180º 36 1618.56 714.39 
150º Anti-clockwise 36 1480.08 572.66 
120º Anti-clockwise 36 1370.01 619.01 
90º Anti-clockwise 36 1385.03 570.19 
60º Anti-clockwise 36 1313.96 522.51 
30º Anti-clockwise 36 1243.76 421.13 
0º 36 1241.86 428.01 
30º Clockwise 36 1242.58 485.04 
60º Clockwise 36 1297.62 480.22 
90º Clockwise 36 1349.22 591.88 
120º Clockwise 36 1444.36 557.01 
150º Clockwise 36 1554.57 643.57 
 
Table 3.9: Means and Standard Deviations for RTs (in ms) for pictures in all degrees of inclination, 
rotated both clockwise and anti-clockwise from canonical position. 
 
Mean (M) and Standard Deviations (SDs) for RTs in 
degrees of rotation, clockwise and anticlockwise 
  N M SD 
180º 36 80.67 11.84 
150º Anti-clockwise 36 82.13 13.55 
120º Anti-clockwise 36 84.57 12.13 
90º Anti-clockwise 36 87.27 13.36 
60º Anti-clockwise 36 89.53 11.06 
30º Anti-clockwise 36 88.40 13.67 
0º 36 89.97 12.26 
30º Clockwise 36 87.67 12.67 
60º Clockwise 36 89.63 09.84 
90º Clockwise 36 89.70 11.40 
120º Clockwise 36 84.50 11.96 
150º Clockwise 36 80.17 12.98 
 
Table 3.10: Means and Standard Deviations for ACC levels (in percentages) for pictures in all degrees 
of inclination, rotated both clockwise and anti-clockwise from canonical position (0º). 
 
A Friedman test yielded significant differences for both RTs and ACC levels for pictures displayed in 
different degrees of inclination [X
2
(11, N=36) = 120.59, p. < 0.00 for RTs, and X
2
(11, N=36) = 
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68.188, p. < 0.00 for ACC levels] as Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show, respectively. By comparing the side at 
which pictures were rotated departing from the canonical position (0º), no significant differences were 
found for pictures displayed anticlockwise from the canonical position to their counterparts displayed 
at the clockwise from the canonical position [X
2
(2, N=36) = -0.195, p. = 0.845 for RTs, and X
2
(2, 
N=36) = -0.054, p. = 0.957 for ACC levels]. The lack of significant differences was also observed for 
RTs and ACC levels for side of the limbs (right hands/feet x left hands/feet) depicted on the screen 
[X²(2, N=36) = -1758.00, p. = 0.079 for RTs, and X²(2, N=36) = -0.34, p. = 0.973 for ACC levels].    
By comparing RTs between pictures depicted at each degree of inclination through Wilcoxon t-tests, it 
was found out that pictures in 0º received significantly faster responses than pictures displayed in 60º 
(z = -2.005, p. = 0.04), 90º (z = - 2.376, p. = 0.01), 120º (z = 2.972, p. < 0.00), 150º (z = -4.453, p. < 
0.00), and 180º (z = -4.53, p. < 0.00), respectively. Pictures displayed at 30º anti-clockwise and 
clockwise had significantly faster responses than pictures displayed in 60º (z = -2.952, p. = 0.003), 90º 
(z = -3.222, p. < 0.00), 120º (z = -3.651, p. < 0.00), 150º (z = -4.721, p. < 0.00), and 180º (z = -4.78, p. 
< 0.00), respectively. Concomitantly, significant differences were found for RTs depicted in 60º 
compared to those at 90º (z = -2.026, p. = 0.04), 120º (z = -2.705, p. = 0.007), 150º (z = 4.576, p. = 
0.00) and 180º (z = -4.247, p. <0.000). Finally, pictures displayed at 90º differed in RTs compared to 
pictures displayed at 150º and 180º (z = - 3.918, p. < 0.00 for 150º, and z = -3.569, p. < 0.00 for 180º) 
and pictures displayed at 120º also differed from those depicted at 150º and 180º (z = -4.309, p. < 0.00 
for 150º, and z = -4.021, p. < 0.00 for 180º). No significant differences were found in RTs between 
pictures displayed at 0º and 30º (z= -1.162, p. = 0.245), 90º and 120º (z = -0.36, p. = 0.719), and 150º x 
180º (z= -0.895, p. = 0.371).  
Differences in ACC levels were less significant than differences in RTs between pictures displayed in 
different degrees of inclination. ACC levels for pictures displayed at 0º differed significantly from 
those displayed at 150º and 180º, respectively (z = -4.227, p. = 0.00 for 150º, and z = -3.303, p. = 
0.001 for 180º). The same pattern emerged for other pictures, such as those displayed at 30º, 60º, 90º 
and 120º, respectively, in which ACC levels for all of them differed significantly from ACC levels of 
pictures displayed at 150º and 180º. Pictures at 30º x 150º yielded z = -3.706, p. < 0.00, and pictures at 
30º x 180º yielded z = -3.104, p. = 0.002. Concomitantly, comparing pictures displayed at 60º with 
those at 150º and 180º yielded z = -4.226, p. = 0.010, and z = -3.254, p. = 0.001, respectively. The 
comparison between pictures displayed at 90º and those at 150º and 180º, respectively, yielded z = -
4.031, p. < 0.000, and z = -2.578, p. = 0.010. Finally, pictures displayed at 120º yielded significant 
differences in terms of ACC levels compared to those displayed at 150º (z = -3.342, p. < 0.00) and 
180º (z = -2.467, p. = 0.014), respectively. 
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Figure 3.5: Graph depicting mean RTs (in milliseconds) for pictures displayed at different degrees of 
inclination (30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º, and 180), rotated both clockwise and anti-clockwise from 
canonical position (0º).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Graph depicting mean ACC levels (in percentage) for pictures displayed at different 
degrees of inclination (30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º, and 180), rotated both clockwise and anti-clockwise 
from canonical position (0º). 
 
Finally, by carrying out an analysis of variance to compare subjects’ performance for all seven degrees 
of inclination (0º, 30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º and 180º) conveyed by the pictures and the three auditory 
conditions (Metric Simple, Metric Complex, and Silence) it was observed that subjects’ RTs and ACC 
levels for pictures displayed at different degrees of inclination did not differ significantly after subjects 
were exposed to any auditory stimulus. Pictures depicted at 0º yielded X
2
(2, N=36) = 4.267, p. = 0.118 
for RTs, and X
2
(2, N=36) = 2.656, p. = 0.265 for ACC levels in the comparison between all three 
auditory stimuli. Pictures at 30º yielded X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.267, p. = 0.875 for RTs, and X
2
(2, N=36) = 
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2.731, p. = 0.875 for ACC levels across auditory stimuli. RTs for pictures at 60º yielded X
2
(2, N=36) 
= 0.800, p. = 0.670, and ACC levels yielded X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.800, p. = 0.670. Pictures depicted at 90º 
yielded X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.267, p. = 0.875, and X
2
(2, N=36) = 4.795, p. = 0.091 for RTs and ACC levels 
across stimuli exposure, respectively. For pictures displayed at 120º, X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.487, p. = 0.792 
was yielded for RTs, and X
2
(2, N=36) = 3.493, p. = 0.174 for ACC levels across all auditory stimuli. 
Pictures at 150º yielded X
2
(2, N=36) = 2.067, p. = 0.356 for RTs and X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.257, p. = 0.879 
for ACC levels. Finally, pictures depicted at 180º yielded X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.467, p. = 0.792 for RTs, 
and X
2
(2, N=36) = 0.212, p. = 0.900 for ACC levels after subjects were exposed to all auditory 
stimuli. 
  
3 Arousal, mood, valence and beat perception  
In order to verify whether a possible Mozart Effect would be due to increases in arousal and mood 
levels (Husain et al., 2002), subjects’ arousal and mood levels were measured before and after they 
were exposed to auditory stimuli prior to completion of MR of bodily-related pictures. First, Table 
3.11 depicts the mean Values and SDs for subjects’ arousal levels before and after exposure to all 
three auditory stimuli, according to subjects’ self-reports on the SAM (Bradley & Leng, 1994), as 
described in the procedures section of the present study.  
 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations 
(SDs) for subjects’ arousal levels before 
and after exposure to auditory stimuli 
  N M SD 
Before Silence 36 4.70 1.96 
After Silence 36 3.97 1.92 
Before Metric Simple 36 4.73 1.85 
After Metric Simple 36 4.30 1.87 
Before Metric Complex 36 5.23 1.73 
After Metric Complex 36 4.30 1.72 
 
Table 3.11: Means and Standard Deviations for SAM ratings for arousal levels before and after 
exposure to auditory stimuli.     
 
Since the variable in interest is the variance of subjects’ self-reported arousal levels after exposure to 
auditory stimuli, Wilcoxon t-tests were employed in order to verify if subjects’ response to the SAM 
changed between before and after exposure to each stimulus. Thus, statistical analyses were carried 
out separately for each auditory stimulus.  
First, significant differences were found for the variance in self-reported arousal levels after subjects 
remained in Silence (z = -2.381, p. = 0.017) and listened to Metric Complex Music (z = - 2.325, p. = 
0.020). More specifically, these results suggest that subjects’ self-reported arousal levels decreased 
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after they were exposed to both Silence and Metric Complex Music. Conversely, no significant 
differences were found for the variance in subjects’ self-reported arousal levels after they were 
exposed to Metric Simple Music (z = - 1.817, p. = 0.069). Figure 3.7 depicts the differences found in 
the variances between subjects’ self-reported arousal levels after exposure to all three auditory stimuli. 
 
Figure 3.7: Graph depicting the differences in mean ratings and SDs (error bars) of subjects’ self-
reported arousal levels between before and after they were exposed to each auditory stimulus  
 
A similar analysis was carried out to compare subjects’ mood levels before and after exposure to 
auditory stimuli. As described, the POMS adapted to European Portuguese (Viana et al., 2001) was 
administered, and similarly to the SAM (Bradley & Leng, 1994), subjects had to fill in a table with 36 
adjectives that comprise six different dimensions, such as Tension-Anxiety, Depression-Dejection, 
Hostility-Anger, Fatigue-Inertia, Vigor-Activity, and Confusion-Disorientation. Firstly, the total 
scores subjects had at each one of these six dimensions were summed. Table 3.12 shows the mean 
Values and SDs for POMS total scores. Secondly, Wilcoxon t-tests were applied in order to verify 
whether significant differences for POMS total scores between before and after subjects were exposed 
to each auditory stimuli. Again, statistical analyses were carried out separately for each auditory 
stimulus. 
Wilcoxon t-tests comparing POMS total scores before and after exposure to each auditory stimulus 
yielded significant differences for the total scores between before and after subjects remained in 
silence prior to task completion (z = -2.109, p. = 0.035). No significant differences were found for 
POMS total scores between before and after subjects were exposed to either Metric Simple Music or 
Metric Complex Music (z = -0.293, p. = 0.769 for Metric Simple Music, and z = -0.492, p. = 0.623 for 
Metric Complex Music). Figure 3.8 depicts the differences between POMS scores both before and 
after subjects were exposed to each one of the three auditory stimuli. 
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Means (M) and Standard Deviation (SDs) for 
POMS scores before and after exposure to 
auditory stimuli 
  N M SD 
Before Silence 36 26.40 5.26 
After Silence 36 24.83 4.96 
Before Metric Simple 36 24.03 7.64 
After Metric Simple 36 24.30 7.50 
Before Metric Complex 36 24.23 7.79 
After Metric Complex 36 24.57 7.35 
 
Table 3.12: Means and Standard Deviations for POMS scores before and after exposure to auditory 
stimuli. 
 
Figure 3.8: Graph depicting the differences in subjects’ self-reported mood levels and SDs (error 
bars) between before and after they were exposed to each auditory stimulus through POMS total 
scores (Viana et al., 2001).   
 
Although significant differences in total scores at the POMS after subjects remained in silence 
compared to before exposure to this particular stimulus were found, by investigating the differences in 
scores for all 6 dimensions of the POMS between before and after subjects remained in silence, 
significant differences only emerged for the Vigor-Activity dimension of adjectives related to mood (z 
= -2.908, p. = 0.004). This specific dimension comprises adjectives related to how aroused subjects 
feel like at a given moment. In line with the results obtained through the SAM regarding the arousal 
levels after subjects were exposed to Silence, the scores at this particular dimension of the POMS also 
suggest that subjects’ arousal levels decreased after they remained in silence. Interestingly, scores at 
the POMS for the Vigor-Activity dimension did not replicate the results obtained through the SAM 
after subjects were exposed to Metric Complex Music, since no significant differences in the Vigor-
Activity dimension were found between before and after subjects listened to this specific stimulus (z = 
-0.058, p. = 0.954). No significant differences were found for any other dimensions under the silent 
condition, nor in other conditions.       
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In order to verify whether subjects had preferences for any specific auditory stimulus, a SAM for 
valence (Bradley & Leng, 1994) was applied after subjects were exposed to each one of the auditory 
stimulus. Subjects were asked to rate the stimulus on a Likert-Scale from 1 to 9. Figure 3.13 shows 
subjects valence ratings across the auditory stimuli. 
Differently from the analyses carried out for both arousal and mood levels, valence ratings were 
measured only after subjects were exposed to an auditory stimulus. Thus, valence ratings between all 
three different stimuli were compared. As a result, a Friedman test yielded no significant differences in 
valence ratings between Silence, Metric Simple Music and Metric Complex Music [X²(2, N=36) = 
3.556, p. = 0.169)].  Figure 3.9 depicts the differences in valence ratings across the three auditory 
stimuli. 
 
Mean values (M) and Standard Deviations 
(SDs) for subjects’ valence ratings 
  N M SD 
Valence for Silence 36 5.67 1.58 
Valence for Metric Simple  36 6.27 1.43 
Valence for Metric Complex 36 5.87 1.45 
 
Table 3.13: Means and Standard Deviations for SAM ratings for valence after exposure to each 
auditory stimuli.     
 
Figure 3.9: Graph depicting subjects’ valence ratings and SDs (error bars) between all three different 
auditory stimuli. 
 
Finally, in order to verify whether subjects managed to perceive and follow the rhythmic structures of 
both Metric Simple and Metric Complex Music, through a 9-point Likert-Scale, subjects had to 
indicate whether following the rhythmic structures of each musical stimulus was “very difficult” (in 
this case, subjects had to place an fill in the number 1 box with an “x”), “very easy” (by filling in the 
number 9 box with an “x) or any other number in the scale in-between, according to their perception. 
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As expected, ratings of beat perception of Metric Simple beats (M = 7.57, SD = 1.22) were 
significantly higher than ratings of Metric Complex Music beats (M = 6.13, SD = 1.65), as the result 
of a Wilcoxon t-test shows: z = - 3.631, p. < 0.000. Figure 3.10 depicts these differences. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Graph depicting subjects’ ratings of beat perception and SDs (error bars) between Metric 
Simple and Metric Complex Music through a 9-point Likert-Scale.     
   
4 Subjects’ feedback   
After completion of the MR of bodily-related task in the last day of experiment, experimenter asked 
subjects to provide their brief feedback on the experiment. Instead of leaving the room, as in the first 
two days of experiment, subjects were asked to sit back on the chairs they were previously allocated 
during the listening task.  
First of all, experimenter asked subjects whether they had employed a specific strategy to carry out the 
MR of bodily-related pictures and, in affirmative cases, what specific strategy had been employed. As 
a response, all subjects reported that they had imagined the rotation of the pictures displayed on the 
screen as if they were physically rotating their own limbs. Thus, subjects performed a motor 
simulation of their own actions (physical rotation of hands and feet) in order to accomplish the task, in 
line with Jeannerod’s (1994, 1995, 2006) description of motor simulation and previous studies on MR 
of cubes (e.g. Wexler et al., 1998).  
Experimenter also asked subjects whether, in order to rotate the image, they had fixated a point of 
reference in the picture. Most subjects responded that the thumbs (for the hands) and the toes (for the 
feet) were the point of references, and they rotated the image according to where these points of 
reference were located on the screen. Two subjects, however, responded that they had chosen a 
specific point at the palm (or back) of the hands to do the rotation (more specifically, below the index 
finger), and a point in the sole of the foot (in their own words “the salient curve” below the toe).  
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Subjects were also asked which pictures they found the most difficult ones to provide an answer to. 
This question yielded no consensus amongst subjects, since some reported having more difficulties 
during the practice trials (Appendix IV) compared to the critical trials (Appendix III). Most subjects, 
however, reported having experienced more difficulties in the laterality judgment when the pictures 
were depicted at 180º compared to other degrees of rotation. Finally, subjects reported having no 
apparent difficulties in discriminating left limbs from right limbs or in rotating pictures displayed at 
clockwise or anti-clockwise orientation departing from the canonical position. This verbal feedback is 
consistent with the data. 
Finally, as far as the auditory stimuli concerns, all subjects reported having noticed differences in the 
rhythmic structures of the musical stimuli. This verbal feedback is consistent with the data described 
last section regarding subjects’ beat perception. These differences, however, did not elicit any negative 
emotions nor any preference toward the Metric Complex Music compared to the Metric Simple Music, 
and vice-versa, according to subjects. Furthermore, when asked whether the exposure to the musical 
stimuli influenced their performance at the tasks, while some participants reported that musical stimuli 
made them feel relaxed and concentrated prior to the task, a few subjects reported that the musical 
stimuli made them feel more aroused and concentrated to the task. A few subjects, however, reported 
that, since the musical stimuli (a minimalist techno) were not correspondent to their favorite musical 
genre, exposure to musical stimuli was detrimental to the subsequent task, since they felt less 
concentrated for the task, according to their verbal report. These subjects reported that their 
performance was better after they remained in silence, rather than when they were exposed to any 
musical stimulus. In line with this point, most subjects reported that exposure to silence made them 
feel more relaxed and concentrated to task completion compared to the exposure to the musical 
stimuli; conversely, however, a few subjects felt anxious with the silence, and reported that the music 
(both Metric Simple and Metric Complex) elicited more positive feelings before completion MR task. 
Finally, when asked about the stimuli that they preferred the best, subjects yielded no consensus in 
their response. Although some had demonstrated preferences for any of the musical stimulus (without 
specifying which one), some had preferred the silence. The verbal report stated in this paragraph is 
consistent with the data regarding the valence of the stimuli yielded by the SAM (Bradley & Leng, 
1994) described in the last section, and somewhat consistent with the results yielded by the SAM for 
arousal (Bradley & Leng, 1994) and the POMS (Viana et al. 2001) regarding arousal decrease after 
subjects were exposed to silence.  
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IV. Discussion 
1 Interpretations of the results 
In the light of the hypotheses raised in section 4 of the Theoretical Background chapter of the present 
study, the results from the experiment described in the last chapter will now be discussed. 
The present investigation aimed to verify whether after listening to musical stimuli subjects would 
enhance their performance at MR of bodily-related pictures. Thus, in line with studies carried out by 
Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998), this study aimed to verify whether a Mozart Effect would 
emerge for this specific task and with the specific musical stimuli selected. Further, the present study 
specifically investigated whether manipulation of one specific musical element alone, namely, the 
rhythm, would suffice to increase subjects’ performance at the task, in which only the rhythmic 
structures of the musical piece were manipulated by the experimenter, giving rise to two distinct 
musical stimuli that were eventually used in the experiment: Metric Simple Music and Metric 
Complex Music. In sum, as described in the objectives and hypotheses section of the present study, 
some assumptions were raised in order to derive the hypotheses that were going to be investigated 
through the experiment. Those assumptions were based on empirical findings and theoretical 
assumptions encountered in the ECT, motor imagery, music perception and Mozart Effect literature. 
Those assumptions are:  
(I) Weak embodiment: some concepts are the simulations of perceptual, motor and introspective 
experiences, grounded in modality-specific systems of the brain (Mahon, 2015).  
(II) Motor imagery is the simulation of bodily movements, carried out in modality-specific 
systems of the brain, namely, the motor cortices (Jeannerod, 2006).  
(III) MR tasks of bodily-related pictures are accomplished by means of simulation of one’s own 
bodily movements to accomplish the task (Wexler et al., 1998). 
(IV) Music activates the motor cortices of the brain, and this activation varies in degree according 
to the rhythmic complexity of the auditory stimulus, in which metric simple rhythmic 
structures elicit higher neuronal activation in these brain areas than metric complex and non-
metric rhythmic structures (Grahn & Brett, 2007). 
(V) Increase of cortical activation and synchronization of neural pattern activities in specific brain 
areas used for cognitive tasks after music listening results in performance enhancement at the 
task compared to control conditions and other stimuli (Rauscher et al., 1993). 
(VI) Increase of cortical activation and synchronization of neural pattern activities in specific brain 
areas used for cognitive tasks after music listening are the reason why the Mozart Effect is 
possible, and not subjects’ increase of arousal/mood levels or subjects’ preference for a 
stimulus (Rauscher et al, 1995; Bodner et al., 2001). 
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Based on these assumptions, hypothesis 1) predicted that after listening to Metric Simple Music, 
subjects would have better performance at MR of bodily-related pictures compared to Metric Complex 
Music and Silence. As data reported in the Results chapter of the present study suggest, this hypothesis 
was not confirmed, since performance levels did not differ after subjects listened to Metric Simple 
Music, Metric Complex Music or Silence before carrying out the MR of bodily-related parts. This lack 
of confirmation relates to the research question raised in the objectives and hypothesis section, 
namely, does listening to music enhance performance at MR of bodily-related pictures? 
Accordingly, based on data, the answer for this question would be a no. In this case, since there was 
no performance enhancement at MR of bodily-related pictures after subjects were exposed to the 
stimuli, hypothesis 2) raised in the objectives and hypothesis section, which stated that subjects would 
have had a better performance after listening to Metric Simple Music compared to the other two 
stimuli, and that performance enhancement would be due to increase in cortical activation of modality-
specific areas involved in the MR task elicited by the Metric Simple Music, and not to any significant 
increase in arousal/mood levels or as an artifact of preference for any particular stimulus (Chabris, 
1999), would also receive a no as an answer in the present study, since there were no significant 
differences in performance after subjects were exposed to any of the three stimuli. Likewise, in line 
with hypothesis 2), question C) raised in the objectives and hypotheses section (if there are significant 
differences in performance after subjects listened to distinct auditory stimuli, are these differences due 
to brain activation elicited by the music or changes in arousal/mood levels or preference for a given 
stimulus?) would remain unaddressed in the present study, since no enhancement in performance after 
exposure to any stimulus was observed.  
In line with the lack of confirmation of hypotheses 1) and 2), it is hypothesized that at least one or 
more than one assumption (I-VI) described above are false. Notwithstanding, it is important to note 
that, since the present study did not employ any brain-mapping techniques, such as fMRI, EEG, etc., 
some of the possible explanations of why hypotheses 1) and 2) were not observed in the present study 
may be speculative, since it was not possible to observe which brain areas were activated either during 
the pre-intervention phase (auditory listening) nor the performance of MR of bodily-related tasks. 
As an example of speculative hypothesis that would account for the null result observed in the 
experiment regarding hypothesis 1) and 2), it is possible to hypothesize that assumption I - Weak 
embodiment: some concepts are the simulations of perceptual, motor and introspective experiences, 
grounded in modality-specific systems of the brain (Mahon, 2015) - may be false for motor concepts 
used in motor imagery tasks. As described in the objectives and hypotheses section, it was expected 
that musical stimuli selected for this study would elicit activation in the motor cortices, modality-
specific areas involved in motor imagery (II) and in MR tasks of bodily-related pictures (III). This 
activation would enhance subjects’ performance in posterior tasks, which was not observed, according 
to data. According to conceptual embodiment (Mahon, 2015), all concepts are grounded in modality-
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specific areas of the brain (strong embodiment) or some concepts are grounded in modality-specific 
areas of the brain (weak embodiment), and concepts are simulations of perceptual, motor and 
introspective experiences (Barsalou, 1999). This particular study investigated whether some concepts 
(motor concepts used in motor imagery) are grounded in modality-specific brain areas, hence, weak 
embodiment. Since the prediction from hypotheses 1) and 2) was not confirmed by the data, it could 
be the case that motor concepts used in motor imagery tasks may not be grounded in modality-specific 
areas of the brain. It could be the case that, for instance, musical stimuli have stimulated the motor 
cortices, but this stimulation would not have made any difference for performance, since motor 
concepts involved in motor imagery tasks may not be grounded in the modality-specific areas such as 
the motor cortices. Once again, since this study did not employ, for instance, EEG or fMRI methods to 
observe which parts of the brain were activated, the hypothesis that musical stimuli activated the 
motor cortices but motor concepts used in motor imagery tasks are not grounded in modality-specific 
areas, such as the motor cortices, is speculative. However, if this speculative hypothesis is true and 
motor concepts are not grounded in modality-specific areas of the brain, then question A) (are motor 
concepts used in motor imagery tasks grounded in modality-specific systems?) is addressed, and the 
answer for that question would then be negative.   
Conversely, if there had been a Mozart Effect and listening to music had enhanced subjects’ 
subsequent performance at MR of bodily-related pictures, this result would have suggested that weak 
embodiment is true for, at least, motor concepts. The reasoning is similar to the one stated in the last 
paragraph hypothesizing that weak embodiment may be false for motor concepts. However, in this 
case, if there had been a Mozart Effect, it could be the case that motor cortices involved in MR of 
bodily-related pictures would have been activated, facilitating performance. This result would have 
provided weak conceptual embodiment with some evidence, since it would suggest that motor 
concepts used in motor imagery tasks are grounded in modality-specific systems that were activated 
by the music and facilitated performance at the MR of bodily-related pictures.  
Further, the hypothesis that weak conceptual embodiment may be false would reflect on some other 
assumptions, such as II and III. First, weak embodiment may not be true for motor imagery tasks, 
since motor concepts may not be grounded in modality-specific brain systems, such as the motor 
cortices. Assumption II claims that motor imagery is the simulation of bodily movements, carried out 
in modality-specific systems of the brain, namely, the motor cortices (Jeannerod, 2006). This 
assumption can be further divided in two claims: [1] motor imagery is the simulation of bodily 
movements, and [2] motor imagery is grounded in modality-specific systems of the brain. According 
to subjects’ self report after the experiment, all subjects reported having imagined performing the task 
by taking their own body as perspective in order to rotate the limbs depicted on the screen, imagining 
the limbs depicted being rotated as if they were physically rotating their own body parts. Thus, 
subjects carried out the rotation of the limbs on the picture through a 1PP, not a 3PP person 
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perspective. This is consistent with motor imagery, since in motor imagery, subjects usually imagine 
themselves carrying a motor action through the 1PP (Jeannerod, 1995). Thus, if motor imagery is the 
simulation of bodily movements performed through 1PP and subjects carried out the MR of bodily-
related pictures through a 1PP, then claim number [1] stated in this paragraph is addressed. However, 
according to the hypothesis that weak embodiment for motor concepts may be false, it seems like 
claim number [2] stated in this paragraph may not hold true. More specifically, one thing is to suggest 
that subjects performed the task by means of simulations of bodily movements (III), which accounts 
for claim number [1] raised in this paragraph; another thing is to claim that this simulation are 
grounded in modality-specific areas in the brain (claim number [2] of this paragraph). If a similar 
reasoning applied to the hypothesis that weak conceptual embodiment may be false for motor concepts 
were to be applied to motor imagery, then music that would have activated the motor cortices would 
not have made any difference for performance, since simulation of bodily movements may not take 
place in modality-specific regions. In this sense, it could be the case that simulations of bodily 
movements are carried out through manipulation of abstract, amodal symbols in a language of thought, 
consistent with CCTM, not necessarily taking place in modality-specific areas of the brain. Likewise, 
this hypothesis would also relate to assumption III, since MR of bodily-related pictures could have 
been performed through simulation of bodily movements, but not specifically using modality-specific 
areas of the brain either, namely the motor cortices. 
The hypothesis that weak conceptual embodiment may be false for motor concepts on the grounds that 
motor concepts may not be grounded in modality-specific areas of the brain may also reflect on the 
constraining and constitutive role that the non-neural parts of the body may have in cognition, as 
entailed by conceptual embodiment. First, as stated in section 1.3 of the present study, conceptual 
embodiment can be seen as a form of ECT, since structural features of the body play a constitutive and 
constraining role in the concepts we use in motor imagery, in this case, the motor concepts. More 
specifically, since concepts are simulations and simulations are the “reenactment of perceptual, motor, 
and introspective states acquired during experience with the world, body and mind”, hence, bodily 
experiences in an environment play a constitutive role in simulations (Barsalou, 2008, p. 618). If weak 
conceptual embodiment for motor concepts is not true, then it may be the case that motor concepts 
may not be the simulations of past experiences grounded in modality-specific brain areas. Again, it 
could be the case that, for instance, motor concepts are deployed through the manipulation of abstract, 
amodal symbols in a language of thought, as discussed in section 1.1 of this study. Likewise, if weak 
conceptual embodiment for motor concepts is not true and concepts are not the simulations of past 
experiences, then the non-neural parts of the body may not play a constraining role in the motor 
concepts deployed in motor imagery tasks. If body as a constraint hypotheses is false on the grounds 
that weak conceptual embodiment for motor concepts is false, then question B) would be addressed 
with ‘no’ as a response.  
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Although the hypothesis that weak conceptual embodiment for motor concepts may not be true reflects 
on constitutive and constraining roles of the body on cognition, this specific hypothesis does not entail 
that ECT is not true. As described in section 1.2.1 of the theoretical background in the present study, 
the ECT entails that the body can play a physical constitutive role or a constraining role in cognition, 
and this is regardless of whether conceptual embodiment is true or not. As predicted by hypothesis 3) 
outlined in the objectives and hypothesis section of the present study, the time to make a laterality 
judgment of a stimulus reflects the degree of MR needed to bring one’s body parts to a position 
adequate for achieving the task, reflecting on an almost perfect linear increase of RTs with angular 
stimulus disparity. In other words, this hypothesis predicts that the body can play a constraining role in 
cognition, independently of whether strong/weak conceptual embodiment is true or not. In sum, 
assuming that subjects would perform the MR of bodily-related pictures through a 1PP, in which they 
would simulate the rotation of the human body limbs depicted on the screen as if they were physically 
rotating their own limbs, it was predicted that subjects would have slower RTs and lower ACC levels 
for stimuli that were displayed in anatomically awkward positions (e.g. 180º) compared to stimuli 
displayed in the canonical position (0º), replicating similar results from other studies of MR of bodily-
related (e.g. Parsons, 1987a, 1987b). If this prediction was true, then biomechanical constraints of the 
human body would have played a constraining role in the performance of MR of bodily-related, 
according to hypothesis 3). Data are consistent with hypothesis 3). First, as reported by subjects in the 
self-report in the end of the experiments, subjects reported having rotated the limb displayed on the 
screen to the canonical position (0º) in order to match with the canonical position of their own limbs. 
By employing this strategy, subjects spent more time to rotate the picture displayed in anatomically 
awkward position to the canonical position in order to provide a laterality judgment response. As it 
can be observed in the results section of the present study, subjects had an almost perfect linear 
increase in RTs and decrease in ACC levels across the degrees of inclinations in which the body parts 
were displayed at (0º, 30º, 60º, 90º, 120º, 150º and 180º, respectively). This pattern was observed 
independently of musical stimuli subject listened to before completing the MR of bodily-related 
pictures. In sum, since subjects mentally simulated their own body-parts rotation while carrying out 
the MR of bodily-related pictures and biomechanical constraints implied by the degree of inclination 
of the body part depicted on the screen interfered in subjects responses, then a constraining role of the 
non-neural parts of the body in cognition is observed and question B) can be answered with an ‘yes’ in 
this case. 
A good amount of studies have provided conceptual embodiment with suggestive evidence that 
conceptual embodiment may be true at least for motor concepts. First, as described in the empirical 
findings of motor imagery section, several studies that employed brain-mapping techniques (e.g. 
fMRI) have observed that modality-specific areas of the brain, more specifically, the motor areas, are 
activated during motor imagery tasks (Jeannerod, 2001). The finding that motor imagery relies on the 
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same mechanisms of motor preparation and execution is a not only a central claim in the motor 
imagery literature, but also accounts for the improvements that sportsmen may have in the physical 
performance after mentally rehearsing a movement that will be employed during the sporting practice. 
For instance, as described in that section, in Murphy et al.’s (2008) study, groups of professional 
golfers who underwent a three-week program of motor imagery and physical practice combined had 
better performance improvement in bunker shots compared to those groups assigned only to the 
physical practice of the movements, and did not perform any motor imagery of the task. It is 
hypothesized by the motor imagery literature that this improvement after subjects employed motor 
imagery techniques before the sporting practice is due to the reinforcement of the brain areas involved 
in motor execution when subjects only imagined performing the movements for a period of time 
(Jeannerod, 2006). Likewise, as reported in diverse sections of the Theoretical Background chapter of 
the present study, a good amount of studies that employed brain-mapping techniques have reported 
that it was observed an increased activation in modality-specific areas of the brain, such as the motor 
areas, in passive reading tasks. For instance, in Hauk et al.’s (2004) study, it was observed that, when 
presented with words related to leg actions (e.g. KICK), the primary motor area and the premotor 
cortex involved in leg movements were activated. Taken together, these studies provide with 
suggestive evidence that weak conceptual embodiment may be true, at least for motor concepts. In line 
with these studies, it is important to note that the hypothesis that weak conceptual embodiment may be 
false for motor concepts is just one hypothesis that may account for the null result observed in the 
experiment in terms of hypotheses 1) and 2) described in the objectives and hypotheses section. 
Assuming that weak conceptual embodiment is true for motor concepts, these motor concepts are 
grounded in modality-specific areas of the brain, namely, the motor areas, and we use these motor 
concepts in order to carry out MR of bodily-related pictures through motor simulation, it is possible to 
raise some auxiliary hypotheses that may account for the null result in terms of hypotheses 1) and 2) 
that do not particularly suggest that weak conceptual embodiment is false for motor concepts.  
First, in line with assumption IV, that musical rhythmic structures activate the motor areas, varying in 
degree of activation across different musical rhythmic structures, namely Metric Simple, Metric 
Complex and Non-metric, according to Grahn and Brett’s (2007) study, it was observed that, although 
Metric Simple, Metric Complex and Non-metric stimuli elicited different levels of cortical activation 
in the motor areas compared to rest, more specifically in areas such as the pre-SMA, SMA, Ventral 
Premotor Cortex, Mid-premotor Cortex, Cerebellum, the STG, PMd areas, areas of the Basal Ganglia, 
such as the Putamen and the Caudate, the levels of activation differed between musicians and non-
musicians. In that study, it was observed that these areas were shown to be more activated in 
musicians than non-musicians after exposure to stimuli. Although Grahn and Brett (2007) noticed that 
the activation of these brain areas in non-musicians was significantly higher when compared to rest, 
since all subjects that took part in the present study were non-musicians, it is hypothesized that the 
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cortical activation elicited in brain areas involved in MR of bodily-related pictures after exposure to 
either Metric Simple Music or Metric Complex Music was not sufficient to result in an increase of 
subjects’ performance at the task, in line with assumption V. It could be speculated, then, that 
musicians would have had better performance at MR tasks after exposure to pieces of music with 
different rhythmic structures on the basis that neural activation of motor areas after exposure to music 
is higher for musicians than non-musicians, and we use the same motor areas to simulate bodily 
movements and to carry out MR tasks of bodily-related pictures. In a meta-analysis on the Mozart 
Effect, Hetland (2000) claims that very few studies compared the performance of different groups of 
subjects with different musical expertise (musicians vs. non-musicians, in this case) at spatial-temporal 
reasoning tasks after exposure to musical stimuli such as Mozart’s music. Whereas one study showed 
no differences in performance between musicians and non-musicians at spatial-temporal reasoning 
tasks after subjects listened to Mozart, Haydn or remained in silence (Cooper, 1997), another observed 
that non-musicians outperformed musicians at MR tasks of cubes after listening to Mozart’s music 
(Aheadi et al., 2009). Due to the short amount of studies that investigated the correlation between 
musical expertise and the Mozart Effect, the hypothesis stated in this paragraph can only be 
speculative.  
Still in line with assumption IV and also related to assumption V, that claims that increase in 
activation and synchronization of neural pattern activities in specific brain areas used for spatial-
temporal tasks after music listening result in performance enhancement at the task compared to control 
conditions and other stimuli, it is also hypothesized that, perhaps, listening to the musical stimuli 
designed for the present study did not elicit activation in all areas that are involved in MR of bodily-
related pictures. According to Parsons et al. (1995) and Hamada et al. (2018), the areas activated when 
subjects carry out MR task of bodily-related pictures are: Prefrontal and Insular Premotor areas, the 
SMA, Anterior Cingulate, right Cingulate, superior Premotor Cortex, bilateral Premotor Cortex, 
Cerebellum and Basal ganglia, posterior and inferior Parietal Cortex, superior Parietal Regions, 
inferior Parietal, Visual processing areas (V1 and V2), right Occipital area, bilateral Middle Occipital 
Gyrus, the right Inferior Parietal lobules and the left Superior and Inferior Parietal lobes. As described 
in section 4.1.1 of the Theoretical Background, Koelsch (2011) reports that, apart from the primary 
and secondary auditory cortices, music perception activates the following Broadmann areas (BA):  for 
harmony, meter, rhythm and timbre perception, BA 44 is activated, which comprises the Frontal 
Cortex and areas such as the Ventral Premotor Cortex, the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex, and the 
inferior Frontal Gyrus; for melodic and rhythmic grouping, BA 22p is activated, which comprises the 
STG; BAs 41 and 42 (PAC) and BA 52 (Parainsular area) are responsible for feature extraction of 
pitch height, pitch chroma, loudness, location; the auditory brainstem and the thalamus seem to be 
involved in extraction of periodicity, timbre, intensity, and location. Also, recent studies that employed 
brain-mapping techniques (e.g. Grahn and Brett, 2007; Zatorre et al., 2008) suggest that the motor 
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system is involved in processing musical rhythms, since activities in the SMA, pre-SMA, Ventral 
Premotor Cortex, Mid-premotor Cortex, Cerebellum, the STG, PMd areas, the Putamen, and the 
Caudate were detected even for listeners that “passively” listened to the musical stimulus. By taking 
together the brain areas activated in both MR of bodily-related pictures and during music perception, 
in particular, the perception of rhythm, it may be the case then that, although music (specially its 
rhythmic components) activates important cortical areas involved in MR of bodily-related pictures, it 
did not activate all the areas involved in the referred task as suggested by Parsons et al. (1995) and 
Hamada et al. (2018). In sum, it could be the case that all assumptions (I-VI) listed in the objectives 
and hypotheses section of the present study are correct; however, an auxiliary hypothesis could be 
that, although MR of bodily-related pictures and rhythmic perception strongly activate the motor 
cortices of the brain, it is possible that neural activation of the motor cortices elicited by music 
perception may not be sufficient for performance enhancement at MR of bodily-related pictures, since 
other essential cortical areas involved in MR of bodily-related pictures may not have been activated by 
the musical stimuli used in this present study. However, since this study did not employ any brain-
mapping technique, it is not possible to conclude that this hypothesis may account for the null effect in 
terms of the lack of Mozart Effect in the present study. 
Alternatively to hypotheses 1) and 2) described in the objectives and hypotheses section of the present 
study, it had been hypothesized that if Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995) are correct that exposure to 
complexly structured music results in increase of neural activation and synchronization of neural 
patterns in modality-specific areas involved in spatial-temporal reasoning tasks, then it would be 
expected that subjects would have had better performance at MR of bodily-related pictures after 
listening to Metric Complex Music compared to the other two stimuli, since Metric Complex Music 
would be a more complex stimulus than the other two, given its complex rhythmic structures, designed 
according to Bouwer et al.’s (2018) study. This alternative hypothesis would sharply contrast with 
assumption IV. However, as observed by data, there was no significant increase in performance after 
subjects listened to any of the three stimuli. This lack of performance enhancement could suggest that 
Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995) are wrong that complexly structured music elicits synchronization 
of neural patterns in brain areas involved in MR tasks which, in turn, results in performance 
enhancement at these tasks compared to other stimuli, such as repetitive and simply structured music 
(as they mention in their studies, Phillip Glass’s music, for instance). Alternatively, it could be the 
case that, for instance, Metric Complex Music, despite having attributes that would make this stimulus 
more complex than Metric Simple Music and Silence (in this case, the rhythmic structures), was not 
‘complex enough’ to elicit the synchronization of neural patterns of brain areas suggested by Rauscher 
et al. (1993, 1994, 1995). This latter hypothesis could further suggest that, perhaps, changing other 
musical features, such as melody, harmony, pitch, would have been necessary to provide the musical 
stimulus with the ‘complexity’ required. In other words, only the rhythmic structures were 
101 
 
manipulated in order to give rise to two distinct pieces of music, namely Metric Simple and Metric 
Complex Music. However, although this manipulation has provided the Metric Complex Music with 
more ‘complexity’ than the other stimuli, that complexity did not suffice to enhance subjects’ 
performance at the task, according to Rauscher et al.’s (1993, 1994, 1995) account for the Mozart 
Effect. Again, it could be the case that the stimuli used in the present study were not suitable for the 
effect expected at the subsequent task, since they were not complex enough. This hypothesis, however, 
seems to be hard to be verified. As stated in section 4.2.1, Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995) have 
never provided the term ‘complexity’ with a proper definition or have never made any scientific 
claims about the term ‘complexity’ in music, special in Mozart’s music. This term was brought up in 
comparison with the structure of other musical stimuli, such as Philip Glass’s repetitive music, 
however, the authors have never made a scientific claim of what makes Mozart’s music complex per 
se. Due to this lack of scientific claims of what constitutes the complexity of Mozart’s music, it does 
not seem possible to measure how complex the Metric Complex Music used in this study is, since 
Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995) or any other researcher within the Music Perception literature do 
not offer an absolute precise definition of ‘complexity’ in music, and, as a consequence, whether 
Metric Complex Music meets Rauscher et al.’s (1993, 1994, 1995) criteria of a musically ‘complex 
stimulus’. 
Besides the hypotheses regarding weak conceptual embodiment, motor imagery, and the musical 
attributes of the musical stimuli employed in the present study, it is also possible to raise a hypothesis 
that concerns the experimental setup. Firstly, as described in the methodological section, for this study, 
students of Sports Science from the Polytechnic Institute of Castelo Branco were recruited to 
participate in the experiment, who reported performing physical activities on a daily basis. According 
to Pietsch and Jansen (2011), by comparing performances of students of music, students of sports and 
students of education in a MR of cubes, the authors found significant differences in students of both 
music and sports’ performance compared to students of education. As far as the performance of 
students of sports concerns, Pietsch and Jansen (2011) attribute their good performance at MR tasks to 
their high motor competence. As reported in the results section, subjects’ performance was relatively 
high in terms of ACC levels and relatively low RTs across all conditions and even degrees of 
inclination of the depicted limbs. It can be hypothesized, then, that perhaps the MR of bodily-related 
pictures was too easy for them, preventing them from showing any improvement in performance and, 
therefore, significant statistical differences in performance after they listened to any auditory stimuli. 
Since it was employed a counterbalanced paradigm, in which all subjects listened to all three auditory 
stimuli in different orders for three consecutive days, if subjects had had a relatively high score on the 
first day, this score would probably not have improved significantly for the next two days of 
experiments, regardless of any auditory stimulus they had listened prior to performance. As observed 
through the data, this was the case for ACC levels, in which subjects scored 85,3% on the first session, 
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86,4% on the second, and 87,9% on the third, not differing significantly among the three days of 
experiments. Thus, at least for ACC levels, the relatively good level of subjects at MR of bodily-
related tasks may have hindered any improvement subjects could have had along the three sessions of 
experiments. Secondly, this lack of improvement was not observed for RTs, since it was observed a 
significantly decrease in RTs across sessions 1, 2 and 3. However, this decrease in RTs across the 
sessions correlated with the auditory stimulus subjects listened prior to task completion, in which no 
significant differences in RTs amongst auditory conditions. Therefore, it may be the case that 
improvement in performance at MR of bodily-related pictures in terms of RTs is sensitive to practice, 
and not to auditory stimuli subjects listen to before the task.             
A final hypothesis for the lack of Mozart Effect in the present study also addresses hypothesis 1), but 
specially addresses hypothesis 2). Also, the following hypothesis sheds light on assumption VI. First, 
as stated in the section 3.2.1 about the Mozart Effect, different accounts for the Mozart Effect have 
been produced: On the one hand, according to Rauscher et al. (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998), there is a 
direct link between exposure to music and spatial reasoning, supported by the trion model (Leng et al, 
1990), which proposes that musical activity and other higher cognition functions share inherent neural 
firing patterns organized in a highly structured spatial-temporal code over large regions of the cortex. 
Some studies that employed brain-mapping techniques (e.g. Bodner et al., 2001) found differences in 
activation by the Mozart sonata compared to Beethoven’s Fur Elise in the Dorsolateral Pre-frontal 
Cortex, Occipital Cortex and Cerebellum, all expected to be important for spatial-temporal reasoning. 
In other words, according to Rauscher et al.’s (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998), the Mozart Effect is a product 
of activation of cortical areas involved in spatial-temporal task, giving rise to assumptions V and VI. 
On the other hand, Chabris (1999) claim that the Mozart effect could be explained as an artifact of 
arousal/mood levels of the subject or to enjoyment caused by listening to Mozart’s music. As 
described in section 3.2.1, Husain et al. (2002), for instance, edited Mozart’s music and created four 
different pieces based on the original piece: Mozart with fast tempo and major mode, Mozart with fast 
tempo and minor mode, Mozart with slow tempo and major mode, Mozart with slow tempo and minor 
mode. The authors found a correlation between the speed of the new piece (fast or slow) and the 
arousal levels reported by participants, and a correlation between the mode of the new piece (major or 
minor) and mood levels reported by participants. In general, participants had better performances at 
spatial-temporal reasoning tasks after listening to Mozart with fast tempo and major mode compared 
to the other three pieces. Arousal/mood levels were measured before and after subjects were exposed 
to the pieces and subjects reported higher levels of arousal and changes of mood after listening to 
Mozart with fast tempo and major mode. As a conclusion, the authors attribute the increase of 
performance at spatial-temporal reasoning tasks as a product of changes of arousal levels and mood in 
subjects, casting doubt on assumption VI. In the present study, the levels of arousal and mood were 
measured before and after exposure to stimuli. As a result, contrary to Husain et al.’s (2002) study, 
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there was no significant increase in arousal levels (in fact, there was a significant decrease in arousal 
levels after exposure to Metric Complex Music and Silence, but not to Metric Simple Music), and in 
terms of mood changes, it was only observed that Silence elicited significant alterations on the 
vigor/activity dimension, in which subjects reported feeling less active after remaining in silence. 
Since the experiment from the present study did not produce results similar to Husain et al’s (2002) in 
terms of arousal/mood changes, and the Mozart Effect was observed in Husain et al’s (2002) study but 
not in the present study, it can be hypothesized that arousal and mood changes are the reason for the 
Mozart Effect. The arousal/mood changes account for the Mozart Effect has been replicated elsewhere 
(Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999; Thompson, Schellenberg & Husain, 2001; Jones, West & Estell, 
2006). Apart from suggesting that assumption VI may not be true, the hypothesis described in this 
paragraph would also address to question C). For that question, the present hypothesis may suggest 
that perhaps there were no significant differences in performance after subjects listened to either the 
musical stimuli or remained in silence because there were no significant increases in arousal/mood 
levels, as observed in Husain et al.’s (2002) study.  
In line with the hypothesis described in the last paragraph, Nantais and Schellenberg (1999) compared 
subjects’ performance at spatial-temporal reasoning tasks after listening to Mozart’s music or to a 
narrated horror story by Stephen King. After completing the task, subjects rated which stimuli they 
preferred the most. While half of them preferred Mozart’s music, the other half preferred the horror 
story by Stephen King. As a result, authors found a correlation between preference of stimulus and 
performance, in which there was a Mozart effect for participants who preferred Mozart’s music and a 
Stephen King’s effect for those who preferred Stephen King’s story. In the present study, participants 
rated how much they enjoyed the stimuli after exposure. As a result, contrary to Nantais and 
Schellenberg’s (1999) study, there was no significant difference in valence ratings between stimuli, 
which suggests that subjects had no preference for any particular stimulus. These data suggest that, as 
subjects did not show preference for a particular stimulus, it could be the case that preference for 
stimulus is essential for the Mozart Effect, and possibly, one of the reasons why there was no increase 
of performance after exposure to musical stimuli in the present study. Like the hypothesis stated in the 
last paragraph, this hypothesis would also suggest that assumption VI is false and would also address 
to question C), suggesting that perhaps the lack of preference for a specific stimulus was the main 
responsible for the lack of Mozart Effect in the present study. 
In sum, from hypotheses 1), 2), and 3) outlined in the objectives and hypotheses section of the present 
work, only hypothesis 3), which predicted that the non-neural parts of the human body would play a 
constraining role in the cognitive task, was confirmed. According to data, the biomechanical 
constraints of the body seem to have played a constraining role in the MR of bodily-related pictures, 
since subjects took longer and were less accurate to emit a laterality judgment for limbs depicted in 
biomechanically awkward positions (e.g. 150º and 180º) compared to limbs depicted in canonical 
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position (0º). Thus, if hypothesis 3) is true, it could be concluded, at least based on the data from the 
experiment, that body as a constraint on cognition, a form of ECT, is true. As far as failure in 
observing hypotheses 2) and 3) concerns, whereas some of the hypotheses stated in this chapter that 
address to the failure in observing the Mozart Effect in the present study suggest that one or more 
assumptions (I-VI) may be false, others do not particularly dismiss them. Very importantly, due to 
lack of use of brain mapping techniques that would have shown which brain areas were activated 
while subjects either listened to the musical stimuli or underwent the MR of bodily-related pictures, 
some of the hypotheses raised in this section are just speculations and should be thoroughly 
investigated in future studies. Apart from the speculative hypotheses, based on this study’s data and on 
the Mozart Effect literature, there seems to be more solid pieces of evidence that suggest that the 
Mozart Effect may be an artifact or arousal/mood or subjects’ preference, since, as discussed, the 
absence of arousal/mood increase and preference for a particular stimulus may have been the 
responsible for the lack of Mozart Effect in the present study. However, until all other speculative 
hypotheses are appropriately addressed, it is too soon to conclude that performance enhancement at 
spatial-temporal reasoning and like-minded tasks are due to increases in arousal/mood levels or are an 
artifact of subjects’ personal preferences as suggested by some authors in the Mozart Effect literature 
(Chabris, 1999; Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999; Husain et al. 2002). 
 
2 Study limitations 
As mentioned in the discussion section of the present study, one major methodological limitation of 
the present study was the lack of employment of brain-mapping techniques, such as EEG, fMRI, PET 
Scan, TMS, etc. Due to the lack of use of these techniques, it was not possible to investigate which 
brain areas were recruited either while subjects listened to the auditory stimuli or during the MR of 
bodily-related pictures. As a result, some of the hypotheses that were drawn out to account for the 
failure in observing both hypotheses 1) and 2) outlined in the objectives and hypotheses section of the 
present study turn out to be speculations based on empirical findings or theoretical assumptions from 
studies described in the theoretical background section of this dissertation. Ultimately, due to the lack 
of objective verification of these speculative hypotheses, it is not possible to conclude what was the 
exact reason behind the failure in replicating the Mozart Effect in the present study. 
One of the hypotheses for the failure in replicating the Mozart effect outlined in the last section refers 
to the subjects recruited to participate in the present study. That is to say, subjects recruited for the 
experiments formed a homogenous group of students of Sports Science with no musical expertise, as 
they reported in the demographic questionnaire prior to attending the experiments. The specific 
hypothesis in question was that Grahn and Brett (2007) observed a significant difference in terms of 
cortical activation of areas such as the pre-SMA, SMA, Ventral Premotor Cortex, Mid-premotor 
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cortex, Cerebellum, the STG, PMd areas, areas of the Basal Ganglia, such as the Putamen and the 
Caudate between musicians and non-musicians while they listened to Metric Simple, Metric complex 
and Non-metric stimuli compared to rest. Thus, it could be the case that non-musicians did not have 
those areas sufficiently activated in order to enhance their subsequent performance at MR of bodily-
related pictures as musicians would possibly have had. Although the aim of the present study was not 
to particularly investigate differences between musicians and non-musicians at MR of bodily-related 
pictures, the lack of another group of subjects formed by musicians may not allow us to thoroughly 
investigate whether the specific hypothesis outlined in this paragraph is true.  
For this study, a counterbalanced paradigm was employed for the experiment. As stated in the 
methodological section of the present study, this paradigm was selected in the light of past studies 
about the Mozart Effect (Rauscher et al., 1993; Rideout et al., 1998; Gilleta et al., 2003) and studies 
that investigated the effects of music on imagery (e.g. Tham, 1994). The counterbalanced paradigm 
allows subjects to receive all experimental conditions, since the experimenter can assign each group to 
different experimental conditions and these conditions are altered along the experimental sessions. As 
Pollatsek and Well (1995) point out, within-subjects design allows for more powerful tests than 
between-subjects design. However, it could have been the case that a ‘demand effect’ emerged, in 
which subjects realized the experimenter’s intention (in this case, to assess performance at MR of 
bodily-related pictures after exposure to auditory stimuli) and, as a consequence, may have 
consciously/unconsciously changed their behavior while carrying out the task after they listened to a 
stimulus (Rosenthal, 1976; Charness, Gneezy & Kuhn, 2012). This change of subjects’ behavior may 
have limited the reliability of their performance.  
The measure of arousal changes both before and after subjects were exposed to any auditory stimulus 
may pose another limitation to the present study. As described in the methodological section of this 
study, the use of a self-report questionnaire to measure subjects’ arousal levels during the experiment 
was based on Husain et al’s (2002) study. In their study, Husain et al. (2002) claim that physiological 
measures of arousal may be often unreliable. Since this experiment employed a counterbalanced 
design, in which subjects were exposed to three different stimuli in different orders for three 
consecutive days, the possibility of subjects answering the SAM based on a comparison between the 
stimuli they have already been exposed to (for instance, subjects could have responded the SAM 
before and after they listened to Metric Complex Music based on the responses they had given on the 
day before when they had listened to Metric Simple Music) cannot be discarded. Also, as the present 
study did not measure arousal manifested in the physical dimension of the subject, such as HR, 
peripheral temperature, galvanic skin response through the employment of specific instruments that 
measure the body’s physiological signals (e.g. heart rate monitor), the subjects’ physical reactions in 
which arousal can be manifested upon (Kuan et al., 2018) were measured by subjects’ self-report 
through the SAM. 
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The experiment took place in a large room in the Polytechnic Institute of Castelo Branco. The room, 
however, was not acoustically isolated. Therefore, it cannot be fully discarded the hypothesis that 
outdoor noises and distractions could have influenced subjects performance at MR of bodily-related 
pictures (which requires concentration) or influenced the hearing of auditory stimuli, in special, when 
subjects remained in silence. Most studies about the Mozart Effect or studies that investigate about the 
imagery phenomenon take place in acoustically isolated rooms in order to keep subjects as 
concentrated as possible. However, an acoustically isolated room was not available for the experiment 
on the scheduled dates. 
The musical samples used in the experiment carried out in the present study were also limited to a 
specific musical genre. In this case, musical samples were limited to the genre minimalist/techno, in 
which the rhythmic structures were edited by the experimenter in order to create two versions of the 
same musical piece: one version would have Metric Simple rhythmic structures, and another would 
have Metric Complex rhythmic structures. This method was employed in order to verify whether 
changing the rhythmic elements of the music would suffice to result in subjects’ enhancement in 
performance in spatial-temporal reasoning tasks, in the light of assumptions IV and V. However, this 
selection limits the investigation of other possible variables that may account for other musical 
features that may be required to enhance subjects’ performance at the task, such as genre or other 
musical elements (e.g. melody, harmony, etc). A suggestion is made in the following section in order 
to address this limitation. 
   
3  Implications for future studies 
To this date, the present study is the first one to investigate the Mozart Effect on MR of bodily-related 
pictures. As previously discussed, the results shed light on a wide range of topics, such as ECT and 
conceptual embodiment, motor imagery, music perception and the Mozart Effect. Two hypotheses 
based on assumptions I-VI derived from the Theoretical Background and previous empirical studies 
were not confirmed, since the Mozart Effect was not observed in the present study. Failure in 
replicating the Mozart Effect then gave rise to several auxiliary hypotheses in order to provide a 
reasonable account for the lack of effect observed in the experiment’s results.  
As pointed out as one of the limitations of the present study, the lack of use of brain-mapping 
techniques has been crucial for the ultimate lack of confirmation of some of the hypotheses raised to 
account for the lack of the Mozart Effect. Thus, it would be methodologically valuable to include the 
use of one of these techniques (e.g. fMRI, PET Scan, EEG, etc.) in follow-up studies. The use of these 
tools would provide these follow-up studies with suggestive evidence regarding which brain areas 
were activated while subjects either during pre-treatment tasks (e.g. while subjects listen to auditory 
stimulus before carrying out the subsequent task) or during the task itself (e.g. MR of bodily-related 
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pictures, in the case of the present study). However, it is important to note some of the consequences 
that the employment of these techniques would bring for follow-up studies. Firstly, the use of these 
techniques would probably alter the experimental design of the experiments. In particular, the use of 
these techniques would probably result in a decrease of number of subjects to be recruited for the 
experiment. Although the use of these brain-mapping techniques has the advantages already pointed 
out in this paragraph, it is important to note that, apart from being expensive resources for an 
experimental study at times, they are also time-consuming resources. In that regard, for instance, an 
fMRI scanner may only accommodate one subject at the time, and since it is claimed in the Mozart 
Effect literature (e.g. Rauscher et al., 1993) that the effect takes place when subjects listen to the 
stimulus for 8-10 minutes, each subject would then have to spend 8-10 minutes inside the scanner. 
Also, fMRI scanners are noisy at times, so it would be convenient for experimenters to provide 
subjects with acoustically isolated headphones. Typically, studies that employ these brain-mapping 
techniques tend to recruit fewer subjects than studies that only measure subjects’ behavioral reactions 
in order to compensate for time constraints (e.g. Hamada et al., 2018), so the experimental design of 
this present study would probably be altered as a consequence of the employment of brain-mapping 
techniques. Secondly, still in line with the time constraints that the employment of these techniques 
might impose, a counterbalanced design would probably consume more time. Taking the fMRI 
scanner as an example, if subjects had to listen to three different auditory stimuli, each subject would 
have to spend a total of 24-30 minutes inside the scanner throughout three different days of 
experiment, increasing the time consumption in the pre-treatment phase. Thus, in this case, it would be 
convenient, perhaps, to change from a counterbalanced paradigm to a between-subjects paradigm, in 
subjects are randomly assigned to an experimental group and listen to the auditory stimulus that 
corresponds that that group. The between-subjects design, however, usually require a larger sample 
sizes to provide data with strong statistical power (Charness et al., 2012) compared to within-subjects 
designs, such as the counterbalanced design. Thus, if more subjects are required for the experiment, 
more time in the pre-treatment phase is required. Finally, when experimenter(s) opt to employ brain-
mapping techniques while subjects perform MR of bodily-related pictures or like-minded cognitive 
tasks, it should be considered that activation of motor areas would be likely to increase when subjects 
perform a motor action in order to provide with a response (e.g. pressing a keyboard key, pressing a 
pedal with the foot, etc.). This increase of activation due to motor action should be taken into 
consideration by the experimenter while carrying out data analysis in order to conclude which exact 
cortical areas were activated during the motor imagery process, and not during the motor action 
performance. As observed in the motor imagery section of the present study, not all areas involved in 
motor performance are involved in motor imagery, and activation during motor imagery typically 
accounts for 30% of brain activation in the motor areas compared to the physical execution 
counterpart (Roth et al., 1996; Jeannerod, 2001). 
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As far as the limitations of the musical samples used in the experiment carried out in the present study 
concern, in order to fully explore whether changing the rhythmic elements of a musical piece would 
suffice for the Mozart Effect, in the light of assumptions IV and V, the edition made to the musical 
pieces used in this study, in which the rhythmic structures of an original musical piece by Motorcity 
Soul were manipulated in order to create two different versions of the same piece, namely Metric 
Simple and Metric Complex versions, could have been applied to a larger extent of musical genres, 
such as Jazz Music, Rock’n’Roll, Samba, MPB, Classical Music, etc. This would probably demand a 
larger study with a larger sample size, but it would be interesting to explore whether manipulation of 
rhythmic structures could have led to a Mozart Effect whether applied to other musical genres rather 
than minimalist/techno. Likewise, other musical features could have been explored even limited to the 
specific musical piece adopted for the present study: in this case, the original piece could have had 
been manipulated in order to transform the complexity of the melody/harmony/pitch, etc. Again, this 
would require a larger study with a larger sample size. In sum, this study was limited to the 
investigation of whether listening to different rhythmic structures of the same musical piece would 
result in a Mozart Effect for one of the conditions (in this case, as hypothesized, the Metric Simple 
Music); this limitation in terms of musical features manipulated could be held responsible for the lack 
of Mozart Effect, as suggested in the discussion section. However, on a positive note, the manipulation 
of rhythmic structures applied in the present study may open new venues for investigation about the 
musical stimuli that may be used in experiments similar to the one conducted in this study.  
In line with the method employed in the present study to select the auditory stimuli, as observed in the 
discussion section, since there were no significant differences in valence ratings across musical stimuli 
and there was also no Mozart Effect, it could be the case that the Mozart Effect is an artifact of 
subjects’ auditory preferences, as suggested elsewhere (Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999). It would be 
interesting to further investigate whether applying the same editing method used in the present study 
to a musical piece that elicit subjects’ preferences (e.g. altering the rhythmic or another musical 
element of an original version) would influence subjects’ performance at the MR of bodily-related 
pictures compared to the original musical piece, another piece that may not elicit subjects’ preferences 
(edited or not, or even both) and control conditions. By doing this, it would be possible to investigate 
whether changing a specific musical feature of a musical piece that elicits subjects’ preference would 
increase performance at a subsequent cognitive test. Alternatively, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether two different musical pieces that elicits similar levels of subjects’ preferences 
would differ in terms of enhancing subjects’ performance at a subsequent test. In line with the 
preference hypothesis, it is also hypothesized that changes in arousal/mood levels are responsible for 
the Mozart Effect (Husain et al., 2002). This hypothesis could be studied in depth, since it could be 
investigated whether two different musical stimuli that elicit similar changes in arousal/mood levels 
lead to differences in performances at the task, or which musical genre elicits the arousal/mood levels 
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that would set subjects onto an optimal state before task completion. These suggestions, however, may 
slightly depart from the investigation on the effects of music listening on motor imagery-based tasks, 
such as MR of bodily-related pictures. Thus, these studies would also have to take into account and 
investigate the role of musical preferences or changes in arousal/mood levels provoked by the music 
over motor imagery.   
As mentioned in the section regarding the limitations of the present study, it was recruited a 
homogeneous group of students of Sports Science to take part in the experiment. As subjects 
mentioned in a demographic questionnaire prior to the experimental sessions, none had previous 
musical experience, therefore, the group was formed by non-musicians. Also, as stated in the 
discussion section, one hypothesis that may account for the lack of Mozart Effect relates to the ability 
of sportsmen/sports students in tasks such as MR (Pietsch & Jansen, 2011), leaving no much space for 
improvement across exposure to different auditory stimuli. In sum, it would be interesting to see 
follow-up studies comparing differences in performance at MR of bodily-related parts after exposure 
to auditory stimuli between two or more homogeneous group. One suggestion would be to select 
similar groups of subjects as Pietsch and Jansen (2011) selected for their experiment. In that study, 
Pietsch and Jansen (2011) selected groups of students of education, sports and music. As a result, they 
observed that students of sports and music outperformed the education students. However, their 
experiment did not involve any auditory stimulus, only a MR task of cubes. It would be interesting, 
thus, to investigate how these three or more different homogeneous groups would perform at the MR 
of bodily-related pictures. In line with this suggestion, it would be also interesting to investigate 
whether other variables may influence on performance at MR of bodily-related pictures after subjects 
listened to auditory stimuli, such as handedness, gender, age, ethnic background, etc. Some studies 
regarding these variables have been performed for MR (e.g. Pietsch & Jansen, 2018), gender (Gilleta 
et al., 2003), ethnic background (Jansen, Paes, Hoja & Machado, 2019) and age (Berg, Hertzog & 
Hunt, 1982). However these studies only investigated the effect of these variables over MR tasks or 
the Mozart Effect alone, and not combined, as proposed by the present study.    
Finally, regarding the specific task employed in the present study, namely the MR of bodily-related 
pictures, it would also be interesting to see follow-up studies approaching other means to assess the 
effects of music on motor imagery or, perhaps, the Mozart effect over distinct categories of imagery. 
Thus, a similar study to Kosslyn et al’s. (1998) could be carried out, in which subjects were asked to 
carry out a MR of cubes either by imagining if they were physically rotating the cubes or by imagining 
an exogenous force, say, an electric motor, performing the task. Applied to the present investigation, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether the Mozart Effect emerges for one group that employed a 
specific strategy to accomplish the task. Another venue of research would be to employ other tasks 
rather than MR of bodily-related pictures or even MR of cubes and other inanimate objects. For 
instance, studies like Kuan et al.’s (2018), Karageorghis and Lee (2001), and Debarnot and Guillot 
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(2013), in which it was investigated how the music would affect motor imagery performance and, 
consequently, physical performance. Although these studies slightly depart from the Mozart Effect in 
terms of methods and investigation venues, they seem to be reliable means to assess the effects of 
music on motor imagery.  
In sum, due to the novelty of the present study, as some of the hypotheses were not confirmed by the 
data, a vast amount of questions regarding the theoretical assumptions and methodological framework 
that laid foundations for the present experiment can be raised. These questions are essential in order to 
guide future research on ECT, conceptual embodiment, motor imagery, MR, music perception, and the 
Mozart Effect, and aid in the setting up of experimental procedures that may thoroughly investigate 
these topics combined, as the present study attempted to do.   
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V. Conclusion 
The present study aimed to investigate the effect of listening to musical pieces with different rhythmic 
structures on a cognitive task that relies upon motor imagery mechanisms, namely, MR of bodily-
related pictures. This investigation was motivated by a wide range of topics within the ECT and Music 
Psychology literature. Firstly, findings from empirical studies within the ECT suggest that body can 
play a constitutive and a constraining role on cognition, and that motor concepts are grounded in 
modality-specific systems of the brain, namely, the motor cortices (Barsalou, 1999; Wilson and 
Foglia, 2017). These motor concepts are claimed to be used while we perform motor imagery, the 
simulation of our own bodily movements (Jeannerod, 2001). Likewise, MR of bodily-related tasks 
seems to rely on motor imagery mechanisms to be performed (Parsons et al., 1995). Secondly, 
perception of the rhythmic elements of the music seems to activate the motor cortices, in which the 
degree of activation varies according to the rhythmic complexity of the stimulus (Grahn & Brett, 
2007). Finally, one account for the Mozart Effect suggests that subjects have increased performance at 
spatial-temporal reasoning tasks due to the priming of cortical areas involved in the task elicited by 
Mozart’s or similar music (Rauscher et al., 1993). 
Based on these findings, a MR of bodily-related pictures was carried out, in which subjects performed 
the task after listening to musical pieces that varied in rhythmic complexity. One out of three 
hypotheses raised was confirmed, suggesting that the biomechanical constraints of subjects’ bodies 
have played a constraining role on task. The other two hypotheses, however, were not observed, 
failing in the replication of the Mozart Effect. This lack of Mozart Effect gave rise to several auxiliary 
and speculative hypotheses, in which the hypothesis with stronger pieces of evidence was that the 
Mozart Effect is due to differences in arousal/mood changes or is an artifact of subjects’ preferences. 
Future research should thoroughly address the hypotheses raised in order to account for the failure to 
replicate the Mozart Effect in the present study. It is strongly suggested that brain-mapping techniques 
such as PET Scan, fMRI, EEG are employed in follow-up studies in order to further investigate which 
brain mechanisms are activated in the tasks proposed in the present study, namely, auditory listening 
and MR of bodily-related pictures. Apart from combining methods from Cognitive Psychology and 
Cognitive Neuroscience, the addition of brain-mapping techniques would provide a greater 
understanding about ECT, conceptual embodiment, motor imagery, music perception and the Mozart 
Effect, and therefore, would provide clearer pieces of evidence of why the Mozart Effect did not 
emerge in the present study.  
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Appendix I – Demographic Questionnaire + informed consent (in European Portuguese) 
ESTUDO SOBRE TAREFAS DE ROTAÇÃO MENTAL DE IMAGENS CORPORAIS 
 
Prezado(a),  
Sou estudante de Mestrado em Ciência Cognitiva pela Universidade de Lisboa. Gostaria de o(a) 
convidar para participar de um estudo que estou a desenvolver para a minha dissertação de 
Mestrado, que terá como foco a investigação de processos de formação de imagens mentais a partir 
da execução de tarefas de rotação mental de imagens de membros do corpo humano. 
As informações colhidas neste questionário bem como as respostas dadas ao longo das tarefas de 
rotação mental serão mantidas sob sigilo, somente utilizadas para fins de recolha de dados para o 
posterior desenvolvimento da Dissertação.   
A experiência consistirá em escutar trechos de peças musicais e realizar, posteriormente, tarefas de 
rotação mental de imagens do corpo.  
As respostas pertinentes às tarefas de rotação mental devem ser adequadas às instruções 
estabelecidas antes do início da sessão prática e da sessão crítica da experiência, pelo que se 
aconselha a leitura atenta de cada uma das introduções. 
Previsivelmente, a experiência demorará entre 30 a 40 minutos a ser executada, podendo ser 
pausada a qualquer momento caso o experimentador e/ou o(s)/a(s) participantes julguem 
necessário. IMPORTANTE: A experiência exigirá a participação do participante pelo período total de 
3 (dias) consecutivos. 
Caso haja alguma dúvida, contacte o experimentador. 
Bom trabalho! 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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DECLARAÇÃO DE CONSENTIMENTO INFORMADO 
“Motor Imagery and Music: the influence of music on Mental Rotation tasks in the light of 
Embodied Cognition Theory” 
Declaro ter tomado conhecimento e aceitar participar, voluntariamente, num estudo que tem por 
objectivo a investigação de processos imagéticos a partir da execução de tarefas de rotação mental 
de imagens corporais . Para esse efeito, aceito que sejam feitas as tarefas de rotação mental após a 
escuta de estímulos musicais conforme acima mencionado.  
Autorizo que os dados obtidos sejam armazenados de acordo com legislação em vigor, podendo 
apenas ser utilizados para o estudo acima. Poderei, no entanto, revogar a autorização para utilização 
dos meus dados em qualquer momento. 
Declaro ainda que os resultados dos estudos realizados com os meus dados poderão ser usados em 
comunicações e publicações científicas de forma anónima. 
O estudo proposto foi-me claramente explicado e tive oportunidade de colocar questões. Recebi 
uma cópia desta declaração devidamente assinada e datada. 
 
 
Data, Nome e assinatura do participante/seu representante legal  
 
 
 
Discuti este estudo com o participante, utilizando uma linguagem compreensível e apropriada. 
Informei adequadamente o participante sobre a natureza deste estudo e sobre os seus possíveis 
benefícios e riscos. Considero que o participante compreendeu a minha explicação. 
 
 
Data, Nome e assinatura do Professor/Investigador responsável 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
iv 
 
DADOS DO(A) PARTICIPANTE 
 
Nome: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Idade:        0 a 14 anos        15 – 24 anos        25 - 54 anos        55 – 65 anos        +65 anos 
 
Gênero:           Masculino   Feminino 
 
Estado Civil:          Solteiro(a)         Casado(a)        Divorciado(a)/Separado(a)        Viúvo(a) 
 
Nacionalidade: ________________________________ 
 
Possui algum problema de saúde?  
         Não 
         Sim. Qual(is)? _______________________________________________________ 
 
Possui algum déficit auditivo? 
         Não  
         Sim 
 
Possui algum déficit visual? 
         Não 
         Sim 
HISTÓRICO E PREFERÊNCIAS MUSICAIS 
Você gosta de escutar música? 
       Sim   Não 
 
v 
 
Qual(is) é (são) o(s) seu(s) gênero(s) musical(is) favorito(s)? 
       Música Clássica         Pop Music          Country Music         Jazz Music        Blues 
       Rap/Hip-Hop       Rock/Classic Rock         Techno/Dance      Outros 
 
Com qual periodicidade você costuma escutar música? 
       Todos os dias 
       3 vezes por semana 
       2 vezes por semana 
       1 vez por semana 
       Algumas vezes ao mês 
       Outros 
 
Por quantas horas diárias você costuma escutar música? 
       Não escuto diariamente 
       1 hora 
       2 horas  
       3 horas 
       4 horas ou mais 
 
 
Você costuma escutar música enquanto desempenha as seguintes tarefas? 
        Estudar     Trabalhar         Praticar desporto       Meditar  Conduzir automóveis 
        Dançar     Praticar atividades religiosas              Outros 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Você toca algum instrumento musical? 
        Sim. Qual? ___________________________ 
        Não 
 
Você já estudou música? 
        Sim, por um ano 
        Sim, por dois anos 
        Sim, por três anos 
        Sim, por cinco anos ou mais 
        Nunca 
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Appendix II – European Portuguese version for the MIQ3 
Movement Imagery Questionnaire-3, versão portuguesa 
Questionário Completo com Instruções 
Instruções  
Este questionário diz respeito a duas formas de desempenho mental de movimentos, as quais são usados 
por algumas pessoas mais que outras, e são mais indicadas para alguns tipos de movimentos do que 
outros. Primeiro tenta-se formar uma imagem visual ou a figura do movimento na mente. Segundo tenta-
se sentir a execução da ação sem realmente realizar o movimento. Será solicitado para realizares ambas 
as tarefas mentais em movimentos variados neste questionário, e de seguida classificar qual a 
facilidade/dificuldade encontrada na realização das tarefas. As classificações que atribuíres não estão 
designadas para avaliar a facilidade ou dificuldade da forma como realizas-te as tarefas mentais. Elas são 
tentativas para descobrir a capacidade individual para a realização das tarefas para movimentos 
diferentes. Não existem classificações certas ou erradas ou classificações melhores que outras.  
Cada uma das seguintes declarações descreve uma ação particular ou movimento. Lê cada declaração 
cuidadosamente e de seguida realiza o movimento como é descrito. Realiza o movimento uma única vez. 
Retorna para a posição inicial como se fosses realizar a ação, uma segunda vez. Depois, dependendo do 
que te for pedido para realizar, ou (1) formar de forma clara e vivída, quanto possível, a imagem visual do 
movimento realizada apenas a partir de uma perspetiva interna (i.e. a partir da perspetiva da 1ª pessoa, 
como se estivesses realmente dentro de ti realizando e vendo a ação através dos teus olhos), (2) formar 
de forma clara e vivida, quanto possível, a imagem visual do movimento realizada apenas a partir de uma 
perspetiva externa (i.e. a partir da perspetiva da 3ª pessoa, como se te estivesses a ver num DVD), ou (3) 
tentar sentir-te a realizar o movimento acabado de executar sem realmente realizá-lo.  
Após teres completado a tarefa mental requerida, classifica a facilidade/dificuldade com que foste capaz 
de realizar a tarefa. Tira a tua classificação a partir da escala fornecida. Tenta ser o mais preciso possível e 
leva o tempo que sentires necessário para chegares à classificação adequada para cada movimento. 
Podes escolher a mesma classificação para qualquer número de movimentos “vistos” ou “sentidos” e não 
é necessário utilizar toda a amplitude da escala.  
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
Appendix III – Bodily-related pictures used in the critical trials 
0º: 
 
 
30º: 
 
 
60º: 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
90º: 
 
 
120º 
 
 
150º 
 
 
xv 
 
180º 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xvi 
 
Appendix IV – Bodily-related pictures used in the practice trials 
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Appendix V – SAM for arousal levels (in European Portuguese) 
 
“Motor Imagery and Music: the influence of music on Mental Rotation tasks in the light of 
Embodied Cognition Theory” 
 
A escala disponível abaixo tem como objetivo mensurar o nível de activação psicofisiológica que você 
está a sentir neste determinado momento. 
Em relação à ativação psicofisiológica, aponte o seu nível de activação mediante a escala de 1 a 9 
disponível abaixo, onde a nota 1 equivale a “Extremamente calmo”, e a nota  9= “Extremamente 
activado”. Por exemplo, utilize as notas de 1 a 9 como referência quantitativa para emitir uma 
resposta referente ao teu respetivo estado de activação psicofisiológica.  
É de se salientar que não existe resposta certa ou errada, apenas a tua resposta! 
Bom Trabalho!  
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Appendix VI – POMS ( in European Portuguese) 
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Appendix VII – SAM for Valence (in European Portuguese) 
 
Valência 
Nesta página, você irá apontar o grau de valência correspondente ao estímulo ao qual você agora foi 
submetido.  
O grau de valência corresponde ao quão agradável você considera o estímulo, sendo que você irá, 
novamente, indicar uma nota dentro de uma escala de 0 a 9. Por exemplo, para um estímulo que 
consideres ser nem agradável nem desagradável, pode-se atribuir ao mesmo um valor médio na 
escala (por exemplo, 5), no intuito de refletir a avaliação do estímulo como "neutro". 
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Appendix VIII – 9-point Likert-Scale for beat perception (in European Portuguese) 
 
Estímulos musicais 
Para a questão abaixo, considere o termo ''batida'' como notas rítmicas que marcam o andamento 
métrico dentro do tempo de uma música, sendo, por muitas vezes, um pulso estável e regular que 
ocorre ao longo da música. O termo ''ritmo", por outro lado, é o fluxo da música ao longo do tempo, 
usualmente construído sobre as batidas do respectivo estímulo musical. Aponte um valor na escala 
abaixo, onde 1 equivale a “Não consegui sentir/acompanhar as batidas da música em nenhum 
momento” e 9 equivale a “Consegui sentir/acompanhar as batidas da música em todos os 
momentos”. 
 
Questão: Em uma escala de 1 a 9, qual foi o grau de dificuldade para sentir/acompanhar as 
batidas desta música?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consegui sentir/acompanhar as 
batidas durante todos os 
momentos da música  
Não consegui sentir/acompanhar as 
batidas em nenhum momento 
durante a música 
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Glossary for musical terminologies 
 
Accent: Acoustic event that is more salient than its surrounding context, caused by differences in 
physical properties of the sound, such as pitch, intensity or timbre, or by the variation in the grouping 
structure of a rhythm, e.g. its beats (Bouwer et al., 2018). 
Bar (measure): In music notation, bars are vertical lines marked on a stave to denote the point of 
metrical division of a musical piece, in which a specific number of musical sounds (musical notes, 
beats, etc.) are organized within this measure, according to a time signature (Kennedy, 1980). Figure 
6.1 depicts examples of bars. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Types of bar lines. The Standard is a bar that indicates the end of a measure. The Double 
bar indicates the end of a section. The End bar indicates the end of a musical piece. The Begin Repeat 
and End Repeat indicate a measure that should be played twice by the musician (or as many times as 
indicated). Image retrieved from www.mightyexpert.com on 31
st
 August, 2019.    
     
Beat: The basic unit of measure of rhythmic pulse in music. Groups of beats embedded in a 
hierarchical organization (metrical system) underlie rhythm. For instance, in a waltz, usually notated 
as a triple meter (3/4), there are 3 beats to the bar (Kennedy, 1980; Bower et al., 2018).     
Harmony: Two or more musical sounds superimposed or occurring simultaneously through 
frequencies, pitches or chords (Malm, 1996). 
Inter Onset Temporal Intervals: “A series of successive notes (of equal durational value) which act 
as a perceptual ground in which to track the various durational periodicities of metric and rhythmic 
cycles” (Jordan, 2014, p. viii). 
Melody: Succession of simple sounds and silence produced by a single voice or instrument that the 
listener perceives as a single entity. Series of successive sounds and silence that form a tune, phrase or 
motive of a musical piece (Stainer & Barrett, 2009).   
Meter (metric): “Timing framework under which a pattern of rhythmic durations is understood. 
Meter organizes the perceived series of beats into regularly repeating patterns of stressed and 
xxiv 
 
unstressed beats” (Levitin et al., p. 53). This recurring pattern of beats is generally indicated by time 
signature that appears at the beginning of the composition. Meter is usually classified by the number 
of beats per measure and the correspondent unit of subdivision of the beat, such as, for instance, duple 
meter (each measure divided into two beats, or a multiple number; e.g. 2/2 time signature), triple meter 
(each measure divided into three beats, or a multiple number; e.g. 3/4 time signature), quadruple meter 
(each measure divided into four beats, or a multiple number; e.g. 4/4 time signature), quintuple meters, 
sextuple, etc.(Benward & Saker, 2003). Figure 6.2 depicts an example of a quadruple meter. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Depiction of a quadruple meter. Inside the rectangle there is the time signature of the 
designated bar with four musical notes, namely a 4/4 time signature. The number four at the top refers 
to the number of beats (in this case, four beats) to occur within that measure. The number four at the 
bottom corresponds to the unit of subdivision of the beat being counted; in this case, a quarter note 
(the musical symbol within the circle at the far right of the bar) is the musical symbol that corresponds 
to one unit of beat in a quadruple meter. Music sheet rendered through ww.noteflight.com 
 
Offbeat: In a quadruple-meter, usually the first beat of the group of four beats within the bar 
(measure) is the strongest accented one, as observed in Grahn and Brett’s (2007) study. Likewise, 
subdivisions of the beat within the meter (such as eight notes or sixteenth notes, in the case of a 
quadruple-meter) may fall in between two beats within the measure, being also characterized as 
offbeat. Figure 6.3 provides an example of offbeat notes within a 4/4 measure.  
 
Figure 6.3: A quadruple-meter measure (bar) with a grouping of beats. The symbol inside the triangle 
is a symbol of a musical pause of a quarter note in the place correspondent to the first beat of the bar. 
Inside the square there are two eight notes, which have shorter durations than the quarter notes (e.g. 
xxv 
 
the third note inside the circle is a quarter note) and an accented beat is placed in the second beat 
inside the square, characterized as an accented offbeat. Finally, the two figures at the right hand side 
are a pause of an eight note and an eight note (inside the rectangle). The note inside the rectangle can 
be seen as another example of an offbeat within this particular meter. Musical sheet rendered through 
www.noteflight.com  
 
Pitch: Location of the sound on a tonal scale according to the rate of vibrations produced by source of 
the sound, in which fast vibrations yield high-pitched sounds and slow vibrations produced low-
pitched sounds. The rate of vibration per second is known as the frequency of the sound waves, 
quantified as Hertz (Hz; Kennedy, 1980).    
Rhythm: Pattern of time intervals demarcating a sequence of stimulus events, perceived as points in 
time (e.g. units of beats grouped together within a meter). Constituted by distinct temporal sub-units 
that contribute to the organization and perception of rhythm in music, such as pattern, meter and 
tempo (Thaut, Trimarchi & Parsons, 2014; Levitin et al., 2018).  
Tempo: Rate of speed of a musical piece, usually measured by beats per minute (BPM). Different 
rates of speed at which the musical piece is being played are most commonly characterized by Italian 
terms such as, for instance, prestissimo (200-208 BPM), presto (168-200 BPM), allegro (120-168), 
moderato (108-120 BPM), andante (76-108 BPM), adagio (66-76 BPM), larghetto (60-66 BPM) and 
largo (40-60 BPM; Randel, 1986).   
 
 
 
 
 
